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Introduction: Payment for performance (P4P) involves the allocation of financial 
incentives to health workers and/or facilities for reaching pre-defined performance targets 
or measures. P4P has been used in high-income countries (HICs) to improve healthcare 
quality, and recently has been applied in low-and middle-income countries (LMICs) to 
improve the coverage and quality of health services and strengthen health systems.  The 
available evidence on the effect of P4P is mixed, but with some promising results of 
improvements in the incentivised indicators. However, most evaluations of P4P have 
focused on average programme effects on the incentivised services, paying little attention 
to distributional effects of P4P. Specifically, little is known about the effects of P4P on 
structural quality of care (e.g. availability of medical commodities), and similarly on the 
understanding of the heterogeneity of the P4P effects among subgroups of providers and 
populations. This PhD work aims to fill that knowledge gap. It estimates the effect of P4P 
on the availability and stock-out of medical commodities, and examine the differential 
effects of P4P across subgroups of health facilities and populations in Tanzania. 
 
Data sources: The study collected data in intervention and control areas through facility 
and household surveys, and facility payments data from administrative records. Baseline 
data were collected in January 2012 with a follow-up 13 months later. Facility survey 
across 150 facilities (75 facilities from each study arm) included data on the availability 
and stock-out of medical commodities (drugs, supplies and equipment), and facility 
characteristics. Household survey across 3000 women who delivered within 12 months 
prior to the survey (20 women per facility catchment area), and a similar sample size in 
the follow-up survey, captured information about individual and household characteristics 
and maternal and child health service utilisation.  
 
Analyses: A difference-in-differences (DID) regression model was used to estimate the 
average effects of P4P on the availability and stock-out of medical commodities (Paper I). 
The DID model was further extended by including a three-way interaction term (i.e. 
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average effect and subgroup indicator) to capture the differential effects of P4P across 
facilities’ subgroups (Paper I and II), and across populations subgroups (Paper III). 
Assessment of differential effects were based on outcomes which improved significantly 
due to P4P (i.e. availability of drugs and supplies, institutional delivery rates and uptake/ 
provision of antimalarial drugs during antenatal care (ANC)). Descriptive measures of 
inequality were also used to assess the distribution of facility payouts across facilities’ 
subgroups (Paper II).  
 
Results: Paper I reports that P4P improved the availability of drugs and supplies and 
reduced their stock-out rates, but had no effect on the availability of medical equipment. 
The improved effects were generally similar across facilities, but relatively higher among 
facilities serving a poor population and located in rural areas. Paper II finds that facility 
payments were initially higher among higher level facilities (hospitals and health centres 
than dispensaries), the better resourced than worse resourced facilities, and facilities 
serving wealthier than poorer populations, but these inequalities in payouts declined over 
time. The effect of P4P on institutional delivery rates was greater among facilities with 
low baseline performance, serving middle wealth populations, located in rural areas, than 
among their counterparts; whereas the effect on provision of antimalarial drugs was 
similar across facilities subgroups. Paper III finds that the effect of P4P on institutional 
deliveries was greater among women in the poorest households, who lived in rural areas 
and who did not have health insurance than among their counterparts. P4P effect on the 
uptake of antimalarial drugs was equally distributed across population subgroups. 
 
Conclusion: The study findings suggest that the P4P programme can improve structural 
quality of care in terms of the availability of medical commodities. It can further enhance 
more equitable performance among facilities as the worse-off providers improved most in 
this study. Similarly, P4P can enhance equitable service utilisation since the service use 
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1.0  Introduction 
 
1.1  Health system challenges 
A health system consists of organisations, institutions, resources, people and actions 
whose primary purpose is to promote, restore or maintain people’s health [1]. A health 
system is made up of six building blocks: service delivery, health workforce, information 
system, medical supplies and drugs, financing, and governance [2]. A functioning health 
system is fundamental to people’s health. However, most health systems especially in 
developing countries suffer from various challenges including insufficient resources, 
limited government accountability, inadequate service delivery, poor information 
systems, inadequate supply of medicine, and limited technology. The failures within 
health systems lead to poor health outcomes and persistent inequities in health status [3]. 
For example, inadequate financial and human resources leads to poor health service 
quality and quantity and ultimately poor health outcomes [4-6].  
 
In terms of service delivery, having health systems that can deliver quality health services 
efficiently and equitably are critical for achieving improved health outcomes and financial 
protection [2]. However, poor service quality and insufficient coverage of life-saving 
interventions exist in most settings. In low-and middle-income country (LMIC) settings, 
for example, the performance of health systems is critical as resources for health are much 
more constrained in these settings. In fact, improving the performance of healthcare 
delivery systems is an important objective globally [7, 8]. Thus, it is necessary to allocate 
the available human and financial resources efficiently and equitably while improving the 
health system performance [9-11].  
 
Most health systems face the problem of a shortage and retention of health workers, 
especially in poor settings [12-16]. However, it has been shown that it is possible to 
increase health care supply with the given stock of health workers, since they perform 
below their capacity on service delivery [17, 18]. Indeed research has shown there is 
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typically a gap between what health workers know how to do and what they actually do 
for their patients [8, 17, 19, 20]. The gap between knowledge and practice is largely due 
to low motivation and absenteeism among health care providers, as well as limited 
resources for health in low-income settings [21]. To avoid wastage of resources or 
inefficacies in providers’ performance, there is an urgent need to improve health worker 
productivity. The approach of paying providers based on their performance or results has 
been suggested to redress the concerns of absenteeism, low motivation and poor 




1.2  Payment for performance (P4P) strategy 
P4P is a financing strategy which involves financial incentives being rewarded to health 
workers and/ or facilities for reaching pre-specified performance measures or targets 
related to quality and quantity of health services. P4P involves purchasing of identified set 
of health services and quality. Purchasing refers to the process by which funds are 
allocated to healthcare providers to obtain services on behalf of identified groups or the 
entire population [1, 10, 23]. Purchasing can be done passively or strategically. Passive 
purchasing implies following a predetermined budget/ simply paying bill when presented, 
while strategic purchasing involves a continuous search for the best ways to maximise 
health system performance by deciding which interventions or services should be 
purchased, how and from whom [1].  
 
In most countries, health care systems have traditionally been financed by paying for 
inputs (e.g. human resources, drugs, supplies, infrastructure, etc.) and this approach is 
considered as passive purchasing of health care services [10, 23]. There is, however, an 
increasing trend in applying an approach of paying for results (e.g. P4P approach) –that 
pays based on results on various aspects such as service delivery, consultations, service 
quality and coverage. Thus, P4P is considered as active and strategic purchasing [9, 10, 
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23]. P4P approach is largely implemented as an additional to input-based financing, and is 
taken forward due to slow and insufficient progress on health-related Millennium 
Development Goals and Sustainable Development Goals especially in LMICs [22, 24-26]. 
It is also one of the strategies developed to improve performance of healthcare providers 
[22, 27]. P4P is based on the notion that providing financial incentives to health providers 
based on performance will motivate them to exert more effort to achieve better outcomes 
[27-29].   
 
The P4P approach started in high-income countries (HICs), especially in the United States 
and in the United Kingdom, with the aim of improving healthcare quality [30-32]. To 
date, P4P has increasingly been used in LMICs to improve coverage and quality of health 
services, as well as to reform and strengthen health systems [22, 28, 33]. In this way, P4P 
facilitates the progress to achieve health-related development goals [22, 28, 33]. 
 
There are several terminologies referring to paying for results, which are commonly used 
and sometimes used interchangeably in literature [28, 33, 34]. These include results-based 
financing (RBF), performance-based financing (PBF), payment for performance (P4P), 
conditional cash transfer (CCT), cash on delivery and others. The RBF is a broad term 
which involves a cash payment or non-monetary transfer made to a national or sub-
national government, manager, provider, payer or consumer of health services after 
predefined results have been reached and verified [34]. The RBF strategy incorporates 
both the demand-side and supply-side incentive programmes. Specifically, the demand-
side programmes such as the CCT and voucher schemes, rewards patients for improved 
behaviour and health outcomes. On the other hand, the supply-side programmes such as 
PBF and P4P, rewards health workers/ facilities based on their performance. The focus of 







1.3  P4P theoretical perspective 
The economic justification of provider P4P programmes is based on agency theory, i.e. 
the principal-agent theory [35-37]. This theory describes a principal-agent relationship, 
which involves the principal (employer or payer) and the agent (employee or service 
provider). In the health sector, there are multiple principals and multiple agents, including 
the provider being the agent of the patient/ payer [21]. The principal-agent relationship is 
directed at the agency relationship, such that the principal delegates a task and authority 
to the agent who receives a compensation for doing that task. However, this relationship 
is faced with a problem, the principal-agent problem, that is based on two sources [35, 
38]. First, the interests/ preferences of the principal and agent on the goals of the 
organisation are not perfectly aligned and independent. For instance, service provider 
(agent) may not perfectly act on behalf of the payer/ patient (principal) [39]. Second, there 
is an information asymmetry between the principal and agent. Specifically, the principal 
faces imperfect information about the effort exerted by the provider (agent), principal 
cannot observe and reward the effort of the agent, and the agent/ provider is risk averse 
[35-37, 40, 41].  
 
The principal-agent theory therefore recommends linking financial incentives with some 
performance measures, as for P4P approach, in order to align the agent’s objective 
function with the principal’s (i.e. increasing outputs or outcome) [38, 42]. Financial 
incentives are applied in the principal-agent model based on two assumptions [38]: 
financial incentives triggers greater motivation to produce the output that the organisation 
cares for, and greater motivation leads to better performance. In particular, P4P approach 
addresses the principal-agent problem through incentive contracting, that is, by adding a 
conditional incentive to the principal-agent contract [43]. The principal attempts to 
structure the contractual relationship for an agent to perform the desired work by the 
principal [44], and in a way that the objectives of both principal and agent are fully 
aligned [40]. As a result, P4P relies on the assumption that the incentives or payments 
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conditional on performance will enhance desired behaviours with few unwanted effects 
[45]. Despite the focus on financial incentives driven from the principal-agent theory to 
address the agency problem, there is evidence that other forms of motivation apart from 
financial incentive (e.g. good leadership and supportive management) also matters [46-
48].   
 
 
1.4  P4P design and structure 
The design and structure of P4P varies in many ways across settings. There are several 
varieties of design features and structures to consider when designing an incentive scheme 
as described elsewhere [19, 27, 49-52]. These includes the frequency of payment, size of 
payment, target setting for rewards, incentive based on loss or gain, and individual or 
group incentives. For the interest of this thesis, one of the design elements, i.e. the target 
setting or rewarding system, is discussed below along with potential implications for 
providers’ response. P4P schemes can reward using, for example, fee-for-service, relative 
performance, single absolute threshold targets, multiple thresholds targets, or 
geographical/ equity targeting [27, 33, 49, 50, 53]. Each approach is described further 
below. 
 
A fee-for-service approach involves purchasing from the first service provided/ 
consultation (e.g. outpatient visit), and at the same value for each subsequent service 
provided [33, 54]. As this approach leads to more services provision and increases 
coverage, most P4P schemes in LMICs use a fee-for-service approach that is conditional 
on quality performance scores [33]. A relative performance target, or tournament 
approach, involves ranking participants based on their performance and rewarding a share 
of top performers (e.g. top 10% of providers) [27, 50]. This approach sometimes includes 
penalties for lower performers, and eventually encourages competition, and has been 
applied in the United States [55]. An absolute target uses a single threshold target, e.g. 
>75% of immunised children, meaning that only providers who can immunise more than 
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75% of children are rewarded. This absolute or linear target can enhance divergence in 
performance if some providers are far above or below the target [19, 49, 50, 56, 57]. 
Improvement is most likely for providers/facilities closest to the threshold target. Top 
performers have no incentive to improve, and those far below the target are likely to 
perceive it as unattainable, a phenomenon referred to as “goal-gradient” theory [56]. A 
further approach is the use of multiple thresholds targets which rewards improvements 
and features all providers in the performance. Some evidence suggests that multiple 
thresholds targets can enhance convergence in performance [27, 49, 53]. This is because 
they account for baseline performance and provide incentives for lower performers to 
catch up. Lastly, geographical or equity target aims to improve equity by providing high 




1.5  P4P and health systems 
Health systems in HICs are performing relatively better than in LMICs [5]. Thus, this 
sub-section focuses on P4P and health systems in LMICs, since P4P schemes aim to 
strengthen and reform health systems in these settings. P4P as implemented in LMICs is a 
reform package with a range of potential attributes to strengthen the health systems [22, 
28]. P4P as a reform package ensures the relationship between organisational units within 
a health system is based on contractual terms with clearly defined performance targets or 
measures, and gives organisation units substantial decision rights (autonomy) over their 
resources [21, 22]. P4P schemes incorporate not only financial incentives but also other 
health systems’ elements (e.g. verification, supervision, health management information 
systems, financial management through bank accounts, accountability, etc.). Although 
health systems in LMICs are characterised by complexity, the effects of P4P on health 




P4P through contractual performance incentives can impact the health system through 
additional financing, improved availability of medical commodities, improved 
governance and accountability, and improved human resource’s productivity. The effects 
on health system financing can be through the bonus payments among health workers and 
additional resourcing earmarked to the health facility for facility improvement. Health 
system financing can also be affected through P4P when providers’ attempt to increase 
user fees to boost facility revenue, encourage enrolment in health insurance schemes, or 
reduce user fees to attract more patients for performance improvement. The effect on 
medical commodities can be realised, for example, through incentivising provision of 
drugs to patients; through facility-level bonus payments which can be used to procure 
commodities which are commonly out of stock; and by incentivising regional and district 
health managers to reduce drug stock-out rates. The health system effects through 
reallocation of resources at the facility or district level are possible, because P4P gives 
organisational units substantial decision rights or autonomy over their resources [22, 33].  
 
P4P can affect health system governance through increased supervision, verification of 
performance data, transparency and accountability [22, 28]. Accountability can also be 
strengthened through providers’ responsiveness to users [22], and through community 
involvement by enhancing health facility governing committees [59]. P4P may also 
change the organisational culture with improved team work and working sprit among key 
health system stakeholders. P4P is further expected to affect human resources for health 
in many other ways. The financial incentives through P4P can increase the staff 
motivation in order to improve the quality of service delivery and overall productivity 
[22, 28, 60]. Financial incentives can even reduce the brain drain and encourage providers 
to work in remote areas [22]. Financial incentives in P4P scheme, while enhancing 
extrinsic forms of motivation, might also undermine or “crowd-out” intrinsic motivation 
especially when health workers have a sense of professionalism [21, 38, 61-63]. However, 
this effect on intrinsic motivation depends on how health workers perceive the financial 
bonuses within P4P schemes (as fair/ unfair, as a form of recognition and supportive or as 
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form of control) [38, 61]. P4P is also more than external financial incentives, as it 
encompasses many attributes (e.g. performance feedback, autonomy, and supervision) 
that can improve instead of crowding-out intrinsic motivation [33]. The health 
management information systems may also improve through P4P as remuneration is 
based on proper reporting systems [22].  
 
 
1.6  P4P and heterogeneous effects  
P4P programmes aim to incentivise providers to change their behaviour to improve health 
service delivery, and obtain financial rewards [64]. Based on this assumption, P4P can 
improve service delivery on the supply-side which in turn triggers a demand-side 
response and improves service utilisation. However, while service delivery on the supply-
side and service utilisation on the demand-side can improve on average due to P4P, such 
improvements are rarely uniform across providers and/ or service users, respectively. 
Thus, P4P can lead to heterogeneous effects among providers on the supply-side, and 
among service users on the demand-side [65]. However, these heterogeneous effects may 
arise due to either varied responses to incentives among providers (supply-side) or varied 
responses to improved health services among populations (demand-side). These two 
pathways are briefly discussed below. 
 
Heterogeneous P4P effects among providers: Health providers/ facilities are not uniform 
and may respond differently to incentives. The initial/ baseline performance, for example, 
may differ across providers (i.e. lower vs. higher baseline performers), and affects 
subsequent performance. Thus, setting performance targets or measures based on baseline 
performance is critical for heterogeneous performance among providers [19, 27, 49, 50, 
53, 56, 64]. It is whether performance targets give an incentive to improve performance 
among lower baseline performers, higher baseline performers, or both. Further, health 
providers/ facilities may differ on structural factors which may favour some facilities to 
better perform than others. For example, structural factors based on facility-characteristics 
 
 9 
(e.g. availability of medical commodities, ownership, level of care, staffing level, etc.) 
and area-based characteristics (e.g. catchment population wealth status, rural-urban 
location, etc.) may affect facility performance and lead to heterogeneous effects on 
performance [28, 33, 58, 66-70]. Specifically, facilities with wealthier catchment 
populations for example may respond better to incentives, as they can more readily 
increase service use, and user fees contributions [66, 67, 71, 72]. Moreover, facilities with 
greater availability of medical inputs, as a marker for quality of care [73-75] will be better 
able to increase patient demand than their counterparts. 
 
  
Heterogeneous P4P effects among populations: Heterogeneous P4P effects among 
population subgroups may arise due to either varied providers’ responses to incentives or 
varied responses among populations themselves. Providers are likely to adopt several 
strategies in order to improve service quality and attract more patients to facilities [22, 
33], but patients’ responses to different strategies may differ and lead to demand-side 
heterogeneous P4P effects. One such strategy could be to make services more affordable 
[22]. This can be, for example, through reducing user fees or by reducing drug shortages 
(e.g. procure drugs that are stocked-out) to protect patients from incurring costs of 
purchasing drugs [76, 77]. To improve responsiveness to service users could be another 
strategy, for example, by being kinder during service delivery [77]. However, providers 
might also attempt to cherry-pick patients or focus on easy-to-reach populations (i.e. 
underserved but easily reached) in order to meet the performance targets for rewards [29, 
78]. This approach of cherry-picking leaves the hard-to-reach (i.e. poorest with greatest 
need) underserved. However, to serve the hard-to-reach population needs providers to 
exert greater effort and time [79]. The efficiency gains can be reached in the case of 
cherry-picking patients but at the expenses of inequity [80]. 
 
Household and individual-based characteristics may also affect how they respond to 
improved health services in the supply-side. According to Andersen's behavioural model 
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of healthcare utilisation, the use of health services is a function of patient’s propensity to 
use services (predisposing factors), factors that facilitate or impede access and use 
(enabling factors), and perceived need for healthcare (need factors) [81, 82]. These factors 
by Andersen's model among others are also social determinants of health [83-85], and 
affects the demand-side responses to healthcare access and use. For example, reduced 
financial barriers to accessing care, resulting from provider response to incentives, may 
stimulate demand especially for poor and/or uninsured individuals, since they are more 
responsive to a change in healthcare costs consistent with demand theory [86, 87]. The 
improvement in quality of care supplied may also increase the demand for health services 
[88]; and likely the better-off populations (e.g. wealthier, educated, and urban residents) 
may benefit more from quality improvements simply because they use services more than 
their counterpart populations [84, 85, 89-93].  
 
Although there are potential interactions between the demand-side and supply-side 
responses to P4P, the health care sector does not operate like a classic free market [41, 
94]. There are some cases where the demand-side response may be weak, for example, 
when some demand-side barriers to accessing care (e.g. cultural and information barriers) 
are not affected by the supply-side response to incentives [7, 94-96].  
 
 
2.0  An overview of the literature: Payment for Performance (P4P)  
2.1  Introduction 
In this section, I present an overview of the literature on P4P from high-income countries 
(HICs) and low-and middle-income countries (LMICs). I separate the P4P literature 
between HICs and LMICs since there are differences in context, scheme design, and 
objectives between settings. This overview focuses on the history of P4P across settings, 
and the effect of P4P in relation to service utilisation, quality of care, health outcomes, 




2.2  P4P in High–income countries (HICs) 
2.2.1 Introduction  
The introduction of P4P schemes in high-income countries (HICs) was pioneered by the 
United States [30] and the United Kingdom [32]. These schemes continued to be 
implemented in other developed countries including Canada, New Zealand, Taiwan, 
Israel, France, Australia and Germany [31, 97]. The focus of P4P in developed countries 
has been to improve the quality of care [31]. P4P for physicians, for example, has focused 
on process and outcome measures related to chronic diseases, as well as primary 
prevention (e.g. screening and immunisations) [44]. However, the hospital-based P4P has 
focused not only on process quality measures but also on health outcome measures [55, 
98].  
 
In the United States, a variety of P4P schemes were introduced [30]. These includes the 
California P4P (Quality Incentive Programme, QIP), which rewards physician groups 
based on five ambulatory care quality indicators and five patient-reported measures of 
service quality [53, 57]. Another P4P scheme in the United States is the Premier Hospital 
Quality Incentive Demonstration (PHQID). The PHQID rewards inpatient quality of care 
and outcome measures regarding five clinical conditions: acute myocardial infarction, 
heart failure, pneumonia, coronary artery bypass surgery, and hip and knee replacement 
[55, 99, 100]. The first phase of the PHQID started in 2003 to 2006, while its extension 
began in 2006 to 2009 [101]. In 2004, the United Kingdom government introduced one of 
the world’s largest P4P programme, the Quality and Outcome Framework (QOF) [32]. 




2.2.2 Evidence base of P4P in HICs 
Despite the widespread implementation of P4P schemes in HICs, there are still mixed 
evidence of their effects on quality of care improvements, health outcomes, inequalities or 
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whether these approaches are cost-effective [31, 94, 100, 102-112]. Some studies with 
evidence regarding quality of care, health outcomes and inequalities are discussed below.  
 
Effects on quality of care: Most P4P studies in HICs show improved quality of care 
measures [31, 55, 94, 103-105]. For instance, the hospital-based P4P scheme in the 
United States, PHQID, improved most of the process measures of quality of care [55, 
103], with limited incremental impact on processes of care for acute myocardial infarction 
[113]. However, after five years of the Premier HQID implementation, there was no 
significant difference in performance on process quality measures between Premier 
hospitals and matched hospitals for comparison [114]. In Hawaii, over a 4-year period of 
implementation, Chen et al [115] found that a P4P programme in a preferred provider 
organisation health plan improved quality of care measures for four conditions. In 
California, the P4P scheme for physician groups (Quality Incentive Programme) revealed 
that although quality improved for most conditions after P4P, only quality measures for 
cervical cancer screening improved significantly [53, 57]. Furthermore, P4P programme 
in the United Kingdom shows that family practitioners improved significantly in quality 
of care at the early stage of the programme, but such an improvement slowed once targets 
were reached and even declined for non-incentivised conditions [108, 116-118].  
 
Effects on health outcomes: Available evidence shows that P4P does not seem to reduce 
mortality rates with few exceptions. For instance, two studies in the United States [113, 
119] assessed the early effects of P4P as the hospital-based Premier HQID on mortality 
reduction for the four incentivised conditions –heart failure, pneumonia, acute myocardial 
infarction and coronary-artery bypass grafting (CABG). They found that the Premier 
HQID did not reduce risk-adjusted mortality for all conditions including acute myocardial 
infarction [113, 119]. A longer term assessment of the Premier HQID also revealed a lack 
of P4P effect on mortality reduction [120]. In the United Kingdom, however, P4P was 
associated with an overall reduction in mortality for three incentivised conditions 
combined, and specifically a significant mortality reduction for pneumonia [98]. The 
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programme reduced mortality in the United Kingdom compared to the United States 
possibly because the United Kingdom programme had larger bonus size, no self-selection 
of hospitals to participate, and presence of good communication and feedback among 
participants [98]. However, the effects of the United Kingdom-based P4P on reduced 
mortality as initially reported were not maintained in a longer term [121]. Further, 
Fleetcroft et al [122] reported the evidence on mortality reduction in the United Kingdom 
across general practices. In terms of health gain, however, there was no clear relationship 
between the size of financial incentive and health gain for indicators included in QOF for 
an average general practice in the United Kingdom [123]. Similarly, Ryan et al [124] have 
recently compared the P4P effect on population mortality between the United Kingdom 
and other HICs not exposed to P4P (as a synthetic control group) and found no significant 
decrease in mortality in the United Kingdom after P4P.  
 
Effects on inequalities: P4P effects on inequalities among service users and among 
providers have been reported in HICs. On the demand-side, P4P generally reduced 
inequalities in access to quality healthcare between population socioeconomic groups, but 
had no effect on inequalities with respect to age, sex and ethnicity [31, 105, 109, 110]. On 
the supply-side, P4P reduced performance inequalities across health providers, in such a 
way that low baseline performers improved most over time [53, 55, 65, 67, 95, 115, 125]. 
Also, providers serving lower socioeconomic populations underperformed initially but 
improved over time [53, 65, 67, 125]. In terms of payments, Ryan et al [68] in the United 
States found that hospitals treating wealthier populations initially received higher 
incentive payments than hospitals serving poorer populations, but these inequalities in 
payments declined over time. Other studies have shown unclear associations between 
performance and characteristics such as provider’s type, size, urban/rural location and 
staffing level [65, 105].  
 
 




P4P is increasingly being implemented in LMICs with support from donors including the 
World Bank Health Results Innovation Trust Fund –HRITF [33]. In LMICs, this move is 
driven by the apparent failure of traditional input-oriented funding to achieve much 
progress on improving service coverage and  quality especially for maternal and child 
health services [7, 33, 40]. Experiments with performance incentives are also being 
stimulated by the concern of providers’ absenteeism and provision of insufficient service 
quality due to low productivity (i.e. large know-do gap) [8, 17, 19, 20, 126]. P4P in 
LMICs is therefore promoted to improve productivity as well as to reform and strengthen 
the health care system, and facilitate the progress towards health-related development 
goals [22, 28, 33].  
 
Haiti and Cambodia were the first low-income countries to apply payment for results 
through performance contracts. P4P was applied to the public sector in Cambodia from 
1999 [127, 128], while non-governmental organisations were contracted in Haiti from 
1995 and the approach was termed as performance-based contracting [129]. This payment 
approach was not rolled out nationally in Haiti nor in Cambodia, despite some promising 
results. In Africa, Rwanda pioneered the implementation of P4P with several pilots from 
2002. In 2005, Rwanda decided to scale up P4P nationally [130-132]. The experience 
from Rwanda inspired and attracted a lot of attention to many other African countries, 
such as Burundi that rolled out the P4P scheme nationally by 2010 [133]. To date, more 
than 30 African countries including Tanzania are currently implementing and scaling up 
P4P (World Bank Health Results Innovation Trust Fund, 2013)1.  
 
 
2.3.2 Evidence base of P4P in LMICs 
                                                            
1 With support from the governments of Norway and the United Kingdom through the Health Results Innovation 




Despite growing implementation of P4P programmes in LMICs, the evidence base on the 
effects of P4P is limited with inconclusive findings [7, 40, 58, 134-136]. The available 
evidence can be summarised across countries and by themes such as effects on service 
utilisation and costs, quality of care, and effects on inequalities.  
 
Effects on service use and costs: In Rwanda, P4P led to an increase in utilisation of 
institutional delivery and child preventive care [132] and further led to improved health 
worker productivity [60]. Further evidence in Rwanda shows that P4P increased the 
probability of HIV testing among individuals and even strongly among married 
individuals [137]. In Burundi, a pilot study from selected provinces found that P4P 
increased the rate of institutional deliveries, antenatal care (ANC) utilisation, and use of 
modern family planning services [138]. When evaluating the national programme in 
Burundi, P4P was associated with an increase in the probability of received full 
vaccinations for children, while the effect on institutional deliveries was only borderline 
significant [133]. In Tanzania, Binyaruka et al [77] revealed a couple of positive effects of 
a P4P pilot scheme in Pwani region. They found that P4P was associated with an increase 
in institutional deliveries, and provision of antimalarial drugs during ANC, and both were 
among the incentivised services. The Tanzanian P4P was also associated with a reduction 
in probability of paying out-of-pocket for delivery care, although the average amount paid 
did not change. P4P in Malawi, that was combined with conditional cash transfer for 
pregnant women, did not affect the household costs associated with seeking obstetric care, 
while reduced time to seek such care [139]. By using facility-level administrative data in 
Burkina Faso, Steenland et al [140] found that P4P increased ANC visits, institutional 
deliveries, and postnatal care visits.  
 
In South Kivu Province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), P4P was associated 
with an increase in the annual per capita revenues from patient user fees, and an increase 
in the per capita out-of-pocket health spending from the household survey [141]. These 
effects on revenues and spending was linked to the P4P design that allowed health 
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providers in P4P areas to negotiate with the communities on the user fees increase. In 
Katanga Province of the DRC, health workers exerted more effort by reducing fees, 
absenteeism, increasing outreaches and improving staff motivation [142]. Despite such an 
increase in effort, there were no changes in the utilisation of health services by the 
population and even lowered staff revenues due to reduced user fees. A recent P4P pilot 
in the Republic of the Congo that focused in rural regions (Niari, Plateaux and Pool) 
found that the scheme significantly improved curative visits, patient referral, vitamin A 
uptakes, HIV testing and assisted deliveries as measured from facility surveys [143]. In 
two provinces of Mozambique, P4P was found to increase the provision of HIV testing 
and treatment, increase of at least four ANC visits, postnatal consultations, and facility-
based deliveries [144]. In Cameroon, De Walque [24] found that P4P led to significant 
increases in utilisation of child and maternal vaccinations, use of modern family planning, 
and significantly reduced formal and informal user fees.  
 
Moreover, P4P in Cambodia raised the rate of institutional deliveries in public facilities, 
but no effect on other incentivised services such as ANC and infant vaccinations [128]. In 
Afghanistan, P4P had no impact on improving service coverage for incentivised services 
[145]. Studies from Haiti showed that participating non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) health facilities outperformed the rest in terms of complete immunisation 
coverage, prenatal care, assisted deliveries and postnatal care [21, 129]. Consistent with 
previous evaluations, a recent evaluation in Haiti using facility-level data showed that 
P4P improved health care delivery, especially on services for under 1 children and 
pregnant women [146]. However, this study used few NGO facilities with P4P compared 
to non-P4P facilities (i.e. 15 vs 202), and non-P4P facilities included NGO and public 
facilities. A P4P scheme in China, for village doctors in rural areas, reduced health care 





Effects on quality of care: Most P4P schemes in LMICs do not explicitly incentivise 
quality of care, but rather these schemes purchase quantity of services and adjust the 
quantity-based payouts with quality scores [33, 149]. P4P schemes also incentivise 
service indicators as content of care that link to process quality of care. Quality of care is 
a multidimensional concept but typically considered in three components (i.e. structural, 
process, and outcome) [73, 150]. The quality scores for P4P that used to adjust the 
quantity indicators payout relies on structural quality and resource availability indicators 
[149]. The effect of P4P with respect to quality is currently skewed towards structural and 
process quality [134].  
 
The effects of P4P on structural quality are generally mixed. In South Kivu of DRC, P4P 
was associated with an increase in staff availability and improved patient perceptions of 
drug availability [141]. A study in Katanga province of DRC, however, found negative 
effects on a structural quality index [142]. The Tanzanian P4P scheme was associated 
with an increase in availability of drugs and supplies, with no effect on the availability of 
equipment [76]. In Burundi, no effect of P4P was found on drug availability as perceived 
by patients [138]; while in Malawi, P4P improved the availability of both functioning 
equipment and essential drugs [151]. P4P in Cameroon also significantly improved the 
availability of essential equipment, and qualified health workers [24]. In Rwanda, P4P 
scheme improved the presence of maternity-related staff, the presence of covered waiting 
areas and facility management [152]. In Afghanistan, however, the availability of drugs 
and equipment were not affected by a P4P programme [145].  
 
Regarding process quality, there is an evidence that P4P improved the quality of ANC in 
terms of adherence to clinical guidelines/ contents of care in Rwanda [60, 132] and in 
Burundi [133]. P4P also improved providers’ practices on most attributes during ANC in 
Egypt [153]. In Tanzania, although there was no effect on quality of ANC for overall 
adherence to guideline except for some contents of care such as IPT2, P4P increased 
providers’ kindness as reported by patients during delivery care [77]. In Malawi, 
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however, P4P scheme had no effect on birth assistants’ adherence to clinical protocols 
[151]. P4P in Cameroon increased satisfaction of care among patients and providers [24]. 
Overall perceived quality of care from the household surveys increased due to a P4P pilot 
in the Republic of the Congo [143]. A randomised study by Peabody [154] in the 
Philippines found that P4P improved process quality scores among physicians as 
measured by clinical knowledge performance vignette.  
 
Further, there is limited evidence on the effect of P4P on health outcomes in LMICs [54], 
with the exception of Rwanda, the  Philippines and Cambodia. In Rwanda, P4P was 
associated with improved health outcomes for child nutritional outcomes [60]. P4P in the 
Philippines improved child health outcomes with respect to wasting and reported health 
status [155]. Other studies in the literature, however, found P4P did not have any effect on 
health outcomes. For example, it did not reduce neonatal mortality in Cambodia [128], 
nor morbidity from diarrhoea, fever or acute respiratory infections in Rwanda [156].  
 
Effects on inequalities: P4P heterogeneous effects have the potential to affect inequalities 
on service utilisation on the demand-side (among population subgroups/ service users) 
and inequalities on facility performance on the supply-side (among providers). On the 
demand-side, available evidence of P4P on utilisation inequalities among population 
subgroups is limited and varies across service types in LMICs [58]. For example, the 
effect of P4P on institutional delivery rates was greater among wealthier populations (pro-
rich) in most settings [128, 133, 157] but there was an indication that it was greater 
among poorer groups (pro-poor) and among rural populations (pro-rural) in Tanzania [77, 
158]. The effect of P4P on institutional deliveries was greater among women with health 
insurance in Rwanda [157] or a maternity care voucher in Cambodia [128] than their 
counterparts, but a greater effect among uninsured women was reported in Tanzania 
[158]. The effect of P4P on family planning coverage was pro-rich in Rwanda [157], and 
the effect on immunisation coverage was pro-poor in Burundi [133]. However, studies 
based on Rwanda Demographic Health Survey (DHS) data reported no differential effect 
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by socioeconomic groups on the use of maternal care [159] and on child curative care 
seeking [156].  
 
Despite increasing evidence of P4P on inequalities among population subgroups 
(demand-side) in LMICs, there is only one published study from a LMIC, Rwanda [70], 
that examined performance inequalities (or heterogeneity of P4P effect) across facilities 
(supply-side) and only by baseline levels of facility quality. Sherry et al  [70] found that 
facilities in the middle of the baseline quality distribution generally improved most across 
a broader range of rewarded services. A forthcoming study from Tanzania (Binyaruka et 
al.), which is one of the articles of this thesis, will supplement the evidence on the supply-
side heterogeneity of P4P effect across health facilities. 
 
 
2.4  Research gaps 
Health systems face considerable challenges in providing good quality services for better 
health outcomes, especially in LMICs. Several initiatives such as P4P have been applied 
to address some of the challenges. Although there are some promising results of P4P in 
improving the incentivised indicators or services in LMICs [7, 40, 58, 134-136], there is 
still little and mixed evidence on structural quality of care and on the heterogeneity of the 
P4P effects.  
 
Evidence on the effect of P4P on structural quality of care through improved availability 
of medical commodities (drugs, supplies and equipment) remain scant and mixed [134], 
despite being a precondition for service delivery [73, 150]. Also, the shortage of medical 
commodities associates with low levels of patient satisfaction [75], and leads to out-of-
pocket payments among patients [74, 160]. From the literature, some studies report on the 
effect of P4P on the availability of medical comodities that was measured subjectively 
through patients’ perceptions [138, 141], rather than objectively through facility register 
checklists/ direct observations [142, 145, 151]; and only one study reports on stock-out 
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rates [142]. Further, neither of the previous studies on the P4P effect on medical 
commodities explains on the potential pathways through which the programme effect 
occurred, nor examined the potential heterogeneity of the P4P effect on medical 
commodities across facilities of different characteristics.  
 
Moreover, most evaluations of P4P have focused on average programme effects on 
incentivised services, with little attention to distributional effects across health providers 
(supply-side) and across population subgroups (demand-side) especially in LMICs [7, 58, 
65, 70]. Evidence on P4P heterogeneous effects is crucial since there is a growing 
awareness that average effects may mask important heterogeneous programme effects 
[65, 161-166]. It is therefore important not only to understanding average P4P effects but 
also heterogeneous P4P effects in order to inform programme design and scale-up. 
 
Limited studies have examined the heterogeneity of P4P effect on service use and quality 
across population subgroups in LMICs [58], but mainly focused on population 
socioeconomic groups rather than a broader range of subgroups of social determinants. 
The use of subgroups based on a variety of social determinants help to better understand 
the exisitence and potential drivers of heterogeneity of programme effect across 
populations of different characteristics in a broader perspective. Furthermore, the 
heterogeneous effects of P4P on performance across health providers (supply-side) are 
limited in LMICs, despite great variation in health facility readiness to deliver services 
[167]. Only a study from Rwanda [70] reports on the supply-side heterogeneous effect of 
P4P on service provision by baseline levels of facility quality. However, this study neither 
assessed the heterogeneity of P4P effect on facility performance based on baseline levels 
of performance outcomes (service use), nor based on baseline area-based and other 
facility-based characteristics. There is also no study in LMICs that assessed the 







3.0  Study objectives 
 
3.1  General objective 
The aim of the study is to examine the effect of P4P on the availability and stock-out of 
medical commodities, and to assess the distribution of the effects of P4P on medical 
commodities, performance outcomes, and utilisation outcomes in Tanzania.   
 
3.2  Specific objectives 
1. To examine the effects of P4P on the availability and stock-out of medical 
commodities, and assess the distributional effects across health facilities in 
Tanzania (Paper I) 
2. To assess the distributional effects of P4P on facility performance outcomes across 
subgroups of health facilities in Tanzania (Paper II) 
3. To assess the distributional effects of P4P on utilisation outcomes across 







4.0  Methods 
4.1  Study setting 
 
4.1.1  Country profile 
Tanzania is a country in Eastern Africa along the coast of the Indian Ocean. Tanzania has 
a total area of 945,087 square kilometres, and the largest country in East Africa. 
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According to the 2012 census survey, its population was 45 million people (and estimated 
to be nearly 56 million in 2016), with an average annual growth rate of 2.7% (3.1% in 
2016) and total fertility rate of 5.5 live births per woman (5.1 in 2016) [168-170]. The 
population growth rate is higher than the average rate of 2.6% per year for sub-Saharan 
Africa, and the fertility rate is also higher than that of sub-Saharan Africa of 4.7 births per 
woman in 2010–15 [171]. About 70% of the population in Tanzania lives in rural areas, 
and about 46% of children are below 15 years of age [168, 169]. Administratively, 
Tanzania is divided into 31 regions, and each region is subdivided into several districts, 
wards, and villages. Tanzania is a low-income country according to the World Bank 
classification. In 2016, the gross domestic product (GDP) of Tanzania was around USD 
47.4 billion, and GDP per capita around USD 879.2 [170]. Tanzania has the annual 
economic growth rate around 7% which is higher than the average rate of around 3% for 
sub-Saharan Africa [170, 172]. A number of sectors such as agriculture, tourism, service 
and mining contribute significantly to the economy, and particularly in terms of 
employment and GDP growth.  
 
 
4.1.2 Health status in Tanzania 
According to the Tanzanian 2012 population census, the life expectancy at birth was 62 
years [169], which is slightly higher than average life expectancy in Africa of 60.2 years 
in 2010-15 [171]. Tanzania has made progress on the  reduction of child mortality over 
time [168, 173, 174]. According to the recent Tanzanian DHS, the under 5 mortality rate 
(U5MR) has dropped from 147 deaths per 1000 live births in 1999 to 67 deaths per 1000 
live births in 2015 [168]. The infant mortality rate (IMR) has dropped from 99 deaths per 
1000 live births in 1999 to 43 deaths per 1000 live births in 2015; while the child 
mortality rate dropped from 53 deaths per 1000 live births in 1999 to 25 deaths per 1000 
live births in 2015. Such a declining trend in child mortality has been associated with an 
increase in coverage of key child survival interventions such as integrated management of 
childhood illness, insecticide-treated nets, vitamin A supplementation, immunisation and 
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exclusive breastfeeding practices [174]. A further reason for improved child survival 
might be an increase in external financing for child health more than three-fold from 2002 
[173].  
 
Figure 1: Trends in health indicators from the Tanzanian DHS (1999 –2016) 
 
 
Source: Author’s own contribution from the TDHS data 
Notes: IMR–rate of dying before the first birthday; Child mortality rate –rate of dying between the first 
and the fifth birthday; U5MR –rate of dying between birth and the fifth birthday; MMR –annual rate of 
female deaths per 100 000 live births from any cause related to pregnancy or childbirth.  
 
However, maternal mortality ratio (MMR) in Tanzania has shown little improvement over 
the last 11 years, as it stands at 556 maternal deaths per 100 000 live births [168, 173]. 
The unfavourable progress on reducing maternal deaths is partly due to unskilled home 
delivery (almost 37% of births still occurring at home [168]), and those who deliver in 
facilities are faced with poor quality of maternal health services [173]. The current MMR 
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2010 (i.e. MMR=454). In general, both child and maternal mortality rates in Tanzania are 
far from the Sustainable Development Goals of reducing MMR to less than 70 per 100 
000 live births and U5MR to less than 25 per 1000 live births by 2030 [175].  
 
In terms of nutritional status for children under 5 years of age, about 34% of children are 
stunted, 5% are wasted, and 14% are underweight in Tanzania [168]. Although the 
prevalence of wasting has remained almost unchanged since 1999, the prevalence of 
stunting and underweight has been declining steadily since 1996 (as it was 50% for 
stunting and 24% for underweight).  
 
The use of maternal and child health (MCH) services has increased over time in Tanzania, 
but with marked imbalance along the continuum of MCH care [168, 173]. According to 
the TDHS [168], the coverage of at least one ANC visit was almost universal, 51% of 
pregnant women went for at least 4 ANC visits, 63% of women delivered in health 
facilities, and about two-thirds received first postnatal care in seven days after delivery.  
 
 
4.1.3 The health system in Tanzania 
 
The decentralised health system 
Tanzania, like other developing countries, has recognised the role of both central and 
local government to foster economic growth. The process of decentralisation of 
government functions with several sectoral reforms, including health services, began 
around 1990s in Tanzania. The aim of these reforms was rooted in improving efficiency, 
equity, and resource mobilization, through leadership, accountability and partnership at 
all levels [176]. A typical policy change has been decentralisation, which involves the 
transfer of power and authority from the central government to local authorities [177, 
178]. The decentralisation process in Tanzania took place mainly in three domains: fiscal, 
political and administrative. Under decentralisation, the local governments should identify 
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priorities and set plans for the allocation and use of resources in order to address local 
needs, while the central government provides technical support, verification of the 
relevance of priorities and assists with resource mobilisation [179]. Furthermore, the 
central government provides grants to local government and then provides autonomy to 
local government to generate their own resources and allocate these accordingly to 
prioritised developmental activities.   
 
In the health sector specific, the district-level managers are responsible for preparing 
annual health sector plans to implement health programmes in their facilities, and they are 
responsible for generating and managing resources for the district. District managers 
(Council Health Management Teams) are supported by a Regional Health Management 
Team, while the health facility governing committees oversee the implementation of plans 
and the management of resources at the facility level. The decentralised health system 
gives great autonomy to the district council and uses a needs-based resource allocation 
formula which can potentially reduce inequalities in resource allocation between rural and 
urban districts [180]. However, there is evidence that most local governments in Tanzania 
face inadequate and unreliable financing sources for public service provision [181]. This 
makes district councils dependent on central government grants, although they further 
face delays in the disbursement of these funds from the central government [180, 181]. To 
deal with these delays district councils borrow money from projects in the council and 
they use money generated from their own source like cost sharing [177].  
 
 
Organisation and structure 
The public sector is the largest sector of the Tanzanian health system, with private for 
profit and the faith-based organisation/ voluntary sector as important supplements [182]. 
More than 60% of facilities are publicly owned. The public health system has a 
hierarchical administrative structure, and is organised in a referral structure with 
dispensaries and health centres providing primary health care services, followed by 
 
 26 
district hospitals, regional hospitals, and national referral hospitals. However, the referral 
structure is hardly followed due to typical bypassing scenarios [183, 184]. Some of the 
faith-based organisation hospitals have a service agreement with government to offer 
services as Designated District Hospitals in districts that lack a district hospital. The 
central government through the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW) 
oversees most hospitals, and the local government authorities oversee the primary care 
facilities. As previously discussed, the health sector in Tanzania is also decentralised with 
great autonomy been given to local governments in terms of budgeting and planning for 
health service delivery.  
 
Human resources for health in Tanzania 
In most settings, especially in LMICs, human resources for health are in shortage and 
poorly distributed [6]. In Tanzania, the health workforce density has recently been 
estimated at around 5.5 of doctors, nurses, and midwives per 10 000 population, which is 
far below the WHO minimum density threshold of 23 per 10 000 population [6, 173, 
185]. A further shortage of health workforce is noted with respect to specialised cadres. 
The staffing level in Tanzania when compared to MoHSW’s staffing guidelines is 
generally low. For example, Manzi et al [186] found only 20% of the recommended 
number of clinical staff and 14% of the recommended number of nurses had been 
employed in Southern Tanzania. The distribution of health workforce in Tanzania is also 
marked with geographical imbalances, and specifically in favour of urban settings [173, 
187]. It was estimated that only 31% of health professionals were found in rural facilities 
in Tanzania [188], despite the fact that most people are residing in rural areas (i.e. 70%). 
Primary health care facilities are mostly located in rural areas and serve the poor with 
greatest need, but they face a huge staff shortage problem. This pattern is typical in 
LMICs, and it reflects an inverse care law since the staffing level is inversely related to 
poverty and level of need [189, 190].  
 
Medical commodities in Tanzania 
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In 1993, Tanzania established the Medical Stores Department (MSD) as an autonomous 
department of the MoHSW. The MSD is responsible for the procurement, storage, and 
distribution of medical drugs and supplies in the country. However, the MSD supply 
chain suffers from a shortage of commodities, inadequate budget allocations, inadequate 
tracking mechanisms and late delivery of required commodities [182, 191-193]. As a 
result, facilities experience regular shortages of essential drugs and supplies especially in 
the public sector [182, 188, 192, 193]. For example, out of 1297 facilities surveyed in 
2012, only 41% stocked the 14 essential tracer medicines at the time of the survey [188]. 
An assessment in 2010 found that the MSD fulfilled 68% of hospital orders and 67% of 
orders from health centres and dispensaries [194]. 
 
In terms of ordering, public health facilities order medical commodities on a quarterly 
basis, based on an estimate of quantity needs. They submit requests to the district who 
review and send them to the MSD and distribute medical commodities to facilities (the 
‘pull’ system) [192, 195, 196]. Districts and health facilities can also use their own funds 
(e.g. insurance contributions, user fees and P4P bonus payments) to procure commodities 
in case of stock-outs [182, 192, 197]. Non-public hospitals that are contracted by districts 
to deliver services on behalf of the MoHSW also receive medical commodities from the 
MSD. All other non-public facilities either procure commodities from the MSD, foreign 
or local manufacturers, privately owned accredited drug dispensing outlets and 
pharmacies [198-200]. Some commodities (vaccines, antiretrovirals, vitamin A and 
family planning) are managed through disease-specific vertical programmes, which are 
financed externally, and distributed via the MSD or directly to facilities [182, 201, 202].  
 
Health financing in Tanzania 
The health financing system in any country has three main functions: revenue collection, 
pooling and purchasing [9]. Revenue collection involves raising or mobilising funds to 
pay for health services; the pooling function involves pooling together resources across 
individuals to share the risks associated with ill health; and the purchasing function 
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involves transfer of pooled resources by service purchaser to the service provider on 
behalf of the beneficiaries who contributed into the pool [9, 10]. In Tanzania, the health 
financing system is highly fragmented with various sources and modes of financing 
(Table 1). Health care is largely financed internally through domestic sources, that is 
64%, while 36% is through external sources [203]. The domestic sources include general 
taxation, out-of-pocket payments, and health insurance schemes. According to the 
National Health Accounts, about 6% of the GDP is invested in health care, and 12% of 
government expenditure or total budget is spent on health, which is below the Abuja 
Target of 15% [197, 203]. Out-of-pocket payments account for about 23% of the total 
health expenditure, while the contribution of prepayment health insurance schemes in 
total financing is insignificant [203, 204].  
 
Table 1: Health financing system and functions in Tanzania 
Resource collection Pooling of funds Purchasing 




• External resources 
(donors) 
 
• Pooled by government 





• Government as a 
purchaser: 
–Direct budget allocation 
–Salary  
 
• Government via basket 
funding 
• Direct donor projects/ 
vertical programmes 
• Payment for performance 
(pilot & roll-out) 
• Health insurance 
o Social Health 
Insurance (e.g., 
 
• NHIF, NSSF pools risk 
for formal sector 
 
• NHIF & NSSF purchases 















• CHF (under NHIF) 
pools risk for informal 
workers 
 
• Private pools risk in 
each scheme 
of health facilities (public 
mainly) in terms of fee-for-
services 
• CHF purchases services in 
terms of capitation/ fee-
for-services  
 
• Private pool purchases 
services from their 
facilities 
 




• Households purchases 
services directly (OOP) 
Source: Author’s own contribution from the literature.  
Notes: NHIF=National health insurance fund for public formal workers; NSSF=National social security 
fund for private formal workers; SHIB=Social health insurance benefit, which is funded from general 
NSSF contributions; CHF=Community health fund; TIKA=Tiba kwa kadi; CHF/TIKA is a voluntary 
scheme for informal workers; OOP= Out-of-pocket.  
 
In 1999, the Government of Tanzania introduced the National Health Insurance Fund 
(NHIF) for public formal sector employees, followed by the Community Health Fund 
(CHF) in 2001 for the population in the informal sector in rural areas [204, 205]. In 2009, 
“Tiba kwa Kadi” (TIKA) was introduced which operates like CHF but it focuses on urban 
settings.  The CHF/TIKA membership is based on household enrolment, and allows up to 
6 household members. An annual contribution per household varies across district 
councils, but it ranges between Tanzanian shillings 5000 –15000 (i.e. between 2 –7 USD/ 
year) with no co-payments [206]. A waiver is granted to households which are unable to 
pay an annual fee [205]. The government of Tanzania through the NHIF provides a 
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matching grant to the CHF/TIKA contributions at the district level [182]. The National 
Social Security Fund (NSSF) initiated the Social Health Insurance Benefit (SHIB) 
program in 2006 for private formal sector workers. SHIB is financed from general NSSF 
contributions. Both the NHIF and NSSF-SHIB are funded through payroll deductions.  
The NHIF is mandatory and its benefit package covers about 11 services (www.nhif.or.tz) 
as per standard treatment guidelines issued by the MoHSW. The CHF/TIKA is voluntary 
and covers mostly public primary health care.  
 
As an effort to move towards Universal Health Coverage (UHC), the Government of 
Tanzania aims to improve the health care financing system through various reforms [204, 
207, 208]. Such an effort involves strengthening the insurance schemes and expanding 
their coverage; also to ensure services are affordable, equitable, accessible, and of good 
quality. In the last decade up to now, the following health care financing reforms have 
been considered in Tanzania:  
• Harmonising management and administration of CHF with the NHIF in 2008 
• Introducing TIKA which is similar to the CHF but for the urban informal sector.   
• CHF to engage non-government providers through service agreements to improve 
service availability; which is part of the public-private partnership policy.   
• Making CHF/ TIKA uniform across the country in terms of benefits package, 
contribution rates, and provider payment mechanisms.  
• Developing a national health financing strategy which proposes a national health 
insurance scheme to reduce fragmentation of health insurance schemes. 
• Recently, Tanzania is introducing a direct health facility financing mechanisms to 
improve efficiency and effectiveness of resources use and management by direct 
allocation/ transfer of health basket fund to all health facilities’ bank accounts. 
 
Despite the introduction of various health financing reforms, the coverage of health 
insurance is gradually increasing, but remains low and variant in the country. A recent 
estimate shows the health insurance coverage ranges between 10–15% in Tanzania [168, 
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204]. A number of challenges to coverage expansion has been documented such as 
inability to pay, poor quality of care provided, poor staff attitudes, large population in the 
informal sector, lack of awareness on risk pooling, lack of provider choice, and limited 
benefit packages [173, 204, 205, 209, 210]. Tanzania also has exemption and waiver 
policies for some population groups. It aims to protect the poor and vulnerable groups, 
which include pregnant women, under five children, elders above 60 years, and patients 
suffering from TB and HIV/AIDS [204, 211]. However, the enforcement of an exemption 
policy is generally weak in Tanzania, as a result eligible patients are paying out of pocket 
[77, 212, 213].  
 
 
4.2  P4P in Tanzania 
The government of Tanzania through the MoHSW, with support from the Government of 
Norway, introduced a P4P pilot scheme in Pwani region (2011 –2014). The objectives of 
the pilot were to inform the national P4P roll out programme, and to accelerate the 
reduction of maternal, neonatal and child morbidity and mortality through improving 
reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health (RMNCH) services and quality. Pwani 
is one of 31 regions in the country and is comprised of seven districts with more than 209 
health facilities. It has a population of just over a million [169]. The scheme was 
implemented in all facilities providing RMNCH services in the region irrespective of 
ownership status. The Tanzanian P4P rewarded health providers based on performance in 
relation to utilisation of specific services (e.g. institutional delivery) or for care provided 
during a service (e.g. provision of antimalarial drugs during ANC) as described elsewhere 
[77, 214].  
 
The Tanzanian P4P scheme rewarded the performance of health workers and their health 
facilities based on two methods of target setting (Table 2): A single threshold for all 
facilities (absolute coverage target which is fixed), and multiple thresholds based on 
performance in the previous cycle (relative change). With multiple thresholds, a facility 
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could fall into one of five groups based on their performance in the previous cycle: Group 
1 (0-20% coverage of said indicator), group 2 (21-40%), group 3 (41-70%), group 4 (71-
85%) and group 5 (>85%). Each of these five groups has its own absolute threshold 
target, with group 5 being required to maintain coverage due to a limited scope for 
improvement (a ceiling effect) (Table 2). For a single threshold target, all facilities have a 
single absolute target irrespective of the previous/ baseline performance. The strategies to 
reach facility-level performance targets were left to the discretion of the health workers at 
the individual facilities. However, district and regional managers provided supportive 
supervision to ensure performance. Health managers at district and regional levels were 
also rewarded depending on the performance of facilities in their district and region, and 
had additional performance targets linked to management, timely deaths audit, and 
reduction of stock-outs of essential drugs (e.g. antimalarials, antibiotics) in their districts/ 
region, respectively.  
 
 
Table 2: Service indicators and performance targets for P4P implementing facilities 
in Tanzania 
P4P service indicators Method Baseline coverage (previous cycle) 
0–20% 21–40% 41–70% 71–85% 85%+ 
Coverage indicators       
% of institutional deliveries  Percentage 
point increase 
15% 10% 5% 5% Maintain 
% of mothers attending a facility within 7 
days of delivery. 
Percentage 
point increase 
15% 10% 5% 5% Maintain 
% of women using long term contraceptives Percentage 
point increase 
20% 15% 10% Maintain 
above 71% 
Maintain 
% children under 1 year received measles 
vaccine 
Overall result 50% 65% 75% 80%+ Maintain 
% children under 1 year received Penta 3 Overall result 50% 65% 75% 80%+ Maintain 




HMIS reports submitted to district managers 
on time and complete  
Overall result 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Content of care indicators 
      
% ANC clients receiving two doses of IPT Overall result 80% 80% 80% 80%+ Maintain 
above 80% 
% HIV+ ANC clients on ART Overall result 40% 60% 75% 75%+ Maintain 
% of children receiving polio vaccine (OPV0) 
at birth 
Overall result 60% 75% 80% 80%+ Maintain 
Notes: 85%+ = 85% or more; 80%+ = 80% or more; HMIS=Health Management Information System; 
ANC=Antenatal care; IPT=Intermittent preventive treatment.  
Source: Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (2011): The Pwani Pay for Performance (P4P) Pilot in 
Pwani region, Tanzania: The Design Document. 
  
The implementation of the scheme was overseen by the Pilot Management Team, 
comprised of MoHSW and Clinton Health Access Initiative officials. Performance data 
were compiled by facilities and verified by the Pilot Management Team every six months 
(one cycle) before distributing payouts. Data reporting followed the existing Health 
Management Information System (HMIS). All facilities with a P4P scheme must have a 
bank account to receive performance payouts.  The scheme rewarded facilities either full 
or partial payments depending on their achievement level. Full payment was made if 
100% of a given target was achieved as pre-specified, 50% of payment was made for 
75%<100% achievement, and no payment was made for a target achievement below 75%. 
The maximum potential payout a facility could earn was USD 820 per cycle for 
dispensaries, USD 3220 per cycle for health centres and USD 6790 per cycle for 
hospitals. P4P payouts were additional to funding for operational costs and health worker 
salaries. It included staff bonuses (approximately 10% of their monthly salary if all targets 
were fully attained) and facility funds earmarked to support improvement or demand 
creation initiatives (10% of the total in hospitals and 25% in lower level facilities). The 
maximum potential payout for district and regional managers was USD 3000 per cycle, if 




The P4P programme in Tanzania was the subject of a process and impact evaluation. I 
was part of the team that focused on the impact evaluation component. I oversaw the 
fieldwork preparation, trained the fieldworkers, oversaw all rounds of data collection, lead 
the data analysis of the household and facility survey data, and participated in the write-
up of publications and be involved in the dissemination of results. The impact evaluation 
found a significant positive effect of P4P on two out of eight incentivised service 
indicators: institutional delivery rate and provision of antimalarial drugs during ANC 
[77]. P4P was also associated with a number of process changes such as increased 
availability of drugs and supplies, increased supportive supervision, a reduced chance of 
paying user fees, and greater provider kindness during delivery care [59, 76, 77, 215]. 
This PhD work is based on further analyses of facility and household survey data to 
determine whether there were heterogeneous effects of the P4P among subgroups of 
populations and facilities in Tanzania.  
 
Based on experience and lesson learned from the P4P pilot, the Government of Tanzania 
with financial support from the World Bank decided to roll out the programme. The initial 
phase of roll out started in 2016 with 8 regions (i.e. Shinyanga, Mwanza, Pwani, Tabora, 
Simiyu, Geita, Kagera and Kigoma). These initial regions were selected due to poor 
health outcomes and high poverty index. The P4P programme was slightly re-designed 
prior to roll out, and was rebranded as a Results-based financing (RBF) scheme. The 
changes in the design included an increased number of incentivised indicators covering 
the outpatient department care and quality of care indicators; indicators for community 
health workers; indicators for MSD offices; paying per service (fee-for-service) 
conditional on quality scores instead of paying for performance targets on service 
coverage; payment cycle (from bi-annual to quarterly); and a higher proportion of bonus 





4.3  Study sites 
The evaluation study of the P4P pilot was conducted in three regions (i.e. Pwani, 
Morogoro and Lindi) out of 31 regions in Tanzania. The P4P pilot was implemented in all 
seven districts in Pwani region, whereas three districts from Morogoro and one district 
from Lindi were selected for comparison purposes. Pwani and Morogoro regions are in 
the eastern zone, while Lindi region is in the Southern zone of Tanzania. The population 
estimates in Pwani region were just above a million, whereas in Morogoro region the 
population estimates were just above two million, and less than a million in Lindi region 
[169]. Pwani region is next to Dar es Salaam city, while Morogoro and Lindi are 












4.4  Study design  
An impact evaluation study attempts to measure the causal impact of a programme or 
policy on an outcome of interest [161, 216]. It seeks to answer cause-and-effect questions. 
The programme’s impact is identified by comparing the observed outcomes of 
participants with an estimate of what would have been the outcome of participants in the 
absence of a programme (unobserved as counterfactual outcome) [216]. The main 
challenge in designing an impact evaluation study relies on how to deal with the 
evaluation problem. The evaluation problem exists because only one outcome at any point 
in time can be observed per unit of observation, but not both outcomes for the same unit 
of observation with and without a programme/ intervention [161, 216]. This problem 
leads to the challenge of finding a good counterfactual group due to missing data, that is 
to find or create a convincing and reasonable comparison group for programme 
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participants [161, 216]. Failure to find a reasonable comparison/ control group may lead 
to biased estimates of programme impact because of selection bias.  
 
The randomisation process addresses the problem of selection bias at the level of 
randomisation, that is, both groups should be similar in observed and unobserved factors 
[161, 216, 217]. Randomised experiments are considered gold standard for causal 
inference. However, randomisation is not always feasible because of ethical issues, lack 
of compliance, being expensive, poor external validity, contamination, spill-over effects, 
politically unacceptable within a targeted area, and selective attrition [218]. Thus, quasi-
experimental designs are preferred to attribute casual inference in the absence of 
randomisation as described elsewhere [161, 216, 219]. 
 
The P4P evaluation study in Tanzania used a quasi-experimental design, which was a 
controlled before and after study design. It was due to the fact that the Government of 
Tanzania introduced a P4P programme in one region in the absence of randomisation. 
This was partly due to political reason of not accepting provision of financial incentives to 
some facilities/ districts within a region and not to others. With a controlled before and 
after study design, surveys were done in two-time period (before and after the 
introduction of P4P) and from two study arms (intervention and comparison districts) as 
previously described. Comparison districts were selected such that they were similar as 
possible to intervention districts in terms of poverty, literacy rates, rates of institutional 
deliveries, infant mortality, population per health facility, and the number of children 
under one year of age per capita [214].  
 
4.5  Sampling and data sources  
The health facility was the primary sampling unit in the survey. This study included all 6 
hospitals and 16 health centres that were eligible for the P4P scheme, and a random 
sample of 53 eligible dispensaries in the intervention arm. A similar number of facilities 
were included in the comparison arm. To assess RMNCH service utilisation in the 
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population, 20 households from the catchment area of each health facility were randomly 
sampled. A household to be eligible had to have a woman aged (15–49 years) who had 
delivered in the 12 months prior to the survey. To sample eligible households, the study 
identified first the village(s) from a facility’s catchment area, and randomly sampled four 
hamlets (sub-villages/ streets) from each village. Then, five eligible households were 
randomly sampled from each hamlet to make a total of 20 households per facility’s 
catchment area. In total, 3000 households with eligible women in both arms at baseline 
were surveyed, and a similar number in the follow-up survey. Furthermore, the P4P Pilot 
Management Team provided data on facility total payouts which reflect performance on 
all incentivised indicators for the 75 facilities in the intervention area over seven payment 
cycles (2011 –2014). The payout data were used to assess the inequality in payout 
distribution as a proxy for performance inequality across health facilities.  
 
4.6  Data collection  
The baseline survey for data collection was carried out in January 20122 in seven 
intervention districts and in four comparison districts, with a follow up survey 13 month 
later. The facility and household surveys were used to capture data from the supply-side 
and the demand-side, respectively. The facility survey questionnaire was administered to 
the facility in-charge or other experienced health worker. The facility survey collected 
information on facility ownership, level of care, availability and stock-out of medical 
commodities (drugs, supplies and equipment), availability of infrastructures and utilities 
(electricity and clean water), facility distance from district headquarters, and rural/urban 
district location. 
  
The household survey questionnaire was in two components –household head and woman 
survey. The household head survey was administered to the household head, and captured 
                                                            
2 Note that the programme started in 2011 and first payouts tied to performance was made in September 2011. 
Therefore, to get around the risk of early P4P effects in the intervention areas, we sampled women aged 16–49 years 
who delivered between October 2010 and October 2011 during the baseline survey in early 2012. (See Borghi et al 
[214] for more details). 
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information on household background characteristics (e.g. household size, health 
insurance status, and ownership of assets and housing particulars for assessing the 
household socioeconomic status). The woman’s questionnaire administered to an eligible 
woman with a child of less than 12 months of age, and captured data on background 
characteristics (e.g. age, marital status, education occupation, religion, and number of 
births), and service utilisation for RMNCH services. For the case where the eligible 
woman was also the household head, such a woman was administered with both sets of 
questionnaires.  
 
The survey of data collection was done by 48 data collectors with three coordinators on 
each round of data collection. These data collectors were grouped into 8 teams of 6 people 
each, including a supervisor per team. All data collectors were trained for one week 
before the pilot of tools and the actual survey of data collection. The pilot of survey tools 
aimed to pre-test the tools before the actual survey to ensure all questions were clear and 
relevant, and possible revisions were done. The survey of actual data collection in all 11 
districts took almost two months.  
 
Ethical approval for the evaluation study was obtained from the Institutional Review 
Board of the Ifakara Health Institute (approval number: 1BI1IRB/38) and the Ethics 
Review Board of the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine. The P4P Pilot 
Management Team which included members of the Ministry of Health approved the study 
design and protocol. Introduction letters were sent to respective District Executive 
Directors (DED) copied to District Medical Officers (DMO) informing them about the 
evaluation study and its objectives prior to fieldworks of data collection. The research 
team provided an information sheet at the district level (DMO’s and DED’s offices), and 
district officers (DMO and DED) provided introduction letters for the team to all facility 
in-charges and community leaders. All study participants were given the information 
sheets and consent forms prior to conducting the interviews. Moreover, this study utilises 
aggregate data on health services utilisation. It does neither utilise sensitive health 
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information attributable to individuals, nor does it concerns the conduct of research to 
generate new knowledge on health and disease. Consequently, we considered the study to 
fall outside the scope of the Norwegian Health Research Act, and that submission to the 
Regional Ethics Committee was not required. 
 
4.7  Variable measurement 
A number of variables of interest were considered in this study. The variable types and 
measurements are shown below for each of the papers of this thesis. Some of the variables 
overlap but there are also some differences across papers.  
 
Paper I 
The main outcomes for this paper included the availability of RMNCH medicines, 
medical supplies and functioning equipment on the day of the survey, and whether there 
was a stock-out of medicines and supplies at the facility in the 90 days preceding the 
survey. In terms of availability measurement, if a commodity was available on the day of 
the survey, the outcome was coded 1 and 0 otherwise. For stock-out measurement, if a 
commodity was out of stock for at least one day in 90 days prior to the survey the 
outcome was coded 1 and 0 otherwise. Medical commodities were classified in terms of 
their therapeutic use as: antibiotics, antimalarials, antihypertensives, antidiarrheal, 
antiretrovirals, oxytocics, vaccines, family planning, vitamin A, medical supplies and 
medical equipment (Appendix S1a, Paper I). There were 37 items of essential drugs, 11 
medical supplies and 16 functioning equipment. Commodities were further differentiated 
between items which relate directly to P4P targets and those which do not, to examine 
eventual spill-over effects. Items were also classified according to their beneficiary/ 
recipient group along the RMNCH continuum of care based on the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) classification of priority medicines [220, 221]. Composite scores 
were generated for each classified subgroup based on an un-weighted mean score across 
items in the group. The composite score can be interpreted as the mean percentage 
availability/ stock-out rate within the grouping across facilities. The proportion of 
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facilities with availability/ stock-out of the respective commodity groups were captured. 
When generating indices each commodity item was given equal weight for ease of 
interpretation, although some of the items may be more important than others in 
enhancing better health outcomes. 
 
Paper II 
This paper used two sets of performance outcomes to assess performance inequalities 
across health facilities. First, a “payout score” for each facility in the intervention arm, 
defined as the percentage of bonus payout received relative to the total potential amount if 
all targets had been fully achieved. Payout scores were generated for each of the seven 
payment cycles (2011 –2014) per facility, and aggregated into an average score for all 
cycles. Note that, a payout for each cycle was in aggregate form to reflect facility 
performance on all incentivised indicators within a cycle. Second, this study considered 
the two incentivised services which improved significantly as a result of P4P [77]. These 
two services also had different incentive designs for target setting: the coverage of 
institutional deliveries (multiple thresholds target) and provision of two doses of 
intermittent preventive treatment (IPT2) for malaria during ANC (single threshold target). 
The average service coverage rates for these two services were estimated at the facility 
level based on outcomes measured from households in the facility catchment area, which 
was used as a proxy for facility performance.  
 
Paper III 
This paper also used the two outcome variables which improved significantly as a result 
of P4P: institutional deliveries and uptake of two doses of intermittent preventive 
treatment (IPT2) for malaria during ANC [77]. These were measured at the individual 
level as binary outcomes for whether a woman gave birth in a health facility and whether 
she received IPT2 during ANC, respectively. These outcome variables overlap in paper II 
and III, but they differ in terms of the level of measurement (facility-level in paper II 





4.8  Generating subgroups for distributional analyses 
 
Subgroups of facilities (Paper I & II) 
To assess the supply-side distributional effects of P4P, health facilities were classified 
into subgroups. The types of subgroups used in each paper and the justification for these 
is provided below. 
 
Paper 1 assessed the distributional effects of P4P on the availability and stock-out of 
medical commodities across facilities. This analysis examined whether the effects of P4P 
differed with the wealth status of the facility catchment population (wealth subgroups), 
facility ownership (public vs. non-public), facility level of care (dispensary vs. health 
centre or hospital) and facility location (urban vs. rural). The choice of wealth subgroups 
was necessary to examine if benefits were pro-poor, given the greater burden of out-of-
pocket payments on poorer groups due to stock-outs of medical commodities [74, 160, 
193, 209]. The out-of-pocket payment for drugs also limits the affordability of and access 
to care, especially among the worse-off population. The analysis by facility ownership 
(public vs. non-public) was because of differing procurement and supply systems in 
public and non-public sectors as described earlier; while the analysis by level of care 
(dispensary vs. health centre or hospital) was due to the fact that dispensaries are typically 
worse-off in resources availability including drug availability [188, 222, 223]; and the 
analysis by location (rural vs. urban district) was done because facilities in urban districts 
are better connected by roads and easily accessible facilitating the distribution of 
commodities relative to those in rural districts. The wealth status of the facility catchment 
population was measured as the mean wealth index score across households in the 
catchment area at baseline. The wealth scores were derived using principal component 
analysis based on 42 items relating to household characteristics and asset ownership 
(Appendix S1c, Paper I) [224, 225]. Then, the average wealth score of the 20 households 
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sampled within the facility catchment area was calculated. Facilities were further ranked 
by scores from poorest (low score) to least poor, and classified into three equal-sized 
groups (terciles): poorest, middle and least poor.  
 
Paper II examined whether facility performance outcomes differed across facility 
subgroups. The first facility subgroups were based on baseline facility performance 
(above or below the median level for the two outcomes –rate of institutional deliveries 
and IPT2 coverage). The use of facility subgroups based on baseline performance was 
considered to test an incentive design effect, i.e. whether target setting design affects 
facility performance differently between lower and higher baseline performers. The 
second set of facility subgroups were considered to test the structural effects, i.e. whether 
the baseline facility- and area-based characteristics affects facility performance. Facility-
based characteristics included: facility ownership (public owned vs. non-public); facility 
level of care (dispensary vs. health centre and hospital); baseline availability of utilities 
(electricity and water supply); and baseline availability of essential drugs (above/below 
the median in an un-weighted index based on the availability share of all 37 essential 
drugs (Appendix S1a, Table I)). Area-based characteristics included: facility location 
(rural vs. urban district) and the wealth status of the facility catchment population 
(poorest, middle and least poor) as previous described.   
 
Subgroups of population (Paper III) 
To assess the demand-side distributional effects of P4P, households were classified into 
subgroups based on individual and household-level characteristics. According to 
Andersen’s behavioural model of healthcare utilisation [81, 82], the use of health services 
is a function of patient’s propensity to use services (predisposing factors), factors that 
facilitate or impede access and use (enabling factors), as well as perceived need for 
healthcare (need factors). These factors among others are also social determinants of 
health [83-85]. Only predisposing and enabling factors were considered in this study since 
data on perceived illness was not available. Further, “perceived illness” could be argued 
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to be of less relevance for maternal service utilisation outcomes, since care seeking is 
preventive to ill health and related to pregnancy status and not a function of ill health. 
 
Predisposing and enabling factors were then used to generate population subgroups to 
assess the differential effects of P4P on service utilisation. The categorisation followed 
previous categorisation in the literature as well as based on context specific and 
frequencies across categories. Subgroups of predisposing factors included: marital status 
(married vs. none), maternal age (15–49) years (below vs. above the median age of 25), 
education (no education vs. primary level/above), occupation (farmer vs. non-farmer), 
religion (Muslim vs. non-Muslim), number of births/parity (parity 1 vs. parity 2/above), 
and household size (below vs. above the median size of 5 members). Subgroups of 
enabling factors included: health insurance status (any insurance vs. none), place of 
residence (rural vs. urban district), and household wealth status subgroups. The wealth 
subgroups were generated from wealth scores derived using principal component analysis 
based on 42 items of household characteristics and asset ownership (Appendix 1: Table 5, 
Paper III) [224, 225]. The household wealth scores were generated separately for baseline 
and follow-up samples, since participants differed over time. Households were ranked by 
wealth scores from poorest (low score) to least poor and classified into three-equal sized 
groups (terciles): poorest, middle and least poor. Subgrouping based on five-equal sized 
groups (quintiles) were also generated to examine the sensitivity of the findings to 
different wealth subgroupings. 
 
 
4.9  Data analyses 
 
The data analyses in all papers proceeded in two parts: descriptive analyses and 




4.9.1 Descriptive analyses  
These included sample means comparison across study arms at baseline and equity 
analysis. The sample means at baseline for all the characteristics of facilities (paper I and 
II) and characteristics of population (paper III) were compared between intervention and 
comparison arms. The baseline assessment also examined the distribution of facility 
outcomes (medical commodities, performance outcomes) across facility subgroups for 
paper I and II respectively, and the distribution of population outcomes (service 
utilisation outcomes) across population subgroups for paper III. The baseline comparison 
of outcomes across subgroups of facilities and population generated the differences/ gaps 
between subgroups which indicates inequalities at baseline [226, 227]. T-tests were used 
to assess whether the gaps were significantly different from zero.  
 
An equity analysis was further conducted for the distribution of P4P payouts as a proxy 
for facility performance in paper II. The equity analysis on the payout distribution used 
three measures of inequality: an absolute measure (the equity gap) and two relative 
measures (the equity ratio and the concentration index) [226, 227]. Equity measures 
identifies the unfair or unnecessary differences in outcomes across facilities subgroups 
[228]. The equity gaps and equity ratios were computed across all stratifying variables 
used, while the concentration indices were computed on a ranking variable of area-based 
wealth status. These three measures of inequality are further described below. The equity 
gaps and equity ratios were generated by comparing the performance payouts (payout 
scores) across facility subgroups. Specifically, the equity gap was measured as the 
difference in payout scores between facility subgroups, while the equity ratio was 
measured as the ratio of payout scores between facility subgroups. A positive (negative) 
equity gap and an equity ratio greater (less) than one in relation to wealth defines a pro-
rich (pro-poor) distribution, respectively. An equity gap of zero and an equity ratio of one 
defines an equal distribution. T-tests were used to assess whether the equity gaps in 
payout distribution were significantly different from zero. Since seven payout cycles of 6-
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months each were considered, the equity measures were applied to each payout cycle and 
to all cycles combined.  
 
Concentration indices (CI) were used to measure wealth-related inequality in the 
distribution of performance payouts using an area-based wealth status [227, 229]. The CI 
is a relative measure of inequality that shows the gradient of an outcome of interest across 
multiple subgroups with natural ranking [226, 227, 229]. It indicates the concentration of 
an outcome of interest across ranked subgroups of interest. The CI ranges between [-1 and 
+1], with zero indicating equality between multiple subgroups. A positive value indicates 
that an outcome of interest is more prevalent in the highest ranked subgroup (e.g. the 
richest), while the negative values indicate that an outcome of interest is more prevalent 
in the lowest ranked subgroup (e.g. the poorest). Equation 1 shows the formula to 




cov	 y+, R+ ,	                     (1) 
 
where y+ is the outcome of interest of the i/0 individual/ facility; R+ is the fractional rank 
of the i/0 individual/ facility (in terms of wealth status); µ is the mean of the outcome and 
cov denotes the covariance. The estimated CIs were also tested whether they were 
significantly different from zero and the p-values were estimated. 
 
4.9.2 Difference-in-differences linear regression analyses  
 
First, the DID analysis was used to identify the effect of P4P on the availability and stock-
out of medical commodities (paper I). Second, the DID analysis was extended to identify 
the differential effects of P4P on medical commodities across facilities subgroups (paper 
I); the differential effects of P4P on facility performance outcomes across facilities 
 
 47 
subgroups (paper II); and differential effects of P4P on increased service utilisation across 
population subgroups (paper III).  
 
Equation 2 estimates the average effects of P4P at the facility-level for paper I. 
 
Y+/ = β4 + β6(P4P+	×δ/) + β$δ/ + γ+ + ε+/                                           (2) 
 
where Y+/ is the outcome (availability/ stock-out of commodities) of facility i at time t. 
P4P+ is a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if a facility is exposed to P4P and 0 if not. 
This analysis controlled for time-invariant facility level determinants γ+ through facility 
fixed-effects estimation, and controlled for year-specific characteristics through δ/	year 
fixed-effects. The error term is denoted by ε+/. The average effect of P4P on the outcome 
is given by β6 in equation 2.  
 
An extension of the DID regression model with three-way interaction terms was used to 
identify differential effects of P4P across facilities’ subgroups (paper I and II) and across 
population subgroups (paper III). The three-way interaction term was between the average 
P4P effect (P4P+	×δ/) and subgrouping variable (facility subgroup G+ / population 
subgroup G+@/). The associated two-order interaction terms were also included in the 
model, though the time-invariant interaction terms were dropped through fixed-effects 
estimation. The coefficient of interest is βA which indicates the differential effect of P4P 
across facility and population subgroups as shown in equation 3 and 4, respectively. 
 
Equation 3 estimates the differential effects of P4P at the facility-level for paper I and II. 
 
Y+/ = β4 + β6(P4P+	×δ/) + β$δ/ + βBZ+/ + βA(P4P+	×δ/×G+	) + βD(P4P+	×G+)  




where Y+/ is the service coverage outcome (facility performance) of facility i at time t. 
P4P+ is a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if a facility is exposed to P4P and zero 
otherwise. This estimation controlled for time-invariant facility-level characteristics γ+ 
through facility fixed-effects estimation, and included δ/	for year fixed-effects. Potential 
confounding factors such as time-varying facility-level covariates Z+/ (availability of 
electricity and water supply, and the mean wealth index for households sampled in the 
catchment area of the facility) were controlled for. Note that the estimation of differential 
effects involved a series of regressions such that each regression has an indicator of 
subgrouping variable G+. The G+ are time-invariant and only baseline values were taken 
for time-varying facility variables to capture the pre-existing structural effects. The error 
term is denoted by ε+/. The confidence interval was reported based on standard errors 
clustered at the facility level to account for serial correlation of ε+/ at the facility level.  
 
Equation 4 estimates the differential effects of P4P at the individual/ household-level for 
paper III. 
 
Y+@/ = β4 + β6(P4P@	×δ/) + β$δ/ + βBX+@/ + βA(P4P@	×δ/×G+@/	) + βD(P4P@	×G+@/)  
+βE(G+@/	×δ/) + γ@ + ε+@/                                                                (4) 
 
where Y+@/ is the utilisation outcome (institutional deliveries or uptake of IPT2) of 
individual i in facility j’s catchment area and at time t. The intervention dummy variable 
P4P@ takes the value 1 if a facility is in the intervention arm and 0 if it is in the comparison 
arm. The time invariant facility characteristics γ@ were controlled for through facility 
fixed-effects estimation; and included δ/	for year fixed-effects. Also, potential 
confounding factors that are time-varying such as individual and household-level 
covariates X+@/ (age, education, occupation, religion, marital status, parity, insurance 
status, household size, and household wealth status) were controlled for in the model. 
Note that the estimation of differential effects involved a series of regressions whereby 
 
 49 
each regression has an indicator of subgrouping variable G+@/ taken among covariates X+@/, 
and the G+@/	were time-varying since sample participants differed over time. The error 
term is donated by ε+@/ in the model. The standard errors were clustered at the facility 
level/ facility catchment area to account for serial correlation of ε+@/ at the facility level.  
 
4.10  Sensitivity analyses 
 
Paper I, II and III  
The first robustness check focused on clustering the standard errors3. Instead of clustering 
at the facility level to account for serial correlation of error terms at the facility level, this 
study also clustered the standard errors at the district level to correct for correlation of 
error terms across facilities within districts. To calculate robust standard errors clustered 
at the district level, the study used the bootstrapping method to adjust for the small 
number of clusters4 [230].  
 
Paper II 
In this paper, an initial sensitivity analysis was used to re-estimate the model for 
institutional deliveries by excluding hospitals (8% of facilities per arm). This is because 
the performance indicator of institutional deliveries was aimed at primary care facilities 
(health centres and dispensaries), as opposed to hospitals that have a less clearly defined 
catchment population. Then, the mean wealth scores were reclassified into two quantiles 
(below or above the median) to check whether the wealth effect was sensitive to the 
classification of the wealth groupings. Lastly, apart from using a conventional parametric 
test (a t-test) to assess whether differences in payouts between subgroups were significant, 
                                                            
3 The default ordinary least squares (OLS) standard errors which ignores data clustering commonly underestimate 
the true OLS standard errors. The clustering is essential as it accounts for any within-group dependence in estimating 
standard errors of regression parameter estimates (Cameron & Miller [230]). 
4 This study used 11 districts (7 intervention and 4 comparison districts) which were quite few for data clustering 
without bootstrapping approach.  
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a non-parametric test (Wilcoxon rank-sum test)5 was also used considering that the 
distributions of payouts in all cycles were not normally distributed [231].  
 
Paper III 
The robustness checks in this paper included re-estimating the P4P differential effects by 
using wealth quintiles instead of wealth terciles to examine whether the results were 
sensitive to wealth group classification. Wealth status subgroups for each study arm were 
also generated and used to re-estimated the P4P differential effects by arm-based wealth 
subgroups to avoid the baseline imbalance in wealth status between study arms. This is 
contrary to initial subgrouping of wealth status which was first generated separately at 
baseline and then in the follow-up survey regardless of study arms. The regression model 
was also re-estimated by including three-way interactions with categorical variables 
which give multiple subgroups (e.g. categories of education levels (no education, primary, 
secondary and college/above)), instead of interactions with binary variables only (e.g. no 
education vs. some education). Lastly, a non-linear logit model was also applied in paper 
III, instead of linear model because paper III used binary outcome variables. All the 
analyses in this study were performed using STATA software (version 13). 
 
 
5.0  Summary of results 
 
5.1  Paper I 
The facility characteristics at baseline were generally balanced across study arms, but 
facilities in the intervention arm were serving poorer populations than those in the 
comparison arm (Table 2, Paper I).  
 
Average effects of P4P 
                                                            
5 The use of parametric test depends on the assumption that data are normally distributed. This implies that samples 
from different groups are independent and that the variances between the groups are equal (Kitchen [231]).  
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The introduction of P4P was associated with an 8.4 percentage point increase in the 
availability of all 37 medicines combined (13.8% increase from baseline, p=0.002), and 
an 8.3 percentage point increase in the availability of medical supplies, though this was 
only borderline significant (12.9% increase from baseline, p=0.050) (Table 3, Paper I). 
There was no effect of P4P on the availability of functioning equipment. The effects of 
P4P were further identified for some medicines related with P4P targets (i.e. 
antimalarials, antihypertensives and oxytocics used for deliveries) and supplies (i.e. 
partograph), but not on vaccines, family planning and antiretrovirals. Effects were also 
observed for drug items that were not clearly linked to service targets, but were 
incentivised for district managers (i.e. antibiotics).  
 
In terms of stock-outs, P4P was associated with a reduction in stock-outs of medicines 
and medical supplies (Table 4, Paper I). Particularly, most of the items which were found 
to increase significantly in availability, were also less likely to be out of stock.  However, 
while there was no effect on the availability of vaccines and family planning medicines, 
we found a borderline significant reduction of stock-outs of these items (Table 4, Paper I). 
Similarly, while the effect on the availability of IPT and partograph was significant, there 
was no effect in terms of their stock-outs in the 90 days prior to the survey. P4P reduced 
the stock-out of medicines across the RMNCH continuum of care, and that of medical 
supplies benefiting mothers and newborns (Appendix 1b, Paper I).  The effects of P4P on 
the availability of commodities were most pronounced for maternal, newborn and child 
medicines and reproductive health supplies.   
 
Differential effects across facility subgroups 
The overall effect of P4P on reducing the stock-out of medicines was pro-poor, with the 
reduction in facilities serving the poorest population being 24.5 percentage points greater 
than that in facilities serving the least poor tercile (p=0.019). Specifically, the effects on 
the stock-outs of antimalarials, antibiotics and oxytocics were pro-poor; effects on 
antimalarial availability were also marginally pro-poor (Table 5, Paper I). Further, P4P 
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had a greater effect on the availability of medicines and medical supplies in facilities in 
rural districts than in urban districts. Similarly, the effect of P4P on the availability and 
stock-outs of antimalarials was greater in facilities in rural than in urban districts. The 
effect of P4P on the availability and stock-out of antihypertensives was greater in health 
centres and hospitals than in dispensaries. Further, there were no differential effects by 
facility ownership.  
 
5.2  Paper II 
 
Distribution of facility payouts 
Generally, there was an increase in average payout scores between payment cycle 1 
(50.1% of total potential payout) and cycle 7 (77.7%) (Table 3, Paper II). Facility payouts 
were pro-rich, because payout scores for facilities with least poor catchment populations 
were higher than for those with the poorest catchment populations. The pro-rich effect 
was supported by the positive equity gaps and concentration indices, as well as an equity 
ratio that is greater than one across all payment cycles (Table 3, column 5 –7). However, 
these pro-rich inequalities were generally stronger in early compared to later cycles 
(Table 3, Paper II). Apart from wealth subgroups, payout scores for facilities with higher 
drug availability at baseline were significantly higher than for those facilities with lower 
drug availability; payout scores for hospitals and health centres were higher than those for 
dispensaries (Table 4, Paper II). However, these payout gaps declined over time. The 
equity ratios between subgroups of other characteristics apart from wealth status were 
approximately one, which reflects a near equal distribution across subgroups. 
 
Distribution of service coverage outcomes 
At baseline, the institutional delivery rates and coverage of IPT2 during ANC were 
similar between most subgroups of facilities (Table 5, Paper II). However, baseline 
institutional delivery rates were higher among facilities that served least poor catchment 
populations than the poorest; while coverage of IPT2 was higher among facilities that 
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served the poorest catchment populations than the least poor. Further, the coverage of 
IPT2 in the catchment area of dispensaries in the intervention arm was higher than the 
coverage around health centres and hospitals in the intervention arm; while dispensaries 
in comparison arm had lower levels of coverage in both outcomes (IPT2 and deliveries) at 
baseline than health centres and hospitals (Table 5, Paper II).  
 
In terms of differential effects, there was a greater increase in institutional deliveries 
among facilities which started with lower baseline coverage than those with higher 
baseline coverage (by 13.0 percentage points, p=0.006) (Table 6, Paper II). There was 
also an evidence of a greater increase in institutional deliveries among facilities serving 
the middle wealth population than those serving the least poor wealth population (by 14.3 
percentage points, p=0.004). In terms of the place of residence, there was a greater 
increase in institutional deliveries among facilities in rural than in urban districts (by 10.0 
percentage points, p=0.030). There were no significant differential effects on the IPT2 
coverage outcome across facility subgroups.  
 
5.3  Paper III 
The majority of individual and household characteristics were similar across intervention 
and comparison arms at baseline (Table 2, Paper III). The differences were noted for 
women in the intervention arm who were more likely to be married, non-farmers, and 
Muslim; and their households were more likely to be poor than their counterparts in the 
comparison arm. 
 
Distribution of service utilisation at baseline 
The institutional delivery rates in both arms were significantly lower for women in 
poorest and middle wealth households, and for women who were illiterate, farmers, with 
parity greater than one than for their counterpart women (Table 3, Paper III). By study 
arm specific, the rate of institutional deliveries was higher among intervention women 
with health insurance and from smaller households than among their counterpart women 
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in intervention arm. In comparison arm, the rate of institutional deliveries was higher 
among urban women than rural women. However, the baseline uptake of IPT2 was 
generally similar across arms and population subgroups, except married women in the 
comparison arm, who were more likely to receive IPT2 than unmarried women (Table 3, 
Paper III).  
 
Differential effects across population subgroups 
P4P was associated with a significant increase in institutional delivery rates among 
women in the poorest and in the middle wealth status households, but not among women 
in the least poor households (Table 4, Paper III). However, when compared with the least 
poor subgroup, the effect of P4P was only marginally greater among women in the middle 
wealth status households only (p=0.094 for differential effect) (Table 4, Paper III). The 
effect of P4P on institutional deliveries was also significantly higher among women in 
rural districts compared to women in urban districts (p=0.028 for differential effect), and 
among uninsured than insured women (p=0.001 for differential effect). There were no 
differential effects of P4P on institutional deliveries among other subgroups, and no 
differential effects of P4P on the IPT2 outcome across any population subgroups (Table 4, 
Paper III).  
 
6.0  Discussion 
An approach of paying for results such as P4P has the potential to improve health system 
performance in LMICs as it rewards health providers based on their performance [22, 28]. 
P4P strategies are gaining popularity in many LMIC settings, but the evidence in terms of 
their effectiveness, cost and equity remain limited and mixed [7, 40, 58, 134-136, 232, 
233]. This thesis, based on the P4P programme in Tanzania, contributes to a growing 
evidence base of P4P especially on the distributional effects of P4P in three aspects, as 
presented in three article papers of the thesis. The research approach in this thesis is 
quantitative and based on the programmes’ impact evaluation. Since the robustness and 
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validity of the results depends on how the research or evaluation was done, it is worth 
discussing the methodology of the study in more detail.  
 
 
6.1  Methodological considerations  
The methods used in this thesis rely on descriptive and regression analyses, which are 
both quantitative in nature. In quantitative research, particularly for impact evaluations, 
the validity of the findings is crucial to various stakeholders such as governments, policy 
makers and donors, as these findings have important implications for policy. Thus, it is 
worth to discuss the methodologies used in this thesis, and specifically based on two types 
of validity: internal and external validity.  
 
6.1.1 Internal validity  
Internal validity assesses the extent that a research study measured what it set out to 
measure in the study population [234]. In relation to impact evaluation, internal validity 
refers to an estimation of the true impact of a programme, that is net of all other potential 
bias and confounding factors, or that the comparison group represents the true 
counterfactual [216]. The internal validity can be undermined with the endogeneity 
problem for example, in many ways through biases (e.g. selection bias, information bias 
and/or confounding/ omitted variables). By definition, bias is a deviation of results or 
inferences from the truth or can be the processes leading to such deviation [234]. I then 
briefly discuss the type of bias in relation to this study. 
 
Sample selection bias: This may refer to an absence of comparability between two study 
groups [234], especially in the context of impact evaluation. The lack of comparability 
may happen if the study participants/ sites are not randomly selected. Therefore, the 
question remains on how best to establish a robust counterfactual group in order to rule 
out selection bias and improve internal validity. In establishing unbiased causality, 
randomised experiments are often considered as credible approach to use [161, 216, 217]. 
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For a successful randomisation, participants and non-participants exhibits similar 
characteristics before the programme, showing comparability. However, randomised 
experiments are rarely applied  for policy evaluation [235], and in some cases they are 
argued to be unnecessary, inappropriate, impossible or inadequate (See Black [218] for a 
detailed discussion). Non-randomised experiments (e.g. quasi-experimental study 
designs) are commonly used in policy evaluation, especially where randomisation is not 
possible [161, 216, 219, 235, 236]. Although quasi-experimental study designs can mimic 
randomisation for causal inference, they rarely rule out completely the risk of 
encountering selection bias. 
 
The Tanzanian P4P evaluation may potentially suffer from selection bias given the nature 
of the study design (i.e. controlled before and after design). The randomisation was not 
possible in Tanzania because the government selected an entire region to start 
implementing the P4P programme, and partly due to political reason as previously 
explained (See section 4.4). However, in order to establish a reasonable comparison 
group, we identified neighbouring districts which were comparable to the intervention 
districts on key variables such as: poverty and literacy rates, the rate of institutional 
deliveries, infant mortality, population per health facility, and the number of children 
under one year of age per capita [214]. Additionally, the DID regression-based approach 
was used in this thesis as a preferred method in a controlled before and after study design 
in order to remove the selection bias. This method compares the changes in outcomes 
over time between study arms, and thus accounts for any differences between study arms 
that are constant over time. As it uses regression-based methods, the observed covariates 
that are different between study arms are easily controlled for. The DID method also 
assumes unobserved factors are constant over time (time-invariant) because they are 
differenced out, and assumes there is no any unobserved time-varying differences exist 




So, the identification of impacts through DID estimation relies on the key identifying 
assumption that the trends in outcomes would be parallel across study arms in the absence 
of the intervention, i.e. parallel trends assumption [161, 216]. That is to say, without an 
intervention, outcomes would need to increase or decrease at the same rate or trend in 
both study groups. This assumption can never be formally tested. However, this study 
supported this assumption by verifying that the pre-intervention trends in selected facility 
and household level outcomes were parallel [77, 215]. When verifying the assumption at 
household level, we used data of women surveyed in households. We first created a time 
trend variable based on the time of birth (single event per time) in the baseline survey 
data; then we ran a regression on outcomes (with longitudinal nature of the data) against 
time trend, intervention dummy, and their interaction to test for a divergence in pre-
trends. A significant coefficient on the interaction term between intervention dummy and 
monthly time trend shows the difference/ divergence in the pre-trend. Four longitudinal 
outcomes during childbirth were used from household data (i.e. share of institutional 
deliveries, share of caesarean section deliveries, share of women who breastfeed within 
one hour of birth, and share of women who paid for delivery care). At the facility level, 
we similarly verified the pre-intervention parallel trends assumption based on monthly 
utilisation outcomes from patient register books prior to the start of the programme, that is 
from 2010 to 2012. The monthly utilisation outcomes include normal deliveries, 
vaccination data (polio, Measles and DPT), family planning visits, ANC visits, and 
outpatient visits. However, we were unable to verify the pre-intervention parallel trends 
based on other facility outcomes (e.g. the availability and stock-out of medical 
commodities) for which we had no data prior to the baseline survey.  
 
Omitted variable bias/ confounding: This type of bias may happen when some variables 
are omitted from the analysis while they correlate with the outcome variable or other 
covariates in the model [237, 238]. In this thesis, we were fortunate that the data sources 
used for analysis captured a rich set of potential covariates/ confounders as observed 
factors. Through the DID regression model, all observed covariates were controlled for. 
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Yet, we cannot rule out the possibility of unobserved factors/ confounders due to 
measurement difficulties. The unobserved factors as omitted factors can either be fixed or 
varying over time. As previously mentioned, with a DID regression analysis, 
unobservable factors are assumed to be fixed (time-invariant) following the parallel trend 
assumption, and can be differenced out [161, 216]. This assumption seems to appeal with 
panel data [238]. This thesis used panel data at the facility level, but not at individual and 
household level. This is because the household survey was not necessarily performed on 
the same set of households over time, and rather their selection was based on whether the 
household had a woman who delivered in the 12 months prior to the survey at each round. 
Following the nature of panel data at facility level, we therefore applied facility-fixed 
effects estimation in order to control for observed and unobserved time-invariant factors 
that are heterogeneous across facilities; and similarly applied a year-fixed effects 
estimation to control the year-specific characteristics common to all observations, 
respectively.  
 
Information bias: This refers to a systematic (non-random) measurement error which 
reflects inaccurate data reported or measured from respondents or participants [239, 240]. 
This type of bias is often observed during data collection [241], for example, when 
conducting surveys either at facility or household levels. Information bias may occur, for 
example, when the respondents do not know the exact answer to the survey questions, but 
they still provide answers [239]. It can also happen when respondents decide to either 
over-report or under-report the information relative to actual information. Typical 
potential sources of information bias include recall bias and social desirability bias. The 
sources of bias can range from how the interviews were conducted to what information 
was given and recorded. In this thesis, the information biases might have happened when 
measuring the outcomes and/or covariates through facility and household surveys. 
Respondents can inaccurately recall the past experience or information when asked (recall 
bias), but this depends on the length of the reference period. Thus, this bias is less likely 
in this study as a reasonable reference period was used that minimised the problem, i.e. a 
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year to recall the experience on maternal service utilisation. In addition, social desirability 
bias refers to inaccuracy in reporting self-reported events with respect to social 
desirability [242]. If self-reported event is socially undesirable individuals are more likely 
to under-report, and potentially over-report the event that perceived socially desirable. 
Similarly, sensitive or personally threating events or behaviours are often under-reported. 
In this study, social desirability bias may seem less of an issue, since both facility and 
household surveys asked questions which were not sensitive, and facility survey involved 
mostly direct observations. Additionally, data collectors were fully trained in many 
aspects that ensures minimal measurement error; for example on data entry approach, on 
ensuring privacy and confidentiality, and on establishing an adequate rapport with 
respondents as these makes respondents comfortable to reveal valid responses [243].  
 
Other methodological limitations 
The findings of convergence in facility performance for institutional deliveries between 
worse-off and better-off performers, and convergence in utilisation of institutional 
deliveries between worse and better-off populations should be interpreted with caution. 
An initial interpretation might show that P4P improves performance and service 
utilisation among the worse-off providers and service users, respectively. However, these 
results might also reflect a regression to the mean principle6 (a random fluctuation rather 
than a true causal effect). To disentangle the two hypotheses, the analyses may need 
longer term observations of data [244] or randomised experiment data [245, 246]. 
 
Paper II used proxy measures from a household survey based on a random sample of 20 
households per facility to model service coverage outcomes as facility’s performance 
outcomes and to measure the wealth status of the facility catchment population. To proxy 
facility-level outcomes based on household data raises two concerns for discussion. First, 
                                                            
6 Regression to the mean (RTM) is a statistical phenomenon that occurs when repeated measurements are made on 





the proxy was from a sample of 20 households which may seem as not representative of 
the entire facility catchment population of women who delivered in the previous 12 
months prior to the survey. However, a random sample of 20 households was reasonable 
and practical in this study because of two reasons: (i) the 20 households were reached 
based on a sample size calculation [214], and (ii) similar P4P evaluation studies have used 
sample sizes within that range to estimate the effects of P4P (e.g. 13 households in 
Rwanda [132] and 20 households in Cameroon [24]). A second concern was that sampled 
households were assumed to have used the health services from their nearest facility. This 
assumption might not always hold for services that are measured through household 
survey like institutional delivery, since has been associated with a high rate of client’s 
bypassing the nearest facility [183, 184]. However, even the use of facility-based data 
from patient register books (though unreliable with several concerns like incompleteness) 
revealed an increase in the number of normal deliveries due to P4P in Tanzania, which is 
consistent with the finding from the household survey [77].  
 
A further limitation was in paper I that several items of medical commodities were used 
when assessing the effect of P4P on the availability and stock-out rates of medical 
commodities. In terms of inference, assessing an impact of a programme on many items 
reflects multiple hypotheses testing which could potentially lead to a Type I error, i.e. of 
rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true [247]. However, this study reduced the risk of 
this error by generating composite scores for subgroups of commodities.  
 
Furthermore, in paper III, the study may have been underpowered to detect the effect of 
P4P in some groups, for example among insured women and urban residents, possibly 
due to the smaller sample sizes for subgroups [248, 249]. The results of differential 
effects on deliveries by wealth status, health insurance and place of residence, were also 
slightly not consistent across all analytical specifications used in robustness checks (i.e. 
non-linear model, and a model that reports standard errors clustered at the district level). 
However, all analytical specifications consistently showed the lack of significant 
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differential effects on deliveries for other subgroups of social determinants (i.e. marital 
status, age, education, occupation, religion, parity, and household size), and the lack of 
significant differential effects on IPT2 overall.  
 
 
6.1.2 External validity 
External validity means that results observed in one population or setting can be 
generalised to others [241, 250]. For an impact evaluation, external validity means that 
the impact estimated in the evaluation sample can be generalised to the population of all 
eligible units [216]. External validity is of utmost importance especially when the 
research findings are used to inform policy in the wider population of interest [216].   
 
The findings of the evaluation of P4P scheme in Pwani region, Tanzania, can easily be 
generalised across Pwani region. This is because all hospitals, health centres, and non-
public dispensaries offering RMNCH services together with a sample of public 
dispensaries were included in the study sample (i.e. 46% of all facilities in Pwani were 
included in the study) [214]. However, the generalisability of findings to other regions 
within Tanzania is more questionable as the performance of facilities, and level of service 
utilisation varies across regions. For example, according to the DHS data, Pwani region 
performed above the national average in most of the RMNCH indicators [168]. Pwani 
region is also next to the capital city of Dar es Salaam, where the MoHSW and the MSD 
responsible for distributing drug and supplies are located. This might potentially enhance 
the performance in Pwani compared to other regions in Tanzania. However, other regions 
in Tanzania especially those with lower performance have more scope for improvement if 
exposed with performance incentives.  In order to learn and incorporate diversity across 
regions within Tanzania, the roll out of the scheme (RBF) started with Pwani region and 
moved to regions in Lake zone, almost in the northern part of Tanzania. Further 
assessment on performance variation based on the RBF roll out is needed, and this can be 




Moreover, the effects of P4P in Tanzania are not easily generalizable to other countries, 
due to the context-specific differences across settings. Some contextual factors influence 
the introduction, design, implementation and effectiveness of P4P schemes [58, 251-257]. 
For example, the contextual variations in institutional, social, political, cultural, 
organisational set-up and policy environment, may lead to varied implementation 
progress, providers’ responses to P4P incentives and eventual effectiveness of the 
scheme. The effectiveness of the scheme, for instance, can be enhanced more in settings 
that have demand-side policies to reduce the barriers to access care (e.g. fee exemptions, 
health insurance, or conditional cash transfers) [128, 157]. Similarly, positive effects of 
P4P are more likely in settings with favourable health system structure, which may 
include functioning information systems, adequate supply of medical commodities, and 
adequate financial and human resources.  
 
 
6.2  Discussion of the main findings 
This section discusses the findings of this thesis in relation to other theoretical and 
empirical literature on performance based payments.  
 
6.2.1 Can P4P improve the structural quality of care?  
 
P4P is increasingly being applied in many settings to improve both health service quantity 
and quality. The Tanzanian P4P pilot scheme considered in this thesis may seem focused 
much on improving service use, with limited attention to quality of care, because the latter 
was not explicitly incentivised. Note that quality of care has three attributes namely 
structural, process and outcomes [73]. In Tanzania, the evidence of P4P effects on 
process quality has been documented [77], but with mixed findings. The effects of P4P on 
structural quality are presented in this thesis, but the P4P effects on health outcomes 




In terms of structural quality, this study found that P4P was associated with an increase in 
the availability of essential drugs and supplies, but there was no effect on the availability 
of functioning equipment. P4P was also associated with a significant reduction in the 
stock-out of essential drugs and supplies. However, this study provides a partial 
assessment of the effects of P4P on structural quality of care, because other aspects of 
structural quality (e.g. human resources, organisation structure, and physical 
infrastructures [73]) were not considered due to a lack of data.  
 
 
How does these results compare to others?  
A recent review by Das et al [134] concluded that P4P is not effective in improving 
structural quality of care in LMICs, which is contrary to our findings. This conclusion 
was based on three studies on structural quality that were published between 1990 and 
2014, and specifically from a study in Burundi and two studies in the DRC. A study in 
Katanga province of the DRC found negative effects on structural quality index, which 
includes drugs, vaccines and equipment [142]. Other two studies considered have used 
subjective measures (i.e. patients’ perceptions) on drug availability. It was revealed that 
patients in Burundi perceived there were no P4P effects on drug availability [138], while 
patients in South Kivu province of the DRC perceived an improvement in drug 
availability [141]. Apart from such studies in a review, there are other studies being 
published recently that can be compared with our findings. For example, a study from 
Afghanistan found that P4P had no effects on the availability of drugs and equipment 
[145]. The finding that P4P improved the availability of essential drugs in Tanzania is 
consistent with recent evidence from P4P programme in Malawi [151]. However, 
contrary to the evidence from Tanzania, P4P improved the availability of functioning 




The variation in results across settings could partly be explained by differences in 
programme designs. While the Tanzanian P4P programme directly incentivised the 
district managers to ensure drugs availability for their facilities, this was not clearly the 
case in other settings. District managers in Tanzania were incentivised because of their 
role in the process of procurement and supply of medical commodities to facilities. In 
Malawi, however, there were incentives to district managers’ that were tied to equipment 
maintenance and management of drug supply across facilities [151]. These incentives to 
district managers explains the similarities of P4P effect between Malawi and Tanzania. In 
the DRC, however, facilities could channel a percentage of their bonus to districts to 
support the functioning of the districts [258]. Further, while up to 25%, 30% and 50% of 
the bonus payment could be used to procure drugs or for facility improvement in 
Tanzania, Malawi and Burundi, respectively [77, 138, 151], this was not clearly the case 
in the other settings.  
 
 
How P4P can improve the availability of medical commodities? 
According to the United Nations commission on life-saving commodities, P4P is 
considered as a strategy to improve access to life-saving commodities for RMNCH [221]. 
The question remains on the mechanisms through which P4P programmes can affect the 
availability of drugs and supplies. In Tanzanian, we conceptualised the pathways in two 
ways: direct and indirect pathway. The direct pathway refers to when the P4P programme 
directly incentives the availability of commodities. P4P in Tanzania incentivised district 
managers to reduce essential drug stock-out rates among facilities in their district, and 
similarly the P4P in Malawi tied incentives to equipment maintenance and management 
of drug supply across facilities [151]. In Tanzania, district managers are in the chain of 
procurement and supply of commodities to the facilities, and therefore they can efficiently 
influence this process in order to limit stock-outs. District managers also frequently visit 
facilities for supportive supervision and data verification, which creates an avenue to 
discuss or report on and deal with stock-outs. Further, the indirect pathway can be in two 
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parts –either by incentivising the provision of commodities/ drugs, or through additional 
financial resources as bonus payments that can be used to procure drugs and supplies. In 
the case of the former, for example, P4P incentivised the provision of IPT during ANC, 
and therefore indirectly incentivised the availability of IPT stocks at facilities. In addition, 
the extra resources provided to facilities by P4P could be used to procure essential 
commodities which are out of stock or equipment. This pathway will only work where 
P4P payments are in part paid to facilities, and providers have autonomy in how they use 
these funds [22, 33].  
 
It is also important to note that the Tanzanian P4P scheme did not affect the availability of 
equipment and some of the drugs. One potential reason is that some of the items –e.g. 
vaccines, antiretrovirals and family planning items, are procured through donor funding 
or vertical programmes, meaning they are not within the direct control of providers [182, 
201, 202]. Also the higher level of availability for vaccines and family planning at 
baseline may have limited the scope for further improvement. The lack of effect on 
equipment availability may be due to the lack of incentives attached to equipment 
availability at the facility or the district level. The cost of equipment is also higher than 
that of many drugs and supplies, which may have deterred facilities from such 
investments. Thus, it seems incentivising managers on equipment availability might have 
served to improve this outcome.  
 
How are the effects of P4P on medical commodities differed across facilities? 
This is the first study to examine the heterogeneity of the effect of P4P on medical 
commodities, despite the importance of assessing distributional effects within program 
evaluation [65, 162]. It was important, for example, to assess whether facilities serving 
the poorer and rural populations improved most, since these populations face a greater 
burden of out-of-pocket payments due to drug stock-outs [74, 160]. The finding shows 
that the effects of P4P on drugs were generally stronger among facilities serving poorer 
and rural catchment population. These pro-poor and pro-rural effects may reflect the 
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potential scope for improvement among facilities in poor and rural settings, as they 
performed poorly in drug availability at baseline than their counterparts. They further 
suggest that facilities in rural and poor communities responded strongly to P4P incentives 
in a bid to earn performance payouts for investing in reducing stock-out rates. Since 
district managers were paid based on performance of their facilities, maybe they focused 
much on strengthening the poorly performing facilities (e.g. in poor and rural areas) by 
for example addressing the issue of their stock-out rates to enhance overall district 
performance. Generally, the pro-poor effects on drugs are encouraging as are the pro-rural 
effects and these are consistent with UHC goals in the Sustainable Development Goal 
three.   
 
Further, despite the differing procurement and supply systems in public and non-public 
sectors in Tanzania, the effects did not differ by facility ownership status. This might be 
due to the fact that non-public facilities often rely on procurement and supply systems of 
the MSD that public facilities also use. Effects also did not differ across facility level of 
care, regardless of the fact that primary care facility such as dispensaries are often worse-




6.2.2 Does P4P increase or reduce performance inequalities?  
 
Most countries especially in LMICs are providing performance incentives to health 
providers to improve the health system’s performance [22, 28, 259]. The intention is 
logical and can improve efficiency and possibly equity. However, the equity dimension 
across providers if not well monitored and get worse may also worsen the pre-existing 
system performance. Given that health providers are not similar, then heterogeneous 
responses to incentives are expected when paying based on providers’ performance. The 
evidence of whether a P4P programme leads to heterogeneous performance which may 
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increase or reduce performance inequalities among providers/ facilities is limited in 
LMICs7, despite the substantial variation in health facility readiness to deliver services in 
this context [167]. However, there is only one study as an exception which is from 
Rwanda [70]. This study has recently assessed the heterogeneous facility performance by 
baseline levels of quality, but they neither used other facility- and area-based 
characteristics to assess the heterogeneous performance, nor assessed how payouts were 
distributed across facilities of differing characteristics. Hence, a sub-study in this thesis 
contributes in these lacking aspects on heterogeneous facility performance on service 
coverage and payouts across facilities of differing characteristics. 
 
The study findings showed that there were inequalities in the distribution of facility 
payouts which favoured the better-off facilities, but these inequalities in payouts declined 
over time. Note that P4P payouts reflects the performance in all incentivised indicators, 
and therefore the better-off facilities were better able to perform at the beginning and 
earned larger payouts than the worse-off facilities who seem to improve over time as well 
(showing convergence). The performance on the coverage of institutional deliveries was 
greater among facilities with initially lower levels of coverage, with middle wealth 
catchment populations, and located in rural areas than their counterpart facilities. These 
greater improvements among the worse-off facilities is partly due to an initial large scope 
for improvement among the worse-off facilities compared to their counterparts. Further, 
the performance on the coverage of antimalarials provision was similar across facilities.  
 
 
How does these results compare to others? 
As there is only one study from LMICs on supply-side heterogeneous performance, the 
findings from Tanzania can largely be compared with findings from HICs. However, it is 
                                                            
7 This evidence is useful because an increase in performance inequality reflects inequality in payments, that may 
widen the resource gap and eventually increase inequality in healthcare provision between providers (Chien et al 
[66], Blustein et al [125]).   
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important to note that the programme design, context, and types of incentivised indicators 
differs across settings. In Rwanda, Sherry et al [70] found that facilities in the middle of 
the baseline quality distribution generally improved most across a broader range of 
rewarded services. This finding is consistently supporting the role of baseline facility 
characteristics in influencing facility performance, as in Tanzania both baseline facility- 
and area-based characteristics were considered for assess heterogeneous performance.  
 
Further, the convergence in performance payouts over time is partly consistent with the 
“inverse equity hypothesis”8 [71]. A study from the United States also found hospitals 
treating wealthier populations initially received higher incentive payments than hospitals 
serving poorer populations, but with a declining trend in payout inequalities over time 
[68]. In Tanzania, lower performers at baseline improved most in terms of institutional 
deliveries which enhanced convergence in performance, and this is consistent with P4P 
studies on quality improvement in the United Kingdom [67], in Canada [95] and in the 
United States [53, 55, 115, 120, 125]. The finding that facilities serving middle wealth 
populations with initial low coverage on deliveries improved more over time than those 
serving the least poor populations, is different to that reported in the United States and 
United Kingdom in relation to quality improvements [66, 67, 109, 116, 125, 260-262]. 
These studies found that providers serving low-income populations performed initially 
less well on quality improvement but improved most over time than those serving high-
income populations. The pro-rural performance on institutional deliveries observed in 
Tanzania, differs with a finding of no association between performance and rural/urban 
location in the United States [263], and the findings from the United Kingdom showing 
less effect in rural than in urban areas [261, 262].  
 
 
What are the potential mechanisms to affect performance inequality? 
                                                            
8 The hypothesis suggests that better-off groups will initially benefit from a new intervention and widen inequalities, 
but over time the worse-off can eventually catch up. 
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Despite growing interest in performance incentives especially in LMICs, a lot remains 
unknown particularly regarding the exact mechanisms through which such schemes bring 
about change and how programme design affects this [58, 215, 264]. Establishing and 
testing a theory of change for P4P programmes remains crucial in understanding 
programme’s impacts. This study hypothesised that the effects on performance 
inequalities will depend on existing structural factors, and how the incentives are 
designed. Performance inequalities can either be enhanced, reduced or remain unchanged 
between worse-off and better-off providers.  
 
Incentive design pathway: The performance inequality may arise depending on how 
payouts are offered with respect to target setting. Despite several ways of target setting, 
the Tanzanian P4P programme used: (i) multiple thresholds targets based on baseline 
performance (e.g. for institutional deliveries), and (ii) single threshold targets (e.g. IPT2 
coverage) irrespective of baseline performance. Based on the two designs in Tanzania, 
evidence shows that lower baseline performers had greater improvements in performance 
on institutional deliveries (with multiple thresholds), but the performance on IPT2 
coverage (single threshold) was similar across all facilities. A greater improvement in 
institutional deliveries among lower baseline performers is possibly because of the design 
that used multiple thresholds targets. Some literature suggest that multiple thresholds 
targets can enhance convergence in performance as they account for baseline performance 
and provide incentives for lower performers to catch up [27, 49, 53].  
 
From a theoretical perspective, a single threshold target, as used for IPT2 in Tanzania, can 
enhance divergence in performance as it fails to account for baseline performance [27, 49, 
50, 53, 56, 57]. However, the finding in Tanzania is different from a theoretical 
prediction, as it shows similar improvement on IPT2 coverage due to P4P across 
facilities. Other factors beyond the incentive design for IPT2 may possibly explain such a 
finding of similar performance. Contextual factors, for example, of almost universal 
coverage of one ANC visit in Tanzania (i.e. more than 98%) [77, 168] may have led to 
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minimal effort needed for most facilities to achieve the target for IPT2. Also the nature of 
the IPT2 indicator which is a content of care (within the control of the provider) as 
opposed to service use (which requires a change in household behaviour), possibly 
facilitated a similar response among providers.  
 
In other settings, some studies have shown how programme design/target affects 
inequalities in performance outcomes. In the United States, for example, a reduction in 
payout inequalities was attributed to a change in the design of the scheme from rewarding 
top performers to rewarding for improvement where all providers were likely to receive 
an incentive payment [68]. Also the convergence in performance on quality improvement 
was partly linked to a design with multiple thresholds targets in the United Kingdom [67] 
and in Canada [95], and to a system that rewards the highest performers and penalised the 
lowest performers in the United States [53, 55]. Theoretically, for a design with multiple 
or single threshold targets, both convergence and divergence are possible outcomes but 
also depending on the structural context.   
 
 
Structural effect pathway: Structural factors provide another pathway through which P4P 
may affect performance inequalities across providers [65, 69, 70]. This study considered 
structural factors such as facility characteristics (ownership status, level of care, and the 
availability of medical inputs) and area-based characteristics (wealth status of the 
catchment population and rural/urban location). The variation of these factors across 
facilities may explain performance inequalities at baseline and over time. In Tanzania, 
some structural factors were significantly associated with performance inequality. For 
example, a greater performance on the coverage of institutional deliveries was shown 
among facilities in middle wealth catchment population and in rural districts with initially 
low coverage than their counterpart facilities. It seems the P4P incentives were stronger 
among the worse-off providers as they improved more on delivery care coverage than 
their counterparts. In contrast, the payouts distribution favoured the better-off facilities 
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initially (higher level facilities, in wealthier catchment areas, and with more medical 
commodities), but these inequalities/ payout gaps declined over time.  
 
The convergence pattern on the coverage of institutional deliveries and on bonus payouts 
stands out as an encouraging finding, because the worse-off providers possibly responded 
positively to incentives and enhanced performance. Note that the two findings (on service 
coverage and payouts) cannot be compared directly because facility improvements were 
assessed only on two incentivised services (delivery care and IPT2 provision), but payout 
outcome reflects a total performance on all the incentivised services. 
 
To this end, the hypothesised pathways to reduce or enhance performance inequalities 
cannot be conclusively confirmed by this study and remains open for discussion and 
future research. This is because multiple thresholds enhanced convergence on deliveries 
while single threshold did not lead to divergence in performance as hypothesised, and not 
all structural factors hypothesised associated with performance inequality. However, there 
is an indication that P4P can reduce performance inequalities by enhancing convergence 
in performance. Therefore, this study suggests that both the incentive design on target 
setting and structural factors matters for performance inequality.    
 
 
6.2.3 Do the benefits of P4P reach the worse-off populations?  
 
From a demand-side perspective, it is clear that more research is needed to monitor and 
evaluate how the benefits of P4P are distributed across a wider range of population 
subgroups. Providers’ responses to incentives may affect not only the average P4P effects 
but also heterogeneous P4P effects across populations. For example, in order to meet 
performance targets, providers may extend services to underserved groups and enhance 
equity [22, 33], or may focus on easier-to-reach population and enhance inequity [29]. 
Therefore, the assessment of heterogeneous P4P effects across populations is crucial, and 
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must look beyond economic status subgroups as commonly reported, but rather 
incorporate a wider range of social determinants subgroups in order to capture a broader 
range of population subgroups that may drive heterogeneous effects [85, 265]. This type 
of evidence is key to inform universal access policies [265-267].  
 
The heterogeneous results from this study show that P4P increased institutional deliveries 
more among women in the middle wealth status households, among the uninsured, and 
among women living in rural areas than among wealthier, insured, and urban residing 
women. However, there were no any heterogeneous effects of P4P on institutional 
deliveries across other population subgroups of social determinants (e.g. education, 
occupation, age, parity). Thus, population wealth status, health insurance status and place 
of residence were the main drivers of demand-side heterogeneous P4P effects on 
institutional deliveries. Moreover, the effect of P4P on the uptake of antimalarial drugs 
was equally distributed across population subgroups.  
 
 
How does these results compare to others? 
While most studies on demand-side heterogeneous effects of P4P have disaggregated the 
effect across population economic status particularly in LMICs, this study used a broader 
range of social determinants subgroups.  
 
In terms of wealth status, this study found that institutional deliveries increased more 
among middle wealth women than least poor women. This pro-middle wealth effect of 
P4P on institutional deliveries, as an indication of being pro-poor, is contrary to the pro-
rich effect on deliveries reported in Burundi [133], Rwanda [157] and Cambodia [128]. 
The pro-rich effect in Cambodia was attributed to the lack of effective demand among the 
poorest women due to user fees [128]; whereas in Burundi it was attributed to other costs 
like transport because the user fees for deliveries were removed prior to P4P [133, 268]. 
However, other study in Rwanda and Burundi revealed a different pattern of results. For 
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example, a pilot study in Burundi [138] and a study using DHS data in Rwanda [159] 
found similar P4P effect on deliveries across household’s socioeconomic groups; and the 
results from Rwanda were attributed to low and uniform coverage of services at baseline. 
In other settings such as the DRC, providers implementing P4P negotiated user fees with 
communities and raised revenues without hurting the poorest [141]. However, the equity 
effects of this approach in the DRC were not assessed empirically. Additional evidence of 
a pro-poor effect of P4P has been shown on immunisation services in Burundi [133], and 
on quality of care improvement in the United Kingdom [31, 67, 105, 109, 110]. 
Generally, from the above studies, it seems the effect of P4P on socioeconomic equity 
remains mixed across settings and across targeted services.  
 
Regarding the place of residence, this study found a greater increase in the institutional 
deliveries in rural than in urban populations. This finding differs from the P4P scheme in 
Rwanda that led to similar improvement in institutional deliveries between rural and 
urban populations [159]. However, the number of urban clusters in Rwanda (which were 
few compared to rural clusters) were thought to limit the power to detect the 
heterogeneity of P4P effect by place of residence [159], while our study had a slightly 
higher number of urban clusters compared to Rwanda (i.e. 28 versus 22 urban clusters). In 
the United Kingdom, the effect of P4P on quality of care was greater in urban areas than 
in rural areas [261, 262], while the effect of P4P on quality of care was similar between 
rural and urban areas in the United States [263]. Although the classification of rural–
urban is context specific [269], the evidence on the heterogeneity of P4P effect between 
rural and urban populations remain limited and mixed across settings.  
 
The Tanzanian P4P was associated with an increase in institutional deliveries among 
uninsured women, whereas a greater effect on institutional deliveries was found among 
women with health insurance in Rwanda [157] and a maternity care voucher in Cambodia 
[128]. The findings from Rwanda and Cambodia were attributed to reduced financial 
barriers to access care [128, 157], and this could be the case with a stronger enforcement 
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of fee exemptions in Tanzania [77]. Efforts to reduce the demand-side barriers seem to 
enhance the equity effects of P4P in healthcare access and use. However, another study in 
Rwanda based on DHS, as nationally representative data, found a similar increase in 
deliveries due to P4P irrespective of women’s health insurance status [159].  
 
In Tanzania, there was also a similar distribution of institutional delivery rates and IPT2 
uptakes across age groups prior to P4P, and the effect of P4P was equally distributed 
across age groups. In contrast, P4P studies in HICs found inequalities in quality of care 




What are the potential mechanisms for P4P to preferentially benefit disadvantaged 
populations?  
This study found that the use of institutional deliveries improved most among women in 
middle wealth households, uninsured, and in rural areas than their counterpart women. 
This was potentially due to the increased adherence to user fee exemption policy among 
public facilities, and also due to the improved availability of drugs, minimising the need 
to pay for drugs in private pharmacies [10, 74, 76, 77, 96, 212, 215, 270-272]. Greater 
improvements on institutional deliveries among the worse-off women suggest that these 
women were likely to have been more responsive to a change in healthcare costs [86, 87]. 
Such a responsiveness is consistent with demand theory, and previously explained 
conceptual framework that incentives stimulated a supply-side response to reduce 
financial barriers to access care which in turn stimulated the demand-side response on 
service utilisation mostly among the disadvantaged population subgroups.  
 
The greater effect of P4P on institutional deliveries among uninsured women in Tanzania 
is also because baseline institutional delivery rates were higher among insured compared 
to uninsured women in the intervention arm, which gave a large scope for improvement 
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among uninsured women. A further possibility would be that uninsured women were 
more responsive to reduced healthcare costs compared to insured women who were 
already covered. It is also likely that the statistical power to detect the effect among 
women with health insurance was limited because fewer women are insured in Tanzania9 
[204], compared to other countries like Rwanda [273, 274]. Further, the pro-rural effects 
of P4P on institutional deliveries in Tanzania, seem to reflects the fact that rural providers 
strongly responded to incentives (as found in paper II) and eventually triggered the 
demand of institutional delivery among women in those areas. This is likely because the 
effect of P4P on deliveries was greater among the worse-off women (e.g. poorer and 
uninsured)[158], and these women often reside in rural areas [275]. Despite an indication 
that P4P may benefit more the worse-off populations (poorer, uninsured and rural 
residents) especially on delivery care, further research is needed to better understand the 
demand-side heterogeneity of P4P effects.  
 
 
6.3  Policy implications 
This work contributes to reducing the knowledge gap in terms of P4P effects on medical 
commodities, and eventual heterogeneous effects of P4P on medical commodities, facility 
performance outcomes, and on service utilisation in LMICs. This study offers a number 
of policy implications. The finding that P4P improved the availability of drugs and 
supplies was linked to a design element of incentivising district managers to limit drug 
stock-outs in Tanzania. This study highlights the importance of incentivising district 
managers, given their role in doing supportive supervision, and in procurement and 
supply of medical commodities. A further P4P design element to be reinforced is financial 
autonomy through bank accounts and ensuring discretion in the use of funds at the facility 
level. Overall health facility autonomy is an important design element of P4P and is 
hypothesised to improve provider’s performance. These highlighted design elements can 
                                                            
9 About 9% of women were insured in this study (Binyaruka et al [77]). 
 
 76 
be strengthened in the P4P roll out design in Tanzania, and similarly be applied in P4P 
designs in other settings to maximise programme impact. 
 
This study also shows that the design of incentives in setting targets can affect 
performance inequalities and eventually benefit facilities differently, but also structural 
factors and the nature of performance indicators themselves also matter for performance 
and eventual payouts. On that regard, it is crucial to carefully consider the incentive 
design structures such that they do not lead to inequalities in performance and payouts, 
and avoid reinforcing the gaps in resources and service provision across facilities. The 
inequalities in performance and payouts should not favour only facilities that are better-
off at baseline (i.e. better able to perform and needs little improvement for higher payout) 
and rather the scheme should incentivise the worse-off facilities to improve, benefit and 
catch-up. For instance, it is possible that paying based on improvement/ per additional 
service delivered (e.g. fee-for-service) may incentive facilities that are worse-off at 
baseline, and those with large scope for improvement, to improve and receive payments; 
as opposed to paying based on target attainment (achieve/ maintain at a threshold) that 
favours the better-offs at the onset as they are better able to achieve targets/ maintain 
above a threshold. Similarly, this study found that payout distribution favoured facilities 
that were better-off at the onset (i.e. facilities with more medical commodities, serving 
wealthier population, and higher level facilities). Therefore, equity bonuses for 
disadvantaged providers/ facilities should be considered to redress such inequalities in 
performance and payouts resulting from pre-existing structural challenges (e.g. 
geographical inaccessibility, low catchment population size, and poverty). It is also 
important to harmonise the capacity to deliver services prior to P4P through a facility 
readiness assessment study and potential quality boosting investments (e.g. through initial 
start-up financial support). 
 
The Tanzanian P4P scheme reduced the chances of paying informal user fees through 
providers’ stronger enforcement of an exemption policy and also the scheme improved 
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the availability of drugs and supplies. These effects of P4P seem to have reduced the 
demand-side financial barriers to access care especially among the worse-off populations 
(e.g. poorer, uninsured and rural residents) and enhanced equitable access and use of 
services particularly for institutional deliveries. Based on these findings, policy makers 
should consider to strengthen or introduce other complementary measures to reduce 
demand-side access barriers which seem to reinforce the P4P effect on service use. 
Examples of such demand-side initiatives may include pre-payment health insurance 
schemes, cash transfers, exemptions and voucher schemes. Although contexts may vary, 
both insurance and voucher schemes have increased the effects of P4P on the use of 
institutional delivery care in Rwanda and Cambodia, respectively. On that regard, P4P is 
likely to be most effective at reducing inequities in service use in settings where they 
offer free health services (or with an exemption policy) or in settings with other demand-
side schemes to enhance access to care. Demand-side initiatives that complement supply-
side interventions are of utmost importance to ensure universal access to care and reduce 
any pre-existing inequities in service utilisation. Policy makers in LMICs should therefore 
discuss and formulate mechanisms to ensure universal access, and stimulate both demand 
for and supply of healthcare services (e.g. combining demand-side and supply-side 
incentives) in order to facilitate the move towards UHC goal in Sustainable Development 
Goals three.  
 
 
6.4  Research implications 
This PhD work shows the potential of a P4P scheme to increase the availability of drugs 
and supplies, and it expands the understanding of the heterogeneity of the P4P effects 
across facilities and populations subgroups. However, further research is needed as some 
questions remain unanswered.  
 
First, since other aspects of structural quality (e.g. human resources, organisation 
structure, and physical infrastructures) are not considered in this study due to a lack of 
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data, future research in LMICs should aim to capture P4P impacts on the overall 
structural quality measures. Furthermore, because most P4P evaluations are increasingly 
examining process and structural quality of care in LMICs, more research is needed to 
identify programme effects on all attributes of quality of care including health outcomes. 
To improve population health, as an ultimate goal of any health system, various 
programmes like P4P should be assessed whether they improve not only service 
utilisation but also quality of care in multidimensional sense.  
 
The understanding of P4P heterogeneous effects is useful to inform the design and scale-
up, therefore, more comprehensive evidence that may shed light on P4P pathways and 
mechanisms (theory of change) is needed as may also facilitate to open up the “black 
box” of P4P. Further, process evaluation through qualitative research that may explain the 
sources and mechanisms in the context of heterogeneous P4P effects is of utmost 
importance to supplement quantitative evidence. 
 
Moreover, this study used only two target setting methods that were used in Tanzania, 
single and multiple thresholds, to assess the relationship between incentive designs and 
facility performance inequalities. Since the findings on this aspect remain mixed in this 
thesis, further studies are needed across settings to assess the influence of incentive 
designs (e.g. paying providers based on fee-for-service or thresholds targets) on 
performance inequalities.  
 
In addition, from a theoretical perspective, P4P as a supply-side intervention which 
affects providers’ behaviour may trigger the demand-side responses and improve both 
service quality and use. Therefore, further insights on how supply- and demand-side 





Lastly, the average and heterogeneous effects of P4P were assessed in short term over a 
13-month period in this study. Since supply-side responses to performance incentives 
(among providers) and demand-side responses to improved services (among service 
users) are not linear as they change over time, there is a need to monitor and assess the 
longer term average and heterogeneous effects of P4P to better understand these schemes 




6.5  Conclusion 
The study findings show the potential of P4P in improving structural quality of care, 
through improved availability of medical commodities and stock-outs reduction. The 
findings also demonstrate the existence of some drivers of heterogeneity of P4P effects on 
the supply- and demand-side in a low- income country.  
 
o The first paper carried out in this thesis found that P4P was associated with 
improvements in terms of drugs and supplies availability, especially among the 
worse-off facilities which serve poorer populations, and are located in rural areas.  
 
o In the second paper, P4P increased the coverage rates of institutional deliveries 
more among the worse-off facilities which serve middle wealth populations, 
located in rural areas, and those with low performance initially. The coverage of 
antimalarials provision (IPT2) increased equally across facilities. Facility bonus 
payouts for all incentivised indictors were initially higher among higher level 
facilities like hospitals, better resourced facilities, and facilities serving wealthier 
populations, but these inequalities in payouts declined over time.  
 
o In the third paper, P4P increased the rate of institutional deliveries more among 
women in middle wealth status households, among the uninsured, and among 
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women living in rural areas than their counterparts. The uptake of at least two 
doses of antimalarial drugs (IPT2) increased equality across population subgroups. 
 
The findings about the heterogeneity of the P4P effects across facilities and population 
subgroups have important implications for inequalities in facility performance and 
inequalities in healthcare use, respectively. Therefore, these heterogeneous effects of P4P, 
and of other financing programmes, should be monitored over time and similarly be 
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Improving quality of care through payment for performance:
examining effects on the availability and stock-out of essential
medical commodities in Tanzania
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Abstract objective To evaluate the effects of payment for performance (P4P) on the availability and stock-
out rate of reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health (RMNCH) medical commodities in
Tanzania and assess the distributional effects.
methods The availability of RMNCH commodities (medicines, supplies and equipment) on the day
of the survey, and stock-outs for at least one day in the 90 days prior to the survey, was measured in
75 intervention and 75 comparison facilities in January 2012 and 13 months later. Composite scores
for each subgroup of commodities were generated. A difference-in-differences linear regression was
used to estimate the effect of P4P on outcomes and differential effects by facility location, level of
care, ownership and socio-economic status of the catchment population.
results We estimated a significant increase in the availability of medicines by 8.4 percentage points
(P = 0.002) and an 8.3 percentage point increase (P = 0.050) in the availability of medical supplies.
P4P had no effect on the availability of functioning equipment. Most items with a significant increase
in availability also showed a significant reduction in stock-outs. Effects were generally equally
distributed across facilities, with effects on stock-outs of many medicines being pro-poor, and greater
effects in facilities in rural compared to urban districts.
conclusion P4P can improve the availability of medicines and medical supplies, especially in poor,
rural areas, when these commodities are incentivised at both facility and district levels, making
services more acceptable, effective and affordable, enhancing progress towards universal health
coverage.
keywords Policy evaluation, payment for performance, medical commodities, structural quality of
care, RMNCH, health financing
Introduction
The availability of essential medical commodities (medici-
nes, medical supplies and equipment) is a key component
of effective service delivery required for maintaining pop-
ulation health [1]. Shortages of medical commodities are
associated with poor structural quality of care, or poor
quality relating to the attributes of the setting in which
care delivery occurs [2, 3], low levels of patient satisfac-
tion and preventable deaths [4–9]. Medicine and supply
shortages in public facilities are also responsible for a
large share of the out-of-pocket payments faced by house-
holds in low- and middle-income settings limiting the
affordability of care [1, 10]. However, ensuring the
availability of essential medical commodities remains a
challenge for many low-income country health systems.
According to the United Nations Commission on Life-
Saving Commodities, payment for performance (P4P) is a
strategy to improve access to life-saving commodities for
maternal and child health [11, 12]. P4P provides financial
incentives to providers and/or healthcare managers based
on the achievement of pre-defined performance targets
and is currently being rolled out in many low-income
countries [13, 14]. P4P could theoretically affect the
availability of medical commodities by, for example,
incentivising the provision of intermittent preventive
treatment (IPT) for malaria during antenatal care (ANC),
through facility-level bonus payments, which can be used
to procure commodities, and by incentivising health care
managers to reduce drug stock-out rates.
However, empirically, only four studies have reported
on the effect of P4P on the availability of medical
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commodities in low-income countries. The effects are var-
ied with no effects on the availability of drugs and equip-
ment in Afghanistan [15]; no effects on patient
perceptions of drug availability in Burundi [16]; an
increase in patient perceptions of drug availability in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) [17]; and a reduc-
tion in the availability of vaccines and equipment in
another study from the DRC [18]. Only one study
reports on stock-out rates [18] and none of the studies
shed light on the pathways through which such changes
occurred. Previous studies have not examined the poten-
tial heterogeneity of effects across facilities and effects on
commodities related to non-incentivised services (spillover
effects). This paper examines the effect of P4P on the
availability and stock-outs of medicines, medical supplies
and equipment for reproductive, maternal, newborn and
child health in Tanzania and assesses whether these
effects differed by facility location, level of care, facility




Since the 1990s, Tanzania began a process of decentrali-
sation of government functions including health services,
involving the transfer of power from central to local gov-
ernment authorities [19]. As a result, district-level man-
agers are responsible for preparing annual health sector
plans and budgets to implement health programmes and
renovations in facilities and are responsible for generating
and managing resources for the district. District managers
are supported by a regional health management team,
while health facility governing committees oversee the
implementation of plans and the management of
resources at facility level. Public health facilities order
medical commodities on a quarterly basis, based on an
estimate of quantity needs; they submit requests to the
district who review and send them on to the medical
stores department (MSD) and distribute medical com-
modities to facilities (the ‘pull’ system) [20–22]. Districts
and facilities can also use their own funds (e.g. insurance
contributions, user fees and P4P bonus payments) to pro-
cure commodities in case of stock-outs [22–24]. Non-
public hospitals that are contracted by districts to deliver
services on behalf of the Ministry of Health and Social
Welfare (MoHSW) also receive medical commodities
from the MSD. All other non-public facilities either pro-
cure commodities from the MSD, foreign or local manu-
facturers, privately owned accredited drug dispensing
outlets (ADDOs) and pharmacies [25–27]. Some
commodities (vaccines, antiretrovirals (ARVs), vitamin A
and family planning) are managed through disease-speci-
fic vertical programmes, which are financed externally,
and distributed via the MSD or directly to facilities [24,
28, 29]. The MSD supply chain suffers from a shortage
of commodities, inadequate budget allocations, inade-
quate tracking mechanisms and late delivery of required
commodities [8, 22, 24, 30]. As a result, facilities experi-
ence regular shortages of essential drugs and supplies
especially in the public sector [22, 24, 30, 31]. For exam-
ple, out of 1297 facilities surveyed in 2012, only 41%
stocked the 14 essential tracer medicines at the time of
the survey [31]. An assessment in 2010 found that the
MSD fulfilled 68% of hospital orders and 67% of orders
from health centres and dispensaries [32].
P4P in Tanzania
In 2011, the MoHSW in Tanzania, with financial support
from the Government of Norway, introduced a P4P
scheme in Pwani region to improve reproductive, mater-
nal, newborn and child health (RMNCH), which is ongo-
ing. Pwani region is one of 30 regions in the country and
has seven districts with more than 209 health facilities
and a population of just over a million [33]. Financial
incentives are given to health facilities, district and regio-
nal managers based on their performance on pre-defined
service delivery targets (Table 1) [34, 35]. Most of the
targets at facility level pertain to increases in service cov-
erage, with four that involve the provision of medicines
such as antiretroviral therapy (ART), IPT during ANC,
vaccines and supplies such as partographs. District man-
agers are rewarded for reducing the proportion of facili-
ties in the district reporting stock-outs of essential
medicines (Appendix S1a) for at least one week. Districts
are required to verify facility performance reports, result-
ing in more frequent contact between district managers
and providers which may also help reduce stock-outs.
Facilities are required to open bank accounts to receive
performance payments.
Facility and district performance data are verified every
six months (one cycle). For dispensaries, the maximum
payout, if all targets are fully attained, is USD 820 per
cycle, while maximum payouts are USD 3220 and USD
6790 for health centres and hospitals, respectively. Incen-
tive payouts at facility level include bonuses to staff (equiv-
alent to 10% of monthly salary) and funds that can be
used to procure drugs and supplies and for facility
improvement (10% of the total in hospitals and 25% in
lower level facilities). District and regional managers
receive bonus payments of up to USD 3000 per cycle based
on the performance of facilities in their district or region.
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Study design
This study uses data from a controlled before and after
study of the P4P scheme in Pwani region, Tanzania, con-
ducted in all seven intervention districts and four com-
parison districts from Morogoro and Lindi regions [34,
35]. Baseline data were collected in January 2012 and
13 months later.
Data sources
The data on the availability and stock-outs of essential
RMNCH commodities within the previous 90 days were
collected through a survey of 75 facilities in each study arm.
In the intervention arm, we included all 6 hospitals and 16
health centres that were eligible for the P4P scheme and a
random sample of 53 eligible dispensaries. A corresponding
number of facilities were surveyed in the comparison arm.
The facility survey also documented facility characteristics
and was administered to the facility incharge. To proxy the
socio-economic status (SES) of the facility catchment popu-
lation, we used data from a survey of 1500 households of
women who had delivered in the previous 12 months prior
to the baseline survey in each arm and a similar number in
the follow-up survey (20 households sampled from the
catchment area of each facility). More details on data
sources and data collection are provided elsewhere [34, 35].
Outcome measures
Our main outcomes are the availability of RMNCH
medicines, medical supplies and functioning equipment,
and the stock-outs of medicines and supplies at the
facility. If a commodity was available on the day of the
survey, the outcome was coded 1 and 0 otherwise; if a
commodity was out of stock for at least one day in the
90 days prior to the survey, the outcome was coded 1
and 0 otherwise (Appendix S1a).
Medical commodities were classified in terms of their
therapeutic use as antibiotics, antimalarials, antihyperten-
sives, antidiarrhoeal, anti-retrovirals (ARVs), oxytocics,
vaccines, family planning, vitamin A, medical supplies
and medical equipment (Appendix S1a). We differenti-
ated between items that relate directly to a P4P target
and those which do not, to examine eventual spillover
effects. Items were also classified according to their bene-
ficiary/recipient group along the RMNCH continuum of
care based on the WHO classification of priority medici-
nes [11, 12]. For each of these groupings, we generated
composite scores based on an unweighted mean score
across items in the group, which can be interpreted as the
mean percentage availability/stock-out rate within the
grouping across facilities. We measured the proportion of
facilities with availability/stock-out of the respective com-
modity groups. In the generation of scores, we gave equal
Table 1 Service indicators and performance targets for facilities
Performance indicators Method
Baseline coverage (previous cycle)
0–20% 21–40% 41–70% 71–85% 85%+
Coverage indicators
% of facility-based deliveries Percentage
point increase
15 10 5 5 Maintain
% of mothers attending a facility
within 7 days of delivery
Percentage
point increase
15 10 5 5 Maintain
% of women using long-term contraceptives Percentage
point increase
20 15 10 Maintain
above 71
Maintain
% children under 1 year received measles vaccine Overall result 50 65 75 80+ Maintain
% children under 1 year received Penta 3 vaccine Overall result 50 65 75 80+ Maintain
% of complete partographs Overall result 80 80 80 80+ Maintain
above 80
HMIS reports submitted to
district managers on time and complete
Overall result 100 100 100 100 100
Content of care indicators
% ANC clients receiving two doses of IPT Overall result 80 80 80 80+ Maintain
above 80%
% HIV+ ANC clients on ART Overall result 40 60 75 75+ Maintain
% children received polio vaccine (OPV0) at birth Overall result 60 75 80 80+ Maintain
85%+ = 85% or more; 80%+ = 80% or more; HMIS, Health Management Information System Source: The United Republic of Tanza-
nia, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, 2011. The Coast Region Pay for Performance (P4P) Pilot: Design Document.
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weight to each commodity item for ease of interpretation,
but we acknowledge some of the items may be more
effective than others in enhancing better health outcomes.
Subgroup effects
We examined whether the effects of P4P differed with
the wealth of the facility catchment population to see
whether benefits were pro-poor, given the greater burden
of out-of-pocket payments from stock-outs on poorer
groups [1, 10, 30, 36]. We also examined effects by facil-
ity ownership (public/non-public) given the differing pro-
curement and supply systems in public and non-public
sectors; level of care (dispensary/health centre or hospital)
given that dispensaries are typically worse off in drug
availability [7, 31, 37]; and whether the facility was in
an urban or rural district as facilities in urban districts
are better connected by roads facilitating the distribution
of commodities relative to those in rural districts.
To generate a wealth score for each household in the
catchment area of the facility based on their ownership of
42 household items and characteristics we used principal
component analysis (PCA)[38, 39] (Appendix S1c). We
then calculated the average wealth score of the 20 house-
holds sampled within the facility catchment area. We
ranked facilities by these scores from poorest (low score)
to least poor and split them into terciles (poorest, middle
and least poor).
Statistical analysis
We compared facility characteristics and outcome scores
across study arms by using t-tests adjusting for
clustering at the facility level. We used a linear
difference-in-differences regression model to identify the
effects of P4P on the availability and stock-out of
medical commodities (1):
Yit ¼ b0 þ b1ðP4Pi  dtÞ þ b2dt þ ci þ eit ð1Þ
where Yit is the outcome of facility i at time t. P4Pi is a
dummy variable, taking the value 1 if a facility is
exposed to P4P and 0 if not. We controlled for time-
invariant determinants ci with facility fixed effects, and dt
year fixed effects. The error term is ɛit. The effect of P4P
on the outcome is given by b1.
In order to examine subgroup effects, we included a
triple interaction term between treatment effect
(P4Pi 9 dt) and subgrouping variable Gi. The associ-
ated two-order interaction terms were also included.
The coefficient of interest for the differential effect is
b3 (2):
Yit ¼b0 þ b1ðP4Pi  dtÞ þ b2dt þ b3ðP4Pi  dt GiÞ
þ b4ðP4Pi GiÞ þ b5ðGi  dtÞ þ ci þ eit
ð2Þ
For each of the effects, we report the confidence inter-
val based on standard errors that are clustered at the
facility level. As a robustness check, we clustered the
standard errors at the district level and used the boot-
strapping method to adjust for the small number of clus-
ters [40]. We were unable to test whether the availability
and stock-out outcomes were parallel between study arms
prior to the intervention. However, we tested and con-
firmed that trends in facility-level utilisation for all incen-
tivised services were parallel prior to the intervention
[35, 41]. All analyses were performed using STATA
version 13.
Ethical issues
The evaluation study received ethical approval from the
Ifakara Health Institute Institutional Review Board and
the Ethics Committee of the London School of Hygiene
& Tropical Medicine. Study participants provided written
consent to participate in this study, requiring them to
sign a consent form that was read out to them by the
interviewers. This consent form was reviewed and
approved by the ethics committees prior to the start of
the research.
Results
Baseline facility characteristics were fairly balanced
across study arms (Table 2). However, facilities in the
intervention arm were serving poorer populations than
those in the comparison arm.
P4P was associated with an 8.4 percentage point
increase in the availability of all 37 medicines com-
bined (P = 0.002) and an 8.3 percentage point increase
in the availability of medical supplies, although this
was only borderline significant (P = 0.050) (Table 3).
P4P had no effect on the availability of functioning
equipment. Effects were noted for some medicines asso-
ciated with P4P targets (antimalarials, antihypertensives
and oxytocics used for deliveries) and supplies (par-
tograph), although this effect was only borderline sig-
nificant. There was no effect on vaccines, family
planning and ARVs. Effects were observed for items
that were not clearly linked to service targets, but were
incentivised for district managers (antibiotics).
P4P was also associated with a reduction in stock-outs
of medicines and medical supplies (Table 4). Most of
those items where we found a significant increase in
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availability were also less likely to be out of stock. In
addition, there was a borderline significant 10.2 percen-
tage point reduction in vaccine stock-outs (P = 0.073)
and a 13.6 percentage point reduction in stock-outs of
family planning medicines (P = 0.062) (Table 4). The
effects of P4P on IPT and partograph stock-outs were not
significant.
P4P reduced the stock-out of medicines across the
RMNCH continuum of care and that of medical supplies
benefiting mothers and newborns (Appendix S1b). Effects
on availability were most pronounced for maternal, new-
born and child medicines and reproductive health
supplies.
The effect of P4P on the stock-outs of medicines over-
all was pro-poor, with reduction in facilities in the poor-
est tercile being 24.5 percentage points greater than that
in the least poor tercile (P = 0.019); specifically, the
effects on stock-outs of antimalarials, antibiotics and
oxytocics were pro-poor; effects on antimalarial availabil-
ity were also marginally pro-poor (Table 5). P4P had a
greater effect on the availability of medicines and medical
supplies in facilities in rural districts (by 10.4 percentage
points, P = 0.051; and 22 percentage points, P = 0.003,
respectively). Similarly, the effect of P4P on availability
and stock-outs of antimalarials was greater in facilities in
rural than urban districts (23.1 percentage points,
P = 0.020; and 23.1 percentage points, P = 0.070,
respectively). The effect of P4P on availability and stock-
outs of antihypertensives was greater in health centres
and hospitals than in dispensaries [by 19.9 percentage
points (P = 0.020) and 26.1 percentage points
(P = 0.064), respectively]. There were no differential
effects by facility ownership.
When standard errors were clustered at the district
level, the effects on the availability of antimalarials, oxy-
tocics and delivery care drugs combined and, on stock-
outs of oxytocics, vaccines and delivery care drugs com-
bined were maintained (results not shown). However, the
effects on composite indices for medicines combined and
medical supplies were no longer significant.
Discussion
We examined the effects of P4P on the availability and
stock-out rate of medical commodities for RMNCH. P4P
was associated with significant improvements in availabil-
ity and reductions in stock-outs of medicines and medical
supplies, but had no effect on the availability of equip-
ment. Among medicines, the main effects were for drugs
associated with the delivery of some incentivised services:
antimalarials, drugs to induce labour and manage bleed-
ing (oxytocics) or manage hypertension during delivery
(antihypertensives). However, there was little or no evi-
dence of effects on medicines linked to other incentivised





(n = 75) Difference (P–value)
Level of care
Hospital (%) 8.0 8.0 0
Health centre (%) 21.3 21.3 0
Dispensary (%) 70.7 70.7 0
Ownership status
Government/public facility (%) 84.0 82.7 1.3 (0.828)
Faith-based organisation
(FBO) facility (%)
10.7 12.0 1.3 (0.798)
Military/parastatal /private facility (%) 5.3 5.3 0 (0.652)
Infrastructure
Electricity available (%) 68.0 66.7 1.3 (0.863)
Clean water available (%) 73.3 78.7 5.3 (0.448)
Community/area features
Facility in rural districts (%) 78.7 84.0 5.3 (0.405)
Distance (km) from district
headquarter, mean [SD]
56.9 [38.8] 62.9 [41.8] 6.0 (0.367)
Poorest SES facilities (%) 40.0 26.7 13.3 (0.084)
Middle SES facilities (%) 34.7 32.0 2.7 (0.731)
Least poor SES facilities (%) 25.3 41.3 16.0 (0.038)
SD is for standard deviation
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services such as vaccines, family planning, ARVs and sup-
plies such as the partograph. P4P improved the availabil-
ity/reduced stock-outs for some of the drugs that districts
were incentivised for, including antibiotics (ampicillin,
amoxicillin, gentamycin and flagyl). However, the scheme
also reduced stock-outs of antibiotics that were not tied
to any incentive (e.g. cotrimoxazole, chloramphenicol
and crystapen injection). This suggests that P4P schemes
have the potential to improve drug availability beyond
those drugs that are directly linked to the delivery of
incentivised services. Effects were generally equally dis-
tributed across facilities, with effects on medicine stock-
outs being pro-poor in many cases, and greater in facili-
ties in rural compared to urban districts. Greater
improvements in the availability/stock-out reduction of
antihypertensives in higher-level facilities are likely reflec-
tive of the greater number of obstetric referral cases at
these facilities and associated need.
There are a variety of potential pathways to P4P
effects on medicines and supplies in our study. The effect
may in part be due to the provision of medicines being a
pre-condition for meeting certain performance targets
(e.g. IPT during ANC). The financial autonomy resulting
from bank accounts enabled facilities to use bonus funds
and cost sharing revenue (from user fees and community-
based insurance) to procure drugs and supplies, consis-
tent with findings from a process evaluation carried out
alongside this study [42]. Incentives to district managers
to limit drug stock-outs were also important, given the
role of district managers in the procurement and supply
process. By providing incentives to facilities and districts,
the scheme ensured that stakeholders at all levels were
working towards the same goals. The verification system
under P4P also meant that district supervision was inten-
sified, providing more opportunities for district managers
to identify and address stock-outs of a wider range of
drugs.
A number of medicines associated with incentivised
services were not affected by P4P (vaccines, ARVs and
family planning). The procurement of these items
depended on donor funding [24, 28, 29]. The average
availability of vaccines was above 94% at baseline (91%
for family planning), so there was also little scope for
improvement. Tanzania faced a problem with shortages
of ARVs during the period of this study due to the intro-
duction of a new treatment regimen, weak procurement
Table 3 Effects of P4P on the availability of medical commodities mean score
Category








facilities Difference N Beta† [95% CI]
P–
value %D*
Medicines combined (%) 60.8 65.7 4.9** 63.9 60.7 3.2 295 8.4 [3.0 to 13.7] 0.002 13.8
Antimalarials – all (%) 60.3 69.9 9.6** 69.7 59.3 10.4** 295 20.5 [11.8 to 29.3] 0.000 33.9
Antimalarials
– targeted (%)
74.6 93.2 18.6*** 96.0 90.7 5.3 295 25.2 [11.1 to 39.4] 0.001 33.8
Antibiotics (%) 36.3 39.9 3.6 43.1 39.8 3.3 295 7.4 [0.8 to 14.1] 0.028 20.4
Antihypertensives (%) 36.2 37.1 0.9 43.8 36.4 7.4* 295 8.7 [0.4 to 16.9] 0.040 24.0
Antidiarrhoeals (%) 60.6 63.5 2.9 74.0 75.3 1.3 295 1.9 [12.5 to 16.3] 0.795 3.1
Oxytocics (%) 42.7 45.0 2.3 45.8 32.9 12.9*** 295 15.0 [3.0 to 26.9] 0.014 35.1
Delivery care
drugs – targeted (%)
39.5 41.1 1.6 44.8 34.6 10.2*** 295 11.8 [3.8 to 19.8] 0.004 29.9
ARVs – targeted (%) 55.4 50.3 5.1 57.4 60.4 3.0 210 7.9 [20.3 to 4.7] 0.208 14.3
Vaccines – all (%) 94.8 92.9 1.9 96.9 92.9 4.0* 276 5.3 [2.7 to 13.3] 0.193 5.6
Vaccines – targeted (%) 95.2 92.7 2.5 97.1 94.8 2.3 276 3.1 [5.4 to 11.5] 0.475 3.3
Vitamin A (%) 91.9 91.8 0.1 92.9 92.9 0.0 276 3.2 [8.7 to 15.0] 0.597 3.5
Family planning
– targeted (%)
91.7 99.5 7.8** 56.5 59.5 3.0 255 7.3 [4.6 to 19.3] 0.227 7.9
Medical supplies (%) 64.4 72.4 8.0** 66.4 66.4 0.0 299 8.3 [0.01 to 16.5] 0.050 12.9
Partograph – targeted (%) 63.5 75.8 12.3 77.0 76.0 1.0 274 16.1 [3.0 to 35.3] 0.098 25.4
Medical equipment (%) 55.0 54.9 0.1 72.8 68.8 4.0 299 3.8 [4.9 to 12.6] 0.391 6.9
Items included for medicines combined [37], medical supplies [11] and equipment [16]; ‘targeted’ are commodities linked to services
targeted/incentivised by P4P; number of observations (N) is small for ARVs, family planning and vaccines because not all facilities
stock these commodities; *the % D = (Beta / baseline mean) 9100, where the baseline mean of the dependent variable is for the
intervention facilities; †the Beta is the estimated intervention effect controlling for a year dummy and facility fixed effects; *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% level.
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd 97
Tropical Medicine and International Health volume 22 no 1 pp 92–102 january 2017
P. Binyaruka et al. Effect of paying for performance on the availability of medical commodities
mechanisms, and shortages of ARVs on the global market
that were outside of facilities’ control [43]. The lack of
effect on equipment availability may be due to the lack
of incentives attached to equipment availability at the
facility or the district level. The cost of equipment is also
higher than that of many drugs and supplies, which may
have deterred facilities from such investments.
Our study stands in contrast to a recent review from
low- and middle-income countries concluding that P4P
is not effective in improving structural quality of care
[44]. However, our finding of increased availability of
drugs is consistent with that reported from South Kivu
Province in the DRC [17], but contrary to the findings
from Afghanistan [15], Burundi [16, 45] and Katanga
Province in the DRC [18] that showed no effects. The
differences in context and variation in programme
design likely explain the difference in effects. In Afgha-
nistan, Burundi and the DRC drugs/supplies were incen-
tivised through service targets, and providers had
financial autonomy as in Tanzania [15–17], and in Bur-
undi, up to 50% of the bonus could be used to procure
drugs; however, this was not clearly the case in the
other settings. Unlike the Pwani scheme, many schemes
weight bonus payments with structural quality scores,
which include the availability of drugs and supplies [15–
17]. While facilities could channel a percentage of their
bonus to districts in the DRC [46], districts were not
directly incentivised, nor were they incentivised in other
settings.
Despite the importance of assessing distributional
effects within programme evaluation [47, 48], ours is the
first study to examine the heterogeneity of the effect of
P4P on medical commodities. The pro-poor effects on
medicines are encouraging as are the pro-rural effects and
these are consistent with universal health coverage (UHC)
goals and efforts to meet sustainable development goal
(SDG) 3.
There are several limitations to this study. First, we
used household data from the facility catchment area to
proxy the SES of the facility’s location based on a sample
of 20 households that may not have accurately reflected
the entire catchment population. Second, there was an
imbalance in SES across study arms, although our results
were reasonably robust when dividing facilities into SES
groups in each arm separately. Third, we were unable to
control for time-varying confounding factors due to a
Table 4 Effects of P4P on the stock-out of medical commodities mean score
Category








facilities Difference N Beta† [95% CI]
P–
value %D*
Medicines combined (%) 43.1 33.5 9.6*** 26.7 30.4 3.7 295 13.6 [22.1 to 5.1] 0.002 31.6
Antimalarials – all (%) 41.9 42.6 0.7 29.8 40.4 10.6** 295 10.5 [21.6 to 0.6] 0.064 25.1
Antimalarials
– targeted (%)
27.1 18.9 8.2 6.7 10.7 4.0 294 13.3 [29.8 to 3.2] 0.113 49.1
Antibiotics (%) 59.1 47.9 11.2** 41.0 45.2 4.2 295 16.6 [29.5 to 3.8] 0.012 28.1
Antihypertensives (%) 57.0 46.0 11.0** 34.9 44.0 9.1* 295 21.0 [35.1 to 6.9] 0.004 36.8
Antidiarrhoeals (%) 42.9 36.9 6.0 26.0 27.3 1.3 294 5.9 [22.2 to 10.3] 0.472 13.8
Oxytocics (%) 55.2 39.3 15.9*** 36.9 48.9 12.0** 294 27.2 [43.7 to 10.7] 0.001 49.3
Delivery care
drugs – targeted (%)
56.1 42.4 13.7*** 35.9 46.4 10.5** 295 24.7 [38.4 to 11.0] 0.000 44.0
ARVs – targeted (%) 40.6 32.5 8.1 25.0 25.0 0.0 210 4.9 [22.8 to 12.9] 0.585 12.1
Vaccines – all (%) 17.1 12.9 4.2 6.9 9.3 2.4 276 10.2 [21.4 to 0.9] 0.073 59.6
Vaccines – targeted (%) 15.6 11.9 3.7 6.7 7.0 0.3 276 7.4 [18.8 to 4.1] 0.206 47.4
Vitamin A (%) 14.5 8.2 6.3 10.0 7.0 3.0 276 6.6 [20.3 to 7.0] 0.339 45.5
Family planning
– targeted (%)
45.4 38.2 7.2 24.0 25.2 1.2 255 13.6 [27.9 to 0.7] 0.062 29.9
Medical supplies (%) 39.7 29.4 10.3** 20.8 21.8 1.0 286 13.1 [23.1 to 3.2] 0.010 32.9
Partograph – targeted (%) 33.9 18.6 15.3* 13.9 13.0 0.0 262 12.3 [31.9 to 7.3] 0.217 36.3
Items included for medicines combined [37], medical supplies [11] and equipment [16]; ‘targeted’ are commodities linked to services
targeted/incentivised by P4P; number of observations (N) is small for ARVs, family planning and vaccines because not all facilities
stock these commodities; *the % D = (Beta/baseline mean) 9100, where the baseline mean of the dependent variable is for the
intervention facilities; †the Beta is the estimated intervention effect controlling for a year dummy and facility fixed effects; *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% level.
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lack of data, but confounding bias due to time-invariant
factors were adjusted through fixed effects estimation.
Fourth, although we tested and confirmed the assumption
of parallel trends in facility utilisation outcomes prior to
the intervention, we failed to test that of drug availability
and stock-out outcomes due to a lack of historical data
on these outcomes. We were also unable to capture sea-
sonal fluctuations in drug availability as this requires time
series data which were not available. Finally, potential
type I errors due to multiple hypotheses testing are a con-
cern to inference; however, we used subgroups of items
to minimise the risk of this error.
Conclusion
Our study has shown that P4P, when introduced with
facility and district-level incentives and in a context
where facilities and local government authorities have
autonomy over the use of funds, can improve the avail-
ability of drugs and supplies and enhance good quality of
care. This makes services more acceptable, effective and
affordable, especially in facilities serving poor, rural pop-
ulations, enhancing progress towards universal health
coverage [1, 10].
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• We examined the distribution of performance outcomes due to P4P across facilities.  
• Inequality in payouts favoured better-off facilities, but declined over time. 
• Lower baseline performers improved most on institutional deliveries coverage. 
• Rural and middle wealth facilities improved most on deliveries coverage. 












There is growing evidence evaluating the impact of payment-for-performance (P4P) 
schemes in the health sector, but there has been little attention to the distributional effects 
of P4P across health facilities, and whether P4P reduces or enhances performance 
inequalities across facilities. We examined the distribution of P4P bonus payouts and two 
service coverage outcomes: institutional deliveries and provision of antimalarials during 
antenatal care (ANC), which differed in terms of incentive design and across facility 
subgroups in Tanzania. We used data from 150 facilities from intervention and 
comparison areas in January 2012 and 13 months later. Service coverage outcomes and 
socioeconomic status of facility catchment populations were measured in a household 
survey, facility characteristics from facility survey, and data on performance payouts 
were obtained from the programme administrator.  Descriptive inequality measures were 
used to examine the distribution of payouts across facility subgroups. Daifference-in-
differences regression analyses were used to identify P4P differential effects on the two 
service coverage outcomes across facility subgroups. We found that performance payouts 
were initially higher among higher level facilities (hospitals and health centres than 
dispensaries), facilities with more medical commodities and among facilities serving 
wealthier populations, but these inequalities declined over time. P4P had greater effects 
on coverage of institutional deliveries among facilities with low baseline performance, 
serving middle wealth populations, and located in rural areas. P4P effects on 
antimalarials provision during ANC was similar across facilities. Performance 
inequalities were influenced by the design of incentives and a range of facility 
characteristics, however, the nature of the service being targeted is also likely to have 
 3 
affected provider response. Further research is needed to further examine the effects of 
incentive design on outcomes and researchers should be encouraged to report on design 
aspects in their evaluations of P4P and systematically monitor and report sub-group 
effects across providers.   
 




















Payment-for-Performance (P4P) programmes, involving financial incentives to health 
workers and/or health facilities for achievement of pre-defined performance outcomes, 
have been widely implemented. These programmes are generally aimed at improving 
quality of care especially in high-income countries (HICs) to improve quality of care 
(Eijkenaar et al. 2013), while in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) the 
emphasise has also been on improving service coverage and to strengthen health systems 
(Meessen et al. 2011; Witter et al. 2013). However, mixed effects of P4P have been 
reported (Das et al. 2016; Eijkenaar et al. 2013; Gillam et al. 2012; Mendelson et al. 
2017; Renmans et al. 2016; Witter et al. 2012). 
 
Evaluations of P4P schemes have largely focused on average programme effects, with 
little attention to distributional effects (Markovitz & Ryan 2016). While the effects of 
P4P on service use inequalities among populations have been documented in the 
literature (Alshamsan et al. 2010; Binyaruka et al. 2018; Renmans et al. 2016; Van de 
Poel et al. 2016), there is little evidence of how P4P affects inequalities between health 
providers (Markovitz & Ryan 2016; Sherry et al. 2017) in relation to financing and 
service delivery outcomes. P4P is expected to reduce performance inequalities by 
motivating worse performing facilities to catch up (Fritsche et al. 2014; Meessen et al. 
2011), but it is also possible that P4P increases performance inequalities by rewarding 
facilities that are better able to perform (Ireland et al. 2011). It is therefore important to 
assess how P4P affects different types of providers (Khandker et al. 2010; Markovitz & 
Ryan 2016), to ensure that P4P does not widen the resource gap and increase inequality 
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in healthcare provision between providers (Blustein et al. 2010; Chien et al. 2012). 
 
Some evidence from HICs shows that P4P can reduce performance inequalities by 
motivating lower performers to improve (Alshamsan et al. 2010; Markovitz & Ryan 
2016). Despite substantial variation in health facility readiness to deliver services in 
LMICs (MoHSW 2013; O'Neill et al. 2013), there is limited evidence of the effect of P4P 
on performance inequalities across health facilities (Sherry et al. 2017). Therefore, we 
examined the distribution of P4P bonus payments and of the increased service coverage 
associated with P4P across health facilities in Tanzania.   
 
Conceptual framework 
To conceptualise the pathways to distributional effects of P4P, we adapted the theoretical 
framework by Rittenhouse et al. (2010) and Markovitz and Ryan (2016) to the Tanzanian 
context (Figure 1).  
 
Suppose performance in period t (!") is given by facility-level effort (#"), and a set of 
structural/ enabling factors ($"):  !" = p(#", $"). Performance is also assumed 
differentiable and weakly increasing in both arguments: %&%' ≥ 0, 
%&
%( ≥ 0. We then consider 
two types of facilities: those with  high (!)*) and low baseline performance (!)+). At 
baseline we have the change: ∆)= !)* – !)+ > 0 , and after P4P is introduced we have ∆-= 
!-* – !-+. The incentive design structure and/or structural factors can modify the effects of 
P4P across facilities over time, resulting in convergence in performance/ positive 
distributional effects (∆)> ∆-); divergence in performance/ negative distributional effects 
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(∆)< ∆-); or similar performance across facilities (i.e. zero distributional effects) (∆)=
∆-). We analysed the extent to which the incentive design and structural factors modify 
the effects of P4P across facilities.  
  
Incentive design effect: P4P schemes can reward using fee-for-service, geographical 
targeting, relative performance, single absolute threshold targets, or multiple threshold 
targets (Eijkenaar 2013; Fritsche et al. 2014; Mehrotra et al. 2010; Rosenthal & Dudley 
2007; Rosenthal et al. 2005). The distributional effects of P4P schemes will partly depend 
on how incentives, and especially targets, are designed.  
  
Multiple threshold target designs can enhance convergence in performance (Eijkenaar 
2013; Mehrotra et al. 2010; Rosenthal et al. 2005) because they account for baseline 
performance and provide incentives for lower performers to catch up.  However, there is 
a study that reported the absence of systematic convergence in performance with this 
design in the UK (Sutton et al. 2012). Absolute single threshold/ linear targets can 
enhance divergence in performance if some providers are far above and below the target 
(Heath et al. 1999; Mehrotra et al. 2010; Miller & Babiarz 2013; Mullen et al. 2010; 
Rosenthal & Dudley 2007). Improvement is most likely for providers/facilities that are 
close to achieve the threshold target. Top performers have no incentive to improve, and 
those far below the target may perceive it as unattainable, a phenomenon referred to as 
“goal-gradient” theory (Heath et al. 1999). A single target design fails to account for any 
variation in baseline performance (Eijkenaar 2013; Mehrotra et al. 2010; Mullen et al. 
2010; Rosenthal et al. 2005). 
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Structural effect: Variation in facility and area-based factors that are potentially 
responsible for inequalities in baseline performance, can also modify the effects of P4P 
programmes (Markovitz & Ryan 2016). This is given by %&%( ≥ 0. We further assume the 
change in effort devoted to affect performance %&%' is increasing in x, that is 
%1213	
%'  >0. If 
facilities invest initial bonus payments in enabling factors, this may improve their future 
performance, but  general predictions of effects based on variation in structural factors 
are difficult to make (Markovitz & Ryan 2016). We hypothesise that public facilities in 
Tanzania are better able to respond to incentives than non-public providers, as they can 
offer free maternal and child health (MCH) services (under the fee exemption policy) and 
have more financial autonomy (Mayumana et al. 2017). However, it is also possible that 
P4P can level the playing field across providers of different ownership status (Meessen et 
al. 2011).  We further hypothesise that facilities with greater resource availability (e.g. 
medical inputs) are better able to increase patient demand than their counterparts 
(Alderman & Lavy 1996; Donabedian 1988; WHO 2004) and that dispensaries are less 
able to respond to incentives compared to health centres and hospitals since they are more 
resource constrained (MoHSW 2013).  
 
Regarding area-based factors, facilities with wealthier catchment populations may 
respond better to incentives, as they can more readily increase service use and revenue 
through user fees (Castro-Leal et al. 2000; Chien et al. 2012; Doran et al. 2008; Victora et 
al. 2000). Facilities in rural areas may be less able to respond to incentives than their 
urban counterparts, because of human resource shortages, poor road infrastructure, and 
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more scattered and disadvantaged populations (Fritsche et al. 2014; Munga & Maestad 
2009; Witter et al. 2013). 
 
Apart from the above hypothesised pathways (incentive design and structural effect), 
provider response may also depend on the nature of the services targeted or incentivised. 
This is because performance improvement can be harder for some services compared to 
other services and this may confound the initial hypothesises of incentive design and 
structural effect. For instance, it is harder to change clients’ behaviour for deliveries than 
for a content of care like IPT provision.  
 
 
P4P in Tanzania  
The public sector is the largest sector of the Tanzanian health system, with private for 
profit and the voluntary sector serving as important supplements (MoHSW 2015). The 
public health system has a hierarchal administrative structure, with dispensaries and 
health centres providing primary health care services, and district hospitals, regional 
hospitals, and national hospitals acting as referral facilities. The public health system in 
Tanzania is decentralised, with district-level managers being responsible for preparing 
annual health sector plans and generating and managing resources for the district. 
 
In 2011, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW) in Tanzania, with support 
from the Government of Norway, introduced a P4P scheme in all seven districts of Pwani 
region to improve MCH and inform the national P4P roll out. Pwani region has more than 
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300 health facilities covering a population of just over a million (NBS 2013). All 
facilities providing MCH services in Pwani were included in the scheme. P4P incentives 
were tied to coverage of services (e.g. institutional delivery) and content of care targets 
(e.g. provision of intermittent preventive treatment (IPT) for malaria during antenatal 
care (ANC)) (Binyaruka et al. 2015; Borghi et al. 2013). There were two methods of 
target setting (Table 1): a single threshold (absolute coverage target), and multiple 
thresholds based on performance in the previous cycle (relative change/ overall result) 
with five performance groups, each with their own absolute threshold: Group 1 (0-20% 
coverage of said indicator), group 2 (21-40%), group 3 (41-70%), group 4 (71-85%) and 
group 5 (>85%). Group 5 was required to maintain coverage. District and regional 
managers were rewarded for performance of facilities in their district or region.  
 
Performance data were compiled by facilities and verified by the P4P implementing 
agency every six months (one cycle) before payments. The maximum payout per cycle 
differed by level of care: USD 820 per cycle for dispensaries; USD 3220 for health 
centres and USD 6790 for hospitals – the majority share of payout (90% in hospitals and 
75% in lower level facilities) being staff bonuses, and the remainder for facility 
improvement/demand creation.  Payments were additional to funding for operational 
costs and salaries which are unrelated to performance. Full payment was made if 100% of 
a given target was achieved, 50% of payment was made for 75-99% achievement, and no 
payment was made for lower levels of performance. Staff bonuses were equivalent to 
10% of their monthly salary if all targets were fully attained. The maximum payout for 
district and regional managers was USD 3000 per cycle.  
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An impact evaluation of the P4P programme showed a significant positive effect on two 
out of eight incentivised service indicators: institutional delivery rate and provision of 
antimalarial during ANC (Binyaruka et al. 2015). The programme also increased the 
availability of drugs and supplies, increased supportive supervision, reduced payment of 
user fees, and resulted in greater provider kindness during delivery care (Anselmi et al. 
2017; Binyaruka & Borghi 2017; Binyaruka et al. 2015; Mayumana et al. 2017).  
 
Materials and methods  
Study design and data sources 
We used data from the impact evaluation of the P4P scheme in Pwani region, described 
elsewhere (Binyaruka et al. 2015; Borghi et al. 2013). The study surveyed all seven 
districts in Pwani region (intervention arm), and four districts from Morogoro and Lindi 
regions (comparison arm). Comparison districts were selected to be comparable to 
intervention districts in terms of poverty and literacy rates, the rate of institutional 
deliveries, infant mortality, population per health facility, and the number of children 
under one year of age per capita (Borghi et al. 2013). 
 
Baseline data at facility and household-levels were collected in January 2012, with a 
follow-up round 13 months later. For each study arm, data on facility ownership, level of 
care, availability of medical inputs and rural/urban location was obtained from 75 
sampled facilities providing MCH services (6 hospitals, 16 health centres and 53 
dispensaries). Data on socioeconomic status of the facility catchment populations and 
 11 
service coverage rates were obtained from households with women who had delivered in 
the 12 months prior to the baseline and endline surveys. We randomly sampled 20 
eligible households from each facility’s catchment area, making a total of 1500 
households in each arm per survey round. Facility payout data were obtained from the 
implementing agency for all incentivised indicators for the 75 intervention facilities in 




We considered two facility performance outcomes.  First, we estimated for each payment 
cycle a “payout score” for each facility in the intervention arm, defined as the bonus 
payment received divided by the total potential payout if all targets had been met, 
multiplied by 100. Second, we estimated facility-level average service coverage rates for 
households in the facility catchment area from both study arms for the two incentivised 
services which improved significantly on average as a result of P4P (Binyaruka et al. 
2015): the coverage of institutional deliveries (that used multiple-threshold target) and 
provision of two doses of intermittent preventive treatment (IPT2) for malaria during 
ANC (that used single threshold target).  
 
Subgroups of facilities for distributional analyses 
To examine whether incentive design and structural effects affected performance 
outcomes, we identified facility subgroups as shown in Table 2, pertaining to: their 
baseline performance for the two incentivised indicators (above or below the median); 
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facility characteristics (ownership, level of care, availability of utilities, rural-urban 
location); an un-weighted index of drug availability at baseline (Appendix: Table A1); 
and wealth of the catchment population, based on mean wealth index scores across 
households in the facility-catchment area generated by principal component analysis 
(Vyas & Kumaranayake 2006) (Appendix: Table A2). 
 
Analysis 
We first compared the sample means at baseline for each of the facility subgroups across 
study arms, and examined eventual differences between study arms using the t-test.  
 
Distribution of bonus payouts  
To assess how bonus payouts were distributed across intervention facilities, we used 
three measures of inequality: an absolute measure (the gap) and two relative measures 
(the ratio and the concentration index) (O'Donnell et al. 2008; WHO 2013). The gap was 
measured as the difference in payout scores between facility subgroups. The ratio was 
measured as the ratio of payout scores between subgroups. In relation to wealth 
subgroups, a positive (negative) gap and a ratio greater (less) than one defines a pro-rich 
(pro-poor) distribution, respectively. A gap of zero and a ratio of one defines an equal 
distribution. We tested whether the gaps were significantly different from zero by using t-
tests.  
 
The concentration index (CI) was computed on a ranking variable of area-based wealth 
status to examine wealth-related inequality in the distribution of payouts (Kakwani et al. 
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1997; O'Donnell et al. 2008). The CI ranges between [-1 and +1], with zero indicating 
equality between wealth subgroups, while negative and positive values indicating that 
payouts are pro-poor and pro-rich, respectively. We tested whether the CIs were 
significantly different from zero.  
 
Distribution of service coverage outcomes 
We measured the difference in mean baseline coverage of the two incentivised services 
between facility subgroups (the coverage gap (WHO 2013)) and tested for significant 
differences between subgroups.  
 
We also assessed whether the effect of P4P on the coverage of these two incentivised 
services differed by facility subgroup.  To this end, we used a linear difference-in-
differences regression model with a three-way interaction term between the average 
treatment effect (5457	×9") and facility subgrouping variable :7.  The associated two-
order interaction terms were also included in the model as shown in Equation 1. 
 
;7" = <) + <-(5457	×9") + <@9" + <AB7" + <C(5457	×9"×:7	) + <D(5457	×:7)  
+<E(:7	×9") + F7 + G7"                                                              (1) 
 
where ;7" is the service coverage outcome of facility i at time t. 5457 is a dummy 
variable, taking the value 1 if a facility is exposed to P4P and zero otherwise. We 
controlled for unobserved time-invariant facility-level characteristics F7 with facility 
fixed-effects estimation, and included 9"	for year fixed-effects. We also controlled for 
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time-varying facility-level covariates B7" (availability of electricity and water supply, and 
the mean wealth index for households sampled in the catchment area of the facility) as 
potential confounding factors. The error term is G7". We report the confidence interval 
based on standard errors clustered at the facility level to account for serial correlation of 
G7" at the facility level. The coefficient of interest for the differential effect across facility 
subgroups is <C. 
 
Causal inference using the difference-in-differences approach relies on the key 
identifying assumption that the trends in outcomes would have been parallel across study 
arms in the absence of the intervention (Khandker et al. 2010). While this cannot be 
formally tested, we verified that the pre-intervention trends were parallel in women who 
had delivered in the past 12 months at baseline for the following outcomes for which we 
had monthly data: share of institutional deliveries, caesarean section deliveries, women 
who breastfeed within one hour of birth, and women who paid for delivery care (Anselmi 
et al. 2017; Binyaruka et al. 2015). We also verified that trends in facility service 
utilisation levels based on patient registers were parallel in the 2-year period preceding 
the introduction of P4P.   
 
We performed some robustness checks. First, we re-estimated the model for institutional 
deliveries excluding hospitals (8% of facilities per arm), as hospitals have less clearly 
defined catchment populations.  Second, we clustered the standard errors at the district 
level and used a bootstrapping method to adjust the small number of district–clusters 
(Cameron & Miller 2015). Third, we reclassified the mean wealth scores into two 
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quantiles (below or above the median) to check whether the wealth effect was sensitive to 
classification of the wealth groupings. Lastly, apart from using a conventional parametric 
test (a t-test) to assess whether differences in payouts between subgroups were 
significant, a non-parametric test (Wilcoxon rank-sum test) was also used (Kitchen 
2009). All the analyses were performed using STATA version 13. 
 
Results 
Facility and area-based characteristics were generally similar in the intervention and 
comparison arms at baseline (Table 2), although intervention facilities served poorer 
populations, and had marginally lower availability of drugs than comparison facilities.  
 
Distribution of bonus payouts 
There was an increase in average payout scores between payment cycle 1 (50.1% of total 
potential payout) and cycle 7 (77.7%) (Table 3), and the payouts were highest for 
facilities with least poor catchment populations. This pro-rich effect was supported by the 
positive equity gaps and concentration indices, and an equity ratio that is greater than one 
across all payment cycles (Table 3, column 5 –7). The inequalities were generally 
stronger in early compare to later cycles (Table 3).  
 
Facilities with greater availability of drugs at baseline, and hospitals and health centres 
had significantly higher payout scores than facilities with more limited drug availability 
and dispensaries (Table 4, the gaps). The equity ratios were approximately one, near 
equality, between most subgroups (Table 4).  
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Distribution of service coverage outcomes 
Baseline institutional delivery rates and coverage of IPT2 during ANC were similar 
between most facility subgroups (Table 5).  However, baseline institutional delivery rates 
were highest among facilities with the least poor catchment populations, while coverage 
of IPT2 was highest among facilities with the poorest catchment populations.  Coverage 
of IPT2 was higher among dispensaries that health centres and hospitals, but there were 
lower levels of coverage in both outcomes in the comparison arm at baseline (Table 5).  
 
P4P resulted in a greater increase in institutional deliveries among facilities with lower 
baseline coverage levels than those with higher coverage levels (by 13.0 percentage 
points, p=0.006) (Table 6). P4P resulted in a greater increase in institutional deliveries 
among facilities serving middle wealth populations than those serving least poor 
populations (by 14.3 percentage points, p=0.004) (Table 6).  P4P also resulted in a greater 
increase in institutional deliveries among facilities in rural compared to urban districts 
(by 10.0 percentage points, p=0.030). The effect of P4P on coverage of IPT2 was similar 
across all facility subgroups (Table 6).  
 
The results on institutional deliveries were similar when we restricted the analysis to 
primary care facilities, except for the difference between rural/urban location which 
became insignificant (Table A3). The results were generally robust to clustering at the 
district level, except that there was no longer a differential effect on deliveries by wealth 
subgroups (Table A4). When two quantiles of wealth scores (lower and higher) were 
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used, the differential effect for institutional deliveries became insignificant (Table A5). 
The use of non-parametric tests of differences between payouts across facilities revealed 
similar results to those using parametric tests (Table A6).  
 
Discussion 
We examined the distribution of P4P bonus payouts and programme effects on service 
coverage across facility subgroups in Tanzania. We specifically assessed whether 
performance was shaped by the design of the incentives and/or facility and area-based 
characteristics. This is the first study to examine the effects of P4P on bonus payout 
distribution and examine broadly whether there was supply-side heterogeneous P4P 
effects in a LMIC.  
 
We found some evidence of an incentive design effect: lower baseline performers had 
greater improvements in the coverage of institutional deliveries (with multiple threshold 
targets); however, performance was similar across all providers in relation to IPT2 
coverage (with a single threshold target).  The characteristics of providers and their 
catchment populations were also found to matter, with hospitals and health centres, and 
facilities with wealthier catchment populations, and a better endowment of drugs, being 
better able to improve coverage of institutional deliveries and receive bonus payouts.  
However, the inequalities in payouts distribution declined over time. The effect of P4P on 
the coverage of institutional deliveries was also greater in rural facilities, with middle 
wealth catchment populations, however, effects on IPT2 coverage were similar across 
facility subgroups.  
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Our finding of convergence in performance payouts by wealth status over time is partly 
consistent with the “inverse equity hypothesis” (Victora et al. 2000). The hypothesis 
suggests that better-off groups will initially benefit from a new intervention, widening 
inequalities, but over time the worse-off will catch up. This is also consistent with US 
evidence that wealthier hospitals initially received higher payouts than their counterparts, 
but the distribution of payouts levelled over time due a change in the design of the 
scheme from only rewarding top performers only to rewarding any improvement where 
all providers were likely to receive a payout (Ryan et al. 2012).  
 
The finding that P4P had greatest effect on institutional deliveries (with multiple 
threshold targets) among baseline lower performers is consistent with evidence on quality 
improvements from the UK (Doran et al. 2008), Canada (Li et al. 2014) and the US 
(Blustein et al. 2010; Chen et al. 2010; Jha et al. 2012; Lindenauer et al. 2007; Rosenthal 
et al. 2005). In Rwanda, however, most rewarded services based on fee-for-service 
improved most among facilities with middle baseline quality scores (Sherry et al. 2017).  
The convergence in performance in HICs was partly linked to a design with multiple 
threshold targets in the UK (Doran et al. 2008) and Canada (Li et al. 2014) and to a US 
design system that rewarded the highest performers and penalised the lowest performers 
(Lindenauer et al. 2007; Rosenthal et al. 2005). However, another study in the UK of a 
hospital incentive scheme with multiple thresholds found evidence of divergence in 
performance in relation to mortality outcomes linked to pneumonia but not for other 
conditions (Sutton et al. 2012).    
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Our finding that the effects of P4P on institutional deliveries differed according to the 
wealth status of facility catchment populations is somewhat different to that reported in 
the UK and US with respect to quality of care improvements (Alshamsan et al. 2010; 
Blustein et al. 2010; Chien et al. 2012; Doran et al. 2008; Gravelle et al. 2008; 
Kontopantelis et al. 2013). These studies found that providers serving low-income 
populations performed initially less well but improved most over time, whereas we found 
facilities serving middle wealth populations with initial low coverage improved more 
over time than those with least poor populations. Moreover, while we found that the 
effect of P4P on coverage of institutional deliveries was greater for rural facilities in 
Tanzania, a US study found no association between performance on quality and 
rural/urban location (Ryan & Blustein 2011); and studies in the UK showed that P4P had 
less effect in rural than in urban areas (Gravelle et al. 2008; Kontopantelis et al. 2013).  
 
We found similar improvements on IPT2 coverage across facilities, which is in contrast 
to literature that suggests a design with a single threshold target, as used for IPT2, fails to 
account for baseline performance and can enhance divergence in performance (Eijkenaar 
2013; Heath et al. 1999; Mehrotra et al. 2010; Mullen et al. 2010; Rosenthal & Dudley 
2007; Rosenthal et al. 2005). Our finding might be explained by the almost universal 
coverage of one ANC visit in Tanzania (Binyaruka et al. 2015; TDHS 2016), and the 
nature of the targeted service (content of care, rather than service use) may have meant 
that minimal effort was needed for providers to achieve the target for IPT2.  
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Our results lend support to the notion that the incentive design, facility characteristics and 
the nature of services being targeted themselves, will determine how providers respond to 
P4P, their ability to achieve targets and receive bonus payouts, and the extent to which 
P4P leads to convergence or divergence in performance outcomes, or similar 
performance across providers. Although P4P is typically talked about as a single or 
uniform intervention, there is in fact substantial variation in incentive structures and 
scheme design across settings, and across the range of providers implementing P4P 
programmes (Eijkenaar 2013; Miller & Babiarz 2013).  Our study supports the fact that 
these design details are crucial, particularly when it comes to determining the 
distributional effects of P4P across providers, and whether P4P will enhance or reduce 
existing performance inequalities (Rosenthal & Dudley 2007; Rosenthal & Frank 2006; 
Rosenthal et al. 2005; Ryan et al. 2012).  Further research is needed to further examine 
the effects of incentive design on outcomes, and researchers should be encouraged to 
report on design aspects in their evaluations of P4P and systematically monitor and report 
subgroup effects across providers.   
 
In addition to potential consideration to incentive design to increase the likelihood of 
reducing performance inequalities with the introduction of P4P, a number of policies 
could be introduced to tackle structural factors that contribute to inequalities in 
performance.  For example, “equity bonuses” might be introduced to enhance 
performance among disadvantaged facilities so they benefit from payouts from the start 
(Fritsche et al. 2014; Meessen et al. 2011; Rosenthal & Dudley 2007). Facility readiness 
assessment studies and potential quality boosting investments are also important to 
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harmonise the capacity to deliver services prior to P4P. These are standard practices for 
most P4P programmes funded by the World Bank in LMICs, and the national P4P rollout 
programme in Tanzania has similarly incorporated these practices.   
 
This study has a number of limitations. First, the administrative data on payouts did not 
allow for a disaggregation of payouts by service indicator, and thus we used the total 
payout per cycle which reflects performance across all P4P indicators. Second, since 
information about payout distribution was limited to intervention facilities, our results 
represent associations rather than causal effects. Third, we used household data from a 
random sample of 20 households per facility to proxy service coverage at facility level 
and wealth status of the facility’s catchment population and these may have not been 
representative of the entire catchment populations surrounding facilities.  Furthermore, 
our analysis assumes that households in a facility’s catchment population would have 
used the facility for care seeking, whereas it is possible that households bypassed their 
nearest provider to seek care at higher level or more distant facilities.  Fourth, the finding 
of the convergence in coverage of institutional deliveries over 13 months may reflects a 
regression to the mean principle (a random fluctuation rather than a true causal effect) 
due to a ‘shorter term’ assessment (Barnett et al. 2005), although the distribution in terms 
of payouts over the ‘longer term’ of seven payment cycles showed a consistent pattern on 
convergence. Fifth, as our two service coverage outcomes differed both in terms of 
incentive design as well as the nature of the service being targeted, it was not possible to 
determine the extent to which the difference in provider performance response was due to 
the former or the latter.  Finally, because of sample size constraints, we examined 
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differential effects across facility subgroups using a three-way interaction term, and were 
unable to run separate models for each subgroup (subgroup effects) and compare their 
effects for better understanding of programme effect. We also classified baseline 
performance into two subgroups rather than five subgroups as used in the design, due to 
insufficient sample size. As a result, it was not possible to determine what effect the 
‘maintain coverage’ target had on performance relative to the ‘improve coverage’ target.   
 
Conclusion 
In this study, P4P rewarded better-off facilities (hospitals, health centres, facilities with 
more medical commodities, and serving wealthier populations), more than worse of 
facilities in the short term; but these inequalities in the distribution of bonus payouts 
declined over time as worse of facilities caught up. The effect of P4P on coverage of 
institutional deliveries was greater among facilities with lower levels of baseline 
coverage, with middle wealth catchment populations, and located in rural areas; whereas 
the increase in IPT2 coverage was similar across facility subgroups. Performance 
inequalities were influenced by the design of incentives and a range of facility 
characteristics, however, the nature of the service being targeted is also likely to have 
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Who benefits from increased service
utilisation? Examining the distributional
effects of payment for performance in
Tanzania
Peter Binyaruka1,2,3* , Bjarne Robberstad1, Gaute Torsvik3,4 and Josephine Borghi5
Abstract
Background: Payment for performance (P4P) strategies, which provide financial incentives to health workers and/or
facilities for reaching pre-defined performance targets, can improve healthcare utilisation and quality. P4P may also
reduce inequalities in healthcare use and access by enhancing universal access to care, for example, through
reducing the financial barriers to accessing care. However, P4P may also enhance inequalities in healthcare if
providers cherry-pick the easier-to-reach patients to meet their performance targets. In this study, we examine the
heterogeneity of P4P effects on service utilisation across population subgroups and its implications for inequalities
in Tanzania.
Methods: We used household data from an evaluation of a P4P programme in Tanzania. We surveyed about 3000
households with women who delivered in the last 12 months prior to the interview from seven intervention and
four comparison districts in January 2012 and a similar number of households in 13 months later. The household
data were used to generate the population subgroups and to measure the incentivised service utilisation
outcomes. We focused on two outcomes that improved significantly under the P4P, i.e. institutional delivery rate
and the uptake of antimalarials for pregnant women. We used a difference-in-differences linear regression model to
estimate the effect of P4P on utilisation outcomes across the different population subgroups.
Results: P4P led to a significant increase in the rate of institutional deliveries among women in poorest and in
middle wealth status households, but not among women in least poor households. However, the differential effect
was marginally greater among women in the middle wealth households compared to women in the least poor
households (p = 0.094). The effect of P4P on institutional deliveries was also significantly higher among women in
rural districts compared to women in urban districts (p = 0.028 for differential effect), and among uninsured women
than insured women (p = 0.001 for differential effect). The effect of P4P on the uptake of antimalarials was equally
distributed across population subgroups.
Conclusion: P4P can enhance equitable healthcare access and use especially when the demand-side barriers to
access care such as user fees associated with drug purchase due to stock-outs have been reduced.
Keywords: Inequality, Equity, Social determinants of health, Universal coverage, Distributional effects, Healthcare
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Introduction
Payment for performance (P4P) is a supply-side finan-
cing strategy which involves financial incentives being
paid to health workers and/or facilities for reaching pre-
defined performance targets. This approach started in
high-income countries (HICs) with the aim of improving
health care quality [24, 64, 65]. P4P is also increasingly
being used in low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs) to improve quality and use of health services,
as well as to strengthen health systems [31, 57, 89]. The
evidence base on the effectiveness of P4P is growing and
suggests mixed effects with notable improvements for
some incentivised indicators [9, 11, 17, 24, 26, 35, 61, 69,
73, 77].
However, most evaluations focus on average effects
and pay little attention to distributional effects across
provider or population subgroups [51]. There is, how-
ever, a growing awareness that average effects may mask
important heterogeneous programme effects [12, 13, 19,
22, 38, 41, 51]. This study examines the heterogeneity of
P4P effects on service utilisation across population sub-
groups. The overall goal is to display heterogeneous
treatment effects, and specifically to check if the effects
on population subgroups will reduce or enhance exiting
inequalities in access to and utilisation of health care
services.
Inequalities in access to and use of health services in
favour of wealthier populations are still prevalent in
many settings, with the greatest inequalities in the poor-
est settings [8, 15, 52, 56, 60, 68, 78, 79, 82, 84]. Factors
referred to as “social determinants of health” such as
economic status, education, location and age [21, 54, 60,
87], mostly drive these inequalities. From a theoretical
point of view, it is hard to know how P4P will affect pre-
existing inequalities. However, P4P can reduce inequal-
ities in access to healthcare, for example, by encouraging
providers to extend services to underserved groups (e.g.
by reducing financial barriers to access care) in a bid to
meet performance targets [31, 57]. On the other hand,
P4P could also enhance inequalities in access to health-
care if providers cherry-pick the easier-to-reach patients
in order to meet their performance targets [40].
Studies in HICs have found differential effects of P4P
on healthcare quality between socioeconomic groups in
favour of wealthier populations (pro-rich) but this effect
declined over time. These studies have not found any
differential effect with respect to age, sex and ethnicity
[2, 14, 24, 80]. Evidence from LMICs is more limited
and varied across service types [63]. For example, the ef-
fect of P4P on institutional delivery rates was greater
among wealthier groups (pro-rich) in most settings [17,
46, 77] but there was an indication that it was greater
among poorer groups (pro-poor) in Tanzania[11]. The
effect of P4P on institutional deliveries was greater
among women with health insurance in Rwanda [46] or
a maternity care voucher in Cambodia [77] than their
counterparts. The effect of P4P on family planning
coverage was greater among wealthier groups (pro-rich),
in Rwanda [46], and the effect on immunisation cover-
age was greater among poorer groups (pro-poor), in
Burundi [17]. However, studies based on Rwanda
Demographic Health Survey (DHS) data reported no
differential effect by socioeconomic groups on the
use of maternal care [62] and on child curative care
seeking [72].
To date, most studies on differential effects of P4P
have disaggregated the effect of P4P across population
economic status particularly in LMICs, with little atten-
tion to other social determinants (e.g. education, occu-
pation, and age), which are also known to affect the use
of health services [4, 60], including maternal health ser-
vices [30, 32, 71]. The assessment of programme differ-
ential effects across various social determinants in a
broad perspective is crucial to inform universal access
policies [28, 53, 60], and may help to understand how
different service users are affected by a programme such
as P4P [63]. In this paper, we examine the differential ef-
fect of P4P on service utilisation in Tanzania across a
variety of population subgroups by stratified analyses ac-
cording to various social determinants.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section pre-
sents the conceptual framework, followed by the de-
scription of the P4P programme in Tanzania. The other
sections include the methods and analysis, followed by
the results, discussion and conclusion.
Conceptual framework
P4P programmes give providers incentives to change
their behaviour to improve the quality of care in order
to enhance utilisation and obtain financial rewards [66].
Based on this logic P4P can improve average service util-
isation and the distribution of improved utilisation
across population subgroups through the supply-side re-
sponse (how providers respond to incentives) and the
resulting demand-side response that triggers (how pa-
tients respond to supply side changes).
Supply-side response
To meet performance targets aimed at increasing the
quantity of services provided, providers are likely to
adopt strategies to attract more patients to facilities [31,
57]. One such strategy could be to make services more
affordable [57], for example by reducing user fees, or by
reducing drug stock-outs, avoiding patients having to
procure drugs privately [10, 11]. Another strategy could
be to improve responsiveness to service users, for ex-
ample, by being kinder during service delivery [11].
However, providers might also attempt to cherry-pick
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patients or focus on easy-to-reach populations (i.e.
underserved but easily reached) in order to meet the
performance targets [25, 40], leaving the hard-to-reach
(i.e. poorest with greatest need) underserved. In fact,
providers may need to exert greater effort and time to
serve the hard-to-reach [37]. The efficiency gains in that
case can be reached but at the expenses of inequity [47].
Demand-side responses
According to Andersen’s behavioural model of health-
care utilisation [3, 4], the use of health services is a func-
tion of patient’s propensity to use services (predisposing
factors), factors that facilitate or impede access and use
(enabling factors), as well as perceived need for health-
care (need factors). These factors among others are also
social determinants of health [21, 54, 74]. The interac-
tions between a P4P programme (supply-side response)
and social determinants (demand-side factors) may
affect the use and distribution of health services. For ex-
ample, reduced financial barriers to access care, resulting
from provider response to incentives, may stimulate de-
mand especially for poor and/or uninsured individuals,
since they are more responsive to a change in healthcare
costs consistent with demand theory [33, 49]. Demand
for health services may also increase if the quality of care
supplied is improved [1]; for example, through increased
drug availability and better interpersonal care [10, 11].
Better-off populations (e.g. wealthier, educated, and
urban residents) may also benefit more from quality im-
provements simply because they use services more than
their counterpart populations [8, 15, 21, 32, 54, 68, 81].
Despite the potential interactions between the demand
and supply-side response to P4P, the health care sector
does not operate like a classic free market [6, 61]. For
example, the demand-side response may be weak when
some demand-side barriers to access care (e.g. cultural
and information barriers) are unaffected by the supply-
side response to incentives [27, 48, 61, 88].
P4P in Tanzania
In 2011, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare
(MoHSW) in Tanzania with support from the Govern-
ment of Norway introduced a P4P scheme as a pilot in
Pwani region. The scheme aimed to improve maternal
and child health (MCH) and inform the national P4P
roll out. Pwani is one of 30 regions in the country and
has seven districts with more than 209 health facilities.
It has a population of just over a million [59]. All health
facilities providing MCH services in the region were eli-
gible to implement the P4P scheme. The P4P scheme in-
volved a series of performance targets for facilities that
were set in relation to the coverage of specific services
(e.g. institutional delivery) or for care provided during a
service (e.g. uptake of antimalarials during antenatal
care) (Table 1), as described in more detail elsewhere
[11, 18]. Performance was rewarded based on two
methods of target setting: single and multiple thresholds
targets. The strategies to reach performance targets were
left to the discretion of the health workers at the individ-
ual facilities. District and regional managers were also
eligible to receive performance payouts based on the
performance of the facilities in their district or region.
The extent to which facilities were successful in
achieving performance targets determined the level of
bonus payout they would receive as part of the
programme. Full payment was made if 100% of a given
target was achieved, and 50% of payment was made for
75% < 100% achievement, while no payment was made
for lower levels of performance. The maximum payout if
all targets were fully attained was USD 820 per cycle for
dispensaries; USD 3220 for health centres and USD
6790 for hospitals. The payouts were additional to the
funding facilities receive to cover operational costs and
salaries of health workers. Incentive payouts at the
facility-level included bonuses to staff (equivalent to 10%
of their monthly salary if all targets were fully attained)
and funds that could be used for facility improvement or
demand creation initiatives (10% of the total in hospitals
and 25% in lower level facilities). District and regional
managers received bonus payments of up to USD 3000
per cycle.
To determine whether performance targets were met,
performance data were compiled by facilities and verified
by the P4P implementing agency every six months (one
cycle) before distributing payouts.
The P4P programme was the subject of a process and
impact evaluation. The impact evaluation showed a sig-
nificant positive effect on two out of eight incentivised
service indicators: institutional delivery rate and
provision of antimalarial during antenatal care [11]. P4P
was also associated with a number of process changes
such as increased availability of drugs and supplies, in-
creased supportive supervision, a reduced chance of pay-
ing user fees, and greater provider kindness during
delivery care [5, 10, 11, 55].
Methods
Study design
Our study used data from a controlled before and after
evaluation study of the P4P scheme in Pwani region,
Tanzania, described elsewhere [11, 18]. All seven dis-
tricts in Pwani region (intervention arm), and four dis-
tricts from Morogoro and Lindi regions (comparison
arm) were sampled. The comparison districts were se-
lected to be comparable to intervention districts in
terms of poverty and literacy rates, the rate of institu-
tional deliveries, infant mortality, population per health
facility, and the number of children under one year of
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age per capita [18]. Baseline data collection was done in
January 2012, with a follow-up survey 13 months later.
Sampling and data source
In the intervention arm, we included all 6 hospitals and
16 health centres that were eligible for the P4P scheme,
and a random sample of 53 eligible dispensaries. A simi-
lar number of facilities were included in the comparison
arm. Facilities were randomly sampled amongst those
where P4P was implemented and matching comparison
facilities were selected based on facility level of care,
ownership, staffing levels, and case load [18]. To assess
maternal and child health service utilisation in the popu-
lation, we randomly sampled 20 households of women
from the catchment area of each health facility who had
delivered in the 12 months prior to the survey. In total,
we surveyed 3000 households with eligible women in
both arms at baseline, and a similar number in the
follow-up survey. The household survey also collected
information on maternal background characteristics (e.g.
age, marital status, education occupation, religion, and
number of births), and household characteristics (e.g.
household size, health insurance status, and ownership
of assets and housing particulars for assessing the house-
hold socioeconomic status).
Outcome variables
Our outcome variables include the two incentivised ser-
vices which we know from prior analysis improved
significantly as a result of P4P: institutional deliveries
and uptake of two doses of intermittent preventive treat-
ment (IPT2) for malaria during antenatal care [11].
These were measured as binary outcomes for whether a
woman gave birth in a health facility and received IPT2
during antenatal care, respectively.
Generation of subgroups for distributional analyses
To examine the distribution of P4P effects on these two
outcomes, we generated population subgroups based on
individual and household-level characteristics, accord-
ing to Andersen’s behavioural model of healthcare utilisa-
tion [3, 4]. In this study we only considered predisposing
and enabling factors since data on perceived illness was
not available. “Perceived illness” could also be argued to
be of less relevance for maternal service utilisation
outcomes, since study participants were largely healthy.
Subgroups of predisposing factors include: marital sta-
tus (married vs. none), maternal age (15–49) years
(below vs. above the median age of 25), education (no
education vs. primary level/above), occupation (farmer
vs. non-farmer), religion (Muslim vs. non-Muslim),
number of births/parity (parity 1 vs. parity 2/above), and
household size (below vs. above the median size of 5
members). Subgroups of enabling factors include: health
insurance status (any insurance vs. none), place of resi-
dence (rural vs. urban district), and household wealth
status subgroups. The wealth subgroups were generated
from wealth scores derived by the principal component
Table 1 Service indicators and performance targets for facilities implementing P4P in Tanzania







71 − 85% 85%+
Coverage indicators
% of institutional deliveries Percentage point
increase
15% 10% 5% 5% Maintain 85%+
% of mothers attending a facility within 7 days of delivery. Percentage point
increase
15% 10% 5% 5% Maintain 85%+
% of women using long term contraceptives Percentage point
increase
20% 15% 10% Maintain above
71%
Maintain 85%+
% children under 1 year received measles vaccine Overall result 50% 65% 75% 80%+ Maintain 85%+
% children under 1 year received Penta 3 Overall result 50% 65% 75% 80%+ Maintain 85%+
% of complete partographs Overall result 80% 80% 80% 80%+ Maintain above
80%
HMIS reports submitted to district managers on time and
complete
Overall result 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Content of care indicators
% ANC clients receiving two doses of IPT Overall result 80% 80% 80% 80%+ Maintain above
80%
% HIV+ ANC clients on ART Overall result 40% 60% 75% 75%+ Maintain 85%+
% of children receiving polio vaccine (OPV0) at birth Overall result 60% 75% 80% 80%+ Maintain 85%+
The United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. 2011. The Coast Region Pay for Performance (P4P) Pilot: Design Document
85% + = 85% or more; 80% + = 80% or more; HMIS Health Management Information System, ANC Antenatal care
Binyaruka et al. International Journal for Equity in Health  (2018) 17:14 Page 4 of 16
analysis based on 42 items of household characteristics
and asset ownership (Appendix 1: Table 5) [29, 83]. The
household wealth scores were generated separately for
baseline and follow-up samples, since participants dif-
fered over time. Households were ranked by wealth
scores from poorest (low score) to least poor and classi-
fied into three-equal sized groups (terciles): poorest,
middle and least poor. Subgrouping based on five-equal
sized groups (quintiles) were also generated to examine
the sensitivity of the findings to different wealth
subgroupings.
Statistical analysis
We first compared the sample means of individual and
household-level characteristics at baseline between inter-
vention and comparison arms, and assessed whether the
differences between arms were statistically significant by
using t-tests. We then assessed the distribution of ser-
vice utilisation outcomes at baseline across population
subgroups by estimating the utilisation gap (i.e. a differ-
ence in average service use between two subgroups)
[87]. We used t-tests to test whether the utilisation gaps
were significantly different from zero.
To examine whether the effects of P4P on outcomes
differed across population subgroups, we first performed
subgroup analyses to identify the P4P effect on each sub-
group, and then tested the significance of differential ef-
fects between subgroups through analysing the
interaction effect. We identified the average effect of
P4P on service utilisation by using a linear difference-in-
differences regression model. This model compares the
changes in outcomes over time between participants in
the intervention and comparison arms as specified in
Eq. (1):
Y ijt ¼ β0 þ β1 P4P j  δt
 þ β2δt þ β3Xijt þ γ i
þ εijt ð1Þ
where Yijt is the utilisation outcome (institutional deliv-
eries or uptake of IPT2) of individual i in facility j’s
catchment area and at time t. The intervention dummy
variable P4Pj takes the value 1 if a facility is in the inter-
vention arm and 0 if it is in the comparison arm. The
unobserved time invariant facility characteristics γj were
controlled for through facility fixed-effects estimation;
and included δt for year fixed effects. We also controlled
for individual and household-level covariates Xijt (age,
education, occupation, religion, marital status, parity, in-
surance status, household size, and household wealth
status) as potential confounders. The error term is εijt.
We clustered the standard errors at the facility level, or
facility catchment area, to account for serial correlation
of εijt at the facility level. The effect of P4P on utilisation
for each subgroup is given by β1.
To test the significance of an eventual differential ef-
fect across subgroups, we included a three-way inter-
action term between the average treatment effect
(P4Pj × δt) and a subgrouping variable Gi (based on pre-
disposing and enabling factors). The associated two-
order interaction terms were also included in the model.
The coefficient of interest is β4 which indicates the dif-
ferential effect of P4P across subgroups as shown in Eq.
(2):
Y ijt ¼ β0 þ β1 P4P j  δt
 þ β2δt þ β3Xijt
þ β4 P4P j  δt  Gijt
 
þ β5 P4P j  Gijt
 þ β6 Gijt  δt
 þ γ j
þ εijt ð2Þ
The use of the difference-in-difference approach to es-
timate the effect of P4P on outcomes relies on the key
identifying assumption that the trends in outcomes
would be parallel across study arms in the absence of
the intervention [41]. While this can never be formally
tested, we supported the assumption by verifying that
the pre-intervention trends in utilisation outcomes at
the household level were parallel across study arms as
described elsewhere [11]. By surveying women who had
delivered in the past 12 months at baseline, four longitu-
dinal outcomes were generated and used to verify the as-
sumption: share of institutional deliveries, caesarean
section deliveries, women who breastfeed within one
hour of birth, and women who paid for delivery care.
We further performed several robustness checks. First,
we re-estimated the P4P differential effect by using
wealth quintiles instead of wealth terciles to examine
whether the results were sensitivity to wealth group clas-
sification. We also generated wealth status subgroups for
each study arm and re-estimated the P4P differential ef-
fect by arm-based wealth subgroups to avoid the pre-
existing baseline imbalance in wealth status between
arms. Second, we re-estimated the regression model by
including three-way interactions with categorical vari-
able which gives multiple subgroups (e.g. education
levels, occupation categories, parity groups and age
groups) instead of interactions with binary variables (e.g.
married vs. none). Third, we applied a non-linear logit
model instead of linear model because of binary out-
come variables. Fourth, we clustered the standard errors
at the district level instead of facility level and used a
bootstrapping method to adjust for the small number of
clusters [20]. All the analyses were performed by using
STATA version 13.
Results
The majority of individual and household characteristics
were similar across intervention and comparison arms at
baseline (Table 2). Exceptions were women in the
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intervention arm, who were more likely to be married,
non-farmers, and Muslim; and their households were
more likely to be poor than their counterparts in the
comparison arm.
The baseline rates of institutional deliveries in
both arms were significantly lower for women in the
poorest and middle wealth households, and for
women who were illiterate, farmers, with parity
greater than one than for their counterpart women
(Table 3). The rate of institutional deliveries was also
higher among intervention women with health insur-
ance and from smaller households, as well as among
urban women in the comparison arm than among
their counterparts. The baseline uptake of IPT2 was
generally similar across arms and population sub-
groups, except married women in the comparison
arm, who were more likely to receive IPT2 than un-
married women (Table 3).
P4P significantly increased the rate of institutional
deliveries among women in the poorest and in the
middle wealth status households, but not among
women in the least poor households (Table 4). How-
ever, when compared with the least poor subgroup,
the effect of P4P was only marginally greater among
women in the middle wealth status households only
(p = 0.094 for differential effect) (Table 4). The effect
of P4P on institutional deliveries was also significantly
higher among women in rural districts compared to
women in urban districts (p = 0.028 for differential ef-
fect), and among uninsured than insured women (p =
0.001 for differential effect). There were no differen-
tial effects of P4P on institutional deliveries among
other subgroups, and no differential effects of P4P on
the IPT2 outcome across any population subgroups
(Table 4).
Our results were generally consistent following ro-
bustness checks. When we used wealth quintiles in-
stead of terciles, the effect of P4P on deliveries was
significantly higher in lower quintiles (indication of
pro-poor) compared to the effect in the top quintile
(least poor), but the results on IPT2 remained the
same (Appendix 2: Table 6). When we used the arm-
based wealth subgroups, the differential effect by
quintiles on both outcomes remained broadly un-
changed, but the differential effect by terciles on de-
liveries disappeared and appeared marginally for IPT2
(Appendix 2: Table 6). The effect of P4P on both out-
comes remained equally distributed across categorical
Table 2 Baseline individual woman and household characteristics by study arms
Characteristics Description/subgroup Intervention arm (n =
1376)
Comparison arm (n =
1468)
Difference
Panel A: Predisposing factors
Marital status =1 for married woman (%) 69.9 64.2 5.7b
Age Mean maternal age (15–49) years [SD] 26.5 [6.7] 26.3 [6.5] 0.2
Age =1 for younger below median age (25 years) (%) 50.9 50.5 0.4
Education =1 for primary education/above (%) 80.3 80.2 0.1
Occupation =1 for farming activities (%) 46.0 54.5 –8.5b
Religion =1 for Muslim woman (%) 86.5 66.6 19.9a
Parity Mean number of births [SD] 2.7 [1.8] 2.6 [1.7] 0.1
Parity =1 for one birth (%) 32.4 31.6 0.8
Household size Mean number of household members [SD] 4.7 [1.8] 4.8 [1.8] −0.1
Household size =1 for small/below the median size of 5 members
(%)
51.1 50.5 0.6
Panel B: Enabling factors
Health insurance status =1 for insured woman (%) 8.6 8.5 0.1
Household wealth
status
Mean household wealth index [SD] −0.43 [2.7] 0.34 [3.3] −0.77b
Wealth status –tercile 1 =1 for poorest household (%) 38.3 29.4 8.9b
Wealth status –tercile 2 =1 for middle wealth household (%) 33.6 33.3 0.3
Wealth status –tercile 3 =1 for least poor household (%) 28.1 37.3 −9.2b
Place of residence =1 for rural district (%) 79.3 84.1 −4.8
SD=Standard Deviation; Subgroups of predisposing factors include: marital status (married vs. none), maternal age (15–49) years (below vs. above the median age
of 25), education (no education vs. primary level/above), occupation (farmer vs. non-farmer), religion (Muslim vs. non-Muslim), number of births/parity (parity 1 vs.
parity 2/above), and household size (below vs. above the median size of 5 members); Subgroups of enabling factors include: health insurance status (any insur-
ance vs. none), place of residence (rural vs. urban district), and household wealth status subgroups (wealth terciles); adenotes significance at 1%, bat 5%, and cat
10% level
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subgroups of education, occupation, parity and age
(Appendix 3: Table 7). Some changes in the results
were noted with the use of a logit model, the pro-
middle wealth and pro-rural effect on deliveries disap-
peared but all other results including the pro-
uninsured effect remained the same (Appendix 4:
Table 8). When standard errors were clustered at the
district-level instead of at facility-level, the differential
effect on deliveries by health insurance and wealth
status disappeared, and women from larger house-
holds increased institutional deliveries more than
their counterparts, but all other results including
the pro-rural effect remained unchanged (Appendix
5: Table 9).
Discussion
This study examined the distribution of P4P effects on
service utilisation outcomes across population subgroups
in Tanzania. This is the first study in LMICs to examine
who is really benefiting from the effects of P4P across a
broad range of population characteristics which aligns
with the social determinants of health framework. We
found that P4P increased institutional deliveries more
among women in middle wealth status households,
among the uninsured, and among women living in rural
areas than among wealthier, insured, and urban residing
women. However, these differential effects were sensitive
to the analytical specifications used during the robust-
ness checks. The effect of P4P on IPT2 was equally
Table 3 Baseline levels of service utilisation by subgroups across study arms
Outcome variable/ subgrouping variable Intervention arm Comparison arm
Yes No Gap Yes No Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OUTCOME 1: Institutional deliveries (n = 1376) (n = 1468)
Predisposing factors
Married woman (%) 84.8 84.7 0.1 86.7 87.0 −0.3
Woman below median age of 25 years/younger (%) 85.4 84.2 1.2 87.3 86.4 0.9
Woman with primary education/above (%) 85.9 80.4 5.5b 89.8 74.8 15.0a
Woman doing farming for occupation (%) 79.1 89.6 −10.5a 82.6 91.9 −9.3a
Muslim woman (%) 84.7 85.4 −0.7 87.5 85.5 2.0
Woman with one birth/parity 1 (%) 90.1 82.3 7.8a 92.5 84.3 8.2a
Household size below the median size of 5 members (%) 87.2 82.3 4.9b 87.3 86.4 0.9
Enabling factors
Woman with any health insurance (%) 89.9 84.3 5.6c 83.3 87.1 −3.8
Household with poorest wealth status (Tercile 1) (%) 83.3 91.7 −8.4a 80.5 94.2 −13.7a
Household with middle wealth status (Tercile 2) (%) 80.8 91.7 −10.9a 84.2 94.2 −10.0a
Household in rural district (%) 83.9 88.0 −4.1 85.8 92.3 −6.5c
OUTCOME 2: Uptake of IPT2 (n = 1029) (n = 1.199)
Predisposing factors
Married woman (%) 51.0 47.0 4.0 59.3 51.7 7.6b
Woman below median age of 25 years/younger (%) 48.7 51.1 −2.4 55.5 57.6 −2.1
Woman with primary education/above (%) 50.9 45.1 5.8 57.5 52.9 4.6
Woman doing farming for occupation (%) 48.5 51.1 −2.6 56.3 56.9 −0.6
Muslim woman (%) 49.9 50.4 −0.5 58.2 53.5 4.7
Woman with one birth/parity 1 (%) 48.0 50.8 −2.8 57.9 56.1 1.8
Household size below the median size of 5 members (%) 50.7 49.1 1.6 55.3 57.9 −2.6
Enabling factors
Woman with any health insurance (%) 45.6 50.4 −4.8 61.6 56.1 5.5
Household with poorest wealth status (Tercile 1) (%) 47.8 49.6 −1.8 59.7 54.2 5.5
Household with middle wealth status (Tercile 2) (%) 52.6 49.6 3.0 56.9 54.2 2.7
Household in rural district (%) 50.4 48.1 2.3 56.7 56.4 0.3
We used a t-test to test the null hypothesis of a gap (column 3 and 6) equals to zero; Tercile 3 (least poor) was the reference category for Tercile 1 and 2; adenotes
significance at 1%, bat 5%, and cat 10% level
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distributed across population subgroups, and was robust
across various analytical specifications. Our results show
a declining trend in inequality to access institutional de-
liveries since service use improved most for subgroups
which initially showed low utilisation rates; while the ab-
sence of inequality in uptake of IPT2 at baseline main-
tained after the introduction of P4P.
The greater impact of P4P on the use of institutional
deliveries among women in the middle wealth
households and uninsured than wealthier and insured
respectively, is likely in part due to the increased adher-
ence to user fee exemption policy among public facilities
as well as the improved availability of drugs, minimising
the need to pay for drugs in private pharmacies [5, 10,
11, 27, 39, 43, 45, 85, 86, 90]. The worse-off groups
which experienced a greater P4P effect were also more
responsive to a change in healthcare costs [33, 49]. This
is consistent with our conceptual framework and
Table 4 Effect of P4P on service utilisation outcomes by population subgroups
Subgrouping variables Institutional deliveries Uptake of IPT2
Average subgroup effect Differential
effect test
(p-value)
Average subgroup effect Differential
effect test
(p-value)
N Beta N Beta
Marital status
Married 3869 7.7a (p = 0.564) 3253 10.2a (p = 0.927)
Unmarried 1878 9.1b 1504 9.1
Maternal age
Younger below the median age 2914 8.5a (p = 0.553) 2336 9.6b (p = 0.841)
Older above the median age 2833 7.2b 2421 9.8b
Education
Some education 4611 8.9a (p = 0.378) 3877 9.3a (p = 0.780)
No education/illiterate 1136 5.9 880 16.5c
Occupation
Farmer 2950 11.5a (p = 0.133) 2434 16.0a (p = 0.167)
Non-farmer 2797 5.6b 2323 5.6
Religion
Muslim 4376 9.7a (p = 0.435) 3623 10.5a (p = 0.562)
Non-Muslim 1371 3.9 1134 6.0
Parity/births
One birth 1886 9.7a (p = 0.517) 1510 9.3c (p = 0.882)
Two or more births 3861 7.6a 3247 10.3a
Household size by members
Small size (< 5) 2996 5.1c (p = 0.173) 2476 7.7c (p = 0.964)
Large size (≥5) 2751 10.4a 2281 9.9b
Health insurance
Insured 475 −7.6 (p = 0.001) 429 20.1c (p = 0.932)
Uninsured 5272 9.7a 4328 10.4a
Household wealth subgroups
Tercile 1 (poorest) 1940 11.4b (p = 0.232) 1559 14.5b (p = 0.158)
Tercile 2 (middle) 1916 10.2a (p = 0.094) 1576 16.2a (p = 0.149)
Tercile 3 (least poor) 1891 3.7 Reference 1622 2.6 Reference
Place of residence
Rural district 4694 9.9a (p = 0.028) 3851 11.4a (p = 0.349)
Urban district 1053 0.9 906 3.3
Beta is the estimated P4P effect on a specific subgroup in percentage point after controlling for a year dummy, facility-fixed effects, and individual and
household-level covariates (age, education, occupation, religion, marital status, parity, health insurance status, household size, and household wealth status); Each
cell for Beta and differential effect reports the result from a separate regression; Differential effect test is a t-test of the null that the coefficient on the three-way
interaction between the P4P effect and subgrouping indicator is zero; adenotes significance at 1%, bat 5%, and cat 10% level
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demand theory, whereby the supply-side responses of re-
ducing the financial barriers to access delivery care in
turn stimulated the demand-side responses on service
utilisation mostly among the disadvantaged population.
The finding that the increased uptake of IPT2 was
similar across population subgroups may be ex-
plained by the already almost universal access to one
antenatal care visit in Tanzania (above 97%) [11, 75,
76]. In an effort to achieve the IPT2 target, pro-
viders likely encouraged women to return for subse-
quent antenatal care visits to receive at least two
doses of IPT. This represents a relatively easy task
for most providers because continuation of care
needs less effort than its initiation [34]. Although
the provision of IPT is within the control of pro-
viders, it also depends on the available stock of anti-
malarial drugs for IPT. Another reason for the lack
of differential effect on IPT2 may have been the pre-
existing balance in the uptake of IPT2 across popu-
lation subgroups at baseline. This is the first study
to examine whether P4P had a differential effect on
the uptake of IPT for malaria during antenatal care
in LMICs. In Burundi, Bonfrer et al. [17] examined
the differential effect of P4P on other contents of
antenatal care and found a pro-rich effect on blood
pressure measurement and a lack of differential ef-
fect on the uptake of anti-tetanus vaccination across
socioeconomic groups.
The pro-middle wealth effect of P4P on institutional
deliveries, as an indication of being pro-poor, is con-
trary to the pro-rich effect on deliveries reported in
Burundi [17], Rwanda [46] and Cambodia [77]. The
pro-rich effect in Cambodia was attributed to the lack
of effective demand among the poorest women due to
user fees [77]; whereas in Burundi it was attributed to
other costs like transport because the user fees for
deliveries were removed prior to P4P [17]. However, a
pilot study in Burundi [16] and a study using demo-
graphic and health survey (DHS) data in Rwanda [62]
found no differential effect on deliveries by household
wealth status; and the results in the later study were
attributed to low and uniform coverage of services at
baseline. In the Democratic Republic of Congo pro-
viders implementing P4P negotiated user fees with
communities and raised revenues without hurting the
poorest [73], but the equity effects of this approach
were not assessed empirically. Further evidence of a
pro-poor effect of P4P has been shown on immunisa-
tion services in Burundi [17], and on quality of care
improvement in high-income countries especially in
the United Kingdom [2, 14, 23, 24, 80].
Moreover, our study found that institutional deliveries
improved more in rural than in urban areas, while there
was no differential effect on institutional deliveries by
place of residence in Rwanda [62]. In Rwanda, the
minimal number of urban clusters compared to
rural clusters were thought to limit the power to
detect the differential effect by place of residence
[62], while our study had a slightly higher number
of urban clusters compared to Rwanda (i.e. 28 ver-
sus 22 urban clusters). In the United Kingdom, the
effect of P4P on quality of care was greater in urban
areas than in rural areas [36, 42], while there was
no differential effect of P4P on quality of care by
rural–urban area in the United States [67].
We found a greater P4P effect on institutional de-
liveries among uninsured women, whereas a greater
effect on deliveries was found among women with
health insurance in Rwanda [46] and a maternity care
voucher in Cambodia [77]. The findings from Rwanda
and Cambodia were attributed to reduced financial
barriers to access care [46, 77], and this could be the
case with a stronger enforcement of fee exemptions
in Tanzania [11].
However, another study in Rwanda based on DHS, as
nationally representative data, found no differential ef-
fect on deliveries by health insurance status [62]. A
greater P4P effect on deliveries among uninsured
women in Tanzania, is partly because the baseline insti-
tutional delivery rate was already higher among insured
than uninsured women in the intervention arm. A fur-
ther reason could be that uninsured women were more
responsive to reduced healthcare costs compared to in-
sured women who were already covered. It is also likely
that the statistical power to detect the effect among
women with insurance was limited because few women
are insured in Tanzania [58], compared to other coun-
tries like Rwanda [50, 70].
Furthermore, we found a similar distribution of insti-
tutional delivery rates and IPT2 uptakes across age
groups prior to P4P, and the effect of P4P was equally
distributed across age groups, which is contrary to P4P
studies in high-income countries as they found inequal-
ities in quality of care across age groups existed and per-
sisted after the introduction of P4P [2, 14, 24, 80].
Overall our findings imply that when P4P results in
supply side responses that reduce demand-side bar-
riers to accessing care, it can enhance equity in ser-
vice utilisation. P4P also appears less likely to show a
differential effect when there is a similar level of ser-
vice utilisation in a given indicator across population
subgroups prior to an intervention. This study sup-
ports the argument that P4P can enhance equity in
access for services where there is a pre-existing in-
equity in coverage, and where efforts to remove the
demand-side financial barriers to access care have
been made [28, 31, 44, 57, 86]. Thus, to ensure P4P
reduces inequities in access to care, policy makers
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should consider introducing complementary measures
to reduce demand-side access barriers. P4P is likely
to be most effective at reducing inequities in settings
where they offer free health services or there is high
coverage of pre-payment schemes.
To make progress towards universal health cover-
age and achieve sustainable development goal three
especially in LMICs, more efforts are needed to
stimulate demand for and supply of healthcare ser-
vices [57, 86, 90]. Further insights on how supply
and demand side interventions interact and comple-
ment each other to affect outcomes are needed.
Moreover, because the social determinants of health
as sources of inequalities emerge from different sec-
tors, strategies within the health sector alone cannot
reduce inequalities in access and use of health ser-
vices [21, 54].
This study has a number of limitations. First, our
study may have been underpowered to detect the ef-
fect of P4P in some groups, for example among in-
sured women and urban residents, possibly due to
the more limited sample size within sub groups. Sec-
ond, our results of differential effects on deliveries by
wealth status, health insurance and place of residence,
were not consistent across all analytical specifications
used in robustness checks (i.e. non-linear model, and
district level clustering of standard errors). However,
the differential effects on deliveries for other sub-
groups of social determinants, and differential effects
on IPT2, were robust to all analytical specifications
used. Third, our finding that P4P reduces inequalities
in service utilisation might be reflective of a regres-
sion to the mean principle (a random fluctuation ra-
ther than a true causal effect) because of having a
short term evaluation [7]. Lastly, we restricted our
distributional analysis to the outcomes which im-
proved significantly under P4P. Although the inequal-
ities in service use may happen with an outcome
which showed insignificant P4P effect on average, our
focus was limited to how the increased average util-
isation effects were distributed across population
subgroups.
Conclusion
In Tanzania, the effect of P4P on institutional deliver-
ies was greater among women in middle wealth
households, in rural areas and among the uninsured
women than their counterparts. P4P effect on the up-
take of IPT2 was equally distributed across population
subgroups. Our finding suggests that P4P can en-
hance equitable healthcare access and use especially




Table 5 Items used to construct household wealth status score
No. Variable description
1. Asset: electricity
2. Asset: working radio
3. Asset: working television (TV)
4. Asset: working DVD
5. Asset: working mobile phone
6. Asset: working landline phone
7. Asset: working iron
8. Asset: working refrigerator
9. Asset: working wall watch
10. Asset: sewing machine
11. Asset: table




16. Household member with a bank account
17. Number of sleeping rooms
18. Source of drinking water: piped water
19. Source of drinking water: borehole/ covered well
20. Source of drinking water: open well
21. Source of drinking water: spring water
22. Source of drinking water: river/ dam/pond/lake
23. Toilet type: flush toilet
24. Toilet type: pit latrine
25. Toilet type: no/ other toilet
26. Source of cooking energy: electricity
27. Source of cooking energy: kerosene/paraffin
28. Source of cooking energy: charcoal
29. Source of cooking energy: firewood
30. Source of light: electricity
31. Source of light: solar
32. Source of light: kerosene/ paraffin
33. Source of light: candle/ firewood
34. Source of light: torch or other source
35. Floor material: sand/earth/dung
36. Floor material: cement
37. Floor material: other
38. Wall material: grass/poles/mud wall
39. Wall material: bamboo with mud wall
40. Wall material: sundried/ burnt bricks
41. Wall material: cement blocks
42. Wall material: stones with mud
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Appendix 2
Table 6 Effect of P4P on service utilisation by different categories of wealth status and by arm-based wealth subgroups
Wealth subgrouping variables Institutional deliveries Uptake of IPT2
Average subgroup effect Differential
effect test
(p-value)
Average subgroup effect Differential
effect test
(p-value)
N Beta N Beta
Panel A: Wealth subgroups
Three wealth subgroups (Terciles)
T1 1940 11.4b (p = 0.232) 1559 14.5b (p = 0.158)
T2 1916 10.2a (p = 0.094)c 1576 16.2a (p = 0.149)
T3 1891 3.7 Reference 1622 2.6 Reference
Five wealth subgroups (Quintiles)
Q1 1170 13.8b (p = 0.079)c 929 13.6c (p = 0.166)
Q2 1158 8.8c (p = 0.069)c 939 16.3b (p = 0.102)
Q3 1143 8.2c (p = 0.034)b 938 21.8a (p = 0.120)
Q4 1146 11.4a (p = 0.015)b 979 14.4b (p = 0.175)
Q5 1130 −0.5 Reference 972 1.9 Reference
Panel B: Arm-based wealth subgroups
Three wealth subgroups (Terciles)
AT1 1917 10.2b (p = 0.293) 1540 13.8b (p = 0.117)
AT2 1913 9.2b (p = 0.156) 1568 18.3a (p = 0.084)c
AT3 1917 3.9c Reference 1649 2.5 Reference
Five wealth subgroups (Quintiles)
AQ1 1149 15.3a (p = 0.089)c 914 16.8b (p = 0.108)
AQ2 1151 6.6 (p = 0.230) 935 15.2b (p = 0.139)
AQ3 1147 12.3b (p = 0.001)a 949 14.6b (p = 0.156)
AQ4 1152 9.9b (p = 0.022)b 972 7.7 (p = 0.310)
AQ5 1148 0.3 Reference 987 0.5 Reference
adenotes significance at 1%, bat 5%, and cat 10% level; Beta is the estimated P4P effect on a specific subgroup in percentage point after controlling for a year
dummy, facility-fixed effects, and individual and household-level covariates (age, education, occupation, religion, marital status, parity, health insurance status,
household size, and household wealth status); Each cell for Beta and differential effect reports the result from a separate regression; Differential effect test is a
t-test of the null that the coefficient on the three-way interaction between the P4P effect and subgrouping indicator is zero
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Appendix 3
Table 7 Effect of P4P on service utilisation by subgroups for categorical variables
Subgrouping variables Institutional deliveries Uptake of IPT2
Average subgroup effect Differential
effect test
(p-value)
Average subgroup effect Differential
effect test
(p-value)N Beta N Beta
Education subgroups
No education 1136 5.9 Reference 880 17.0b Reference
Some primary 459 4.1 (p = 0.550) 355 9.1 (p = 0.479)
Primary/some secondary 3729 11.3a (p = 0.157) 3148 12.1a (p = 0.965)
Secondary/above 423 3.8 (p = 0.276) 374 −9.8 (p = 0.144)
Occupation subgroups
Formal sector 113 −17.4 (p = 0.715) 99 −5.1 (p = 0.329)
Farmers 2950 11.6a (p = 0.162) 2434 15.9a (p = 0.777)
Self-employed 1167 7.7b (p = 0.650) 996 1.1 (p = 0.132)
Unemployed 1517 3.9 Reference 1228 16.8a Reference
Birth parity subgroups
Parity 1 1886 9.8a Reference 1510 9.3c Reference
Parity 2 1353 3.4 (p = 0.215) 1123 7.0 (p = 0.583)
Parity 3 1029 10.9b (p = 0.766) 868 0.4 (p = 0.317)
Parity 4 664 3.3 (p = 0.342) 570 3.2 (p = 0.567)
Parity 5+ 815 13.3c (p = 0.700) 686 30.0a (p = 0.038)
Age subgroups
Age (15–19) years 965 11.5a Reference 726 19.2b Reference
Age (20–24) years 1613 9.7a (p = 0.366) 1322 4.2 (p = 0.708)
Age (25–29) years 1459 4.2 (p = 0.568) 1232 7.3 (p = 0.820)
Age (30–34) years 978 4.9 (p = 0.510) 846 10.3 (p = 0.666)
Age (35+) years 732 15.5a (p = 0.446) 631 20.4b (p = 0.218)
adenotes significance at 1%, bat 5%, and cat 10% level; Beta is the estimated P4P effect on a specific subgroup in percentage point after controlling for a year
dummy, facility-fixed effects, and individual and household-level covariates (age, education, occupation, religion, marital status, parity, health insurance status,
household size, and household wealth status); Each cell for Beta and differential effect reports the result from a separate regression; Differential effect test is a
t-test of the null that the coefficient on the three-way interaction between the P4P effect and subgrouping indicator is zero
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Appendix4
Table 8 Effect of P4P on service utilisation by subgroups –using the non–linear logit model
Subgrouping variables Institutional deliveries Uptake of IPT2
Average subgroup effect Differential
effect test
(p-value)
Average subgroup effect Differential
effect test
(p-value)N (dy/dx) N (dy/dx)
Marital status
Married 3385 9.2a (p = 0.503) 3253 9.2a (p = 0.935)
Unmarried 1338 13.3a 1481 9.8c
Maternal age
Younger below the median age 2361 11.2a (p = 0.492) 2336 9.2b (p = 0.830)
Older above the median age 2325 9.1a 2421 9.5b
Education
Some education 4021 10.9a (p = 0.070) 3877 8.6a (p = 0.793)
No education/illiterate 900 9.1 816 16.5c
Occupation
Farmer 2638 13.4a (p = 0.590) 2396 16.0a (p = 0.149)
Non-farmer 2126 7.5b 2295 5.3
Religion
Muslim 3991 10.8a (p = 0.497) 3614 9.7a (p = 0.554)
Non-Muslim 980 5.6 1061 7.8
Parity/births
One birth 1180 15.2a (p = 0.122) 1476 9.9c (p = 0.939)
Two or more births 3436 9.3a 3247 10.0a
Household size by members
Small size (< 5) 2381 7.3b (p = 0.320) 2464 7.6c (p = 0.903)
Large size (≥5) 2299 12.8a 2281 9.1b
Health insurance
Insured 171 −20.7 (p = 0.012) 315 18.3 (p = 0.900)
Uninsured 4820 11.1a 4328 10.1a
Household wealth status
Tercile 1 (poorest) 1656 13.4b (p = 0.894) 1508 13.2b (p = 0.145)
Tercile 2 (middle) 1528 12.7a (p = 0.737) 1539 17.1a (p = 0.106)
Tercile 3 (least poor) 1066 8.2b Reference 1599 2.4 Reference
Place of residence
Rural district 4387 11.3a (p = 0.152) 3851 11.2a (p = 0.268)
Urban district 787 1.6 906 1.7
Non-linear logit model with FE, covariates, clustering at HF level; Logit with FE cuts down the sample size; dy/dx is the estimated partial P4P effect on a specific
subgroup in terms of marginal effect after controlling for a year dummy, facility-fixed effects, and individual and household-level covariates (age, education, occu-
pation, religion, marital status, parity, health insurance status, household size, and household wealth status); Each cell for dy/dx and differential effect reports the
result from a separate regression; Differential effect test is a t-test of the null that the coefficient on the three-way interaction between the P4P effect and sub-
grouping indicator is zero; a denotes significance at 1%, bat 5%, and c at 10% level
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